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THORP - Thermal oxide reprocessing plant 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past few years, nuclear energy has been experiencing somewhat of a 
“renaissance”: having for a long time been perceived as a source of environmental and 
safety risks, nuclear energy is today increasingly seen as a solution to the problems of 
climate change and energy security. While the Fukushima nuclear accident has again 
changed the context, with a number of countries imposing moratoria on the further 
construction of nuclear power, many Western countries nevertheless are continuing to 
renew their nuclear programmes (e.g. the USA, Finland, France, the UK), or revisiting 
their earlier policy of phasing out nuclear energy (e.g. Spain and Sweden). 
 
The renewed interest in nuclear energy brings to the spotlight the technical 
development of the so-called third and fourth generation nuclear reactors. The future 
of these new technologies is intimately linked to considerations concerning the 
perceptions and appraisal of risk, given the centrality of such considerations to the 
social acceptability of the new technologies. The history of nuclear energy 
demonstrates that the country-specific context significantly shapes the perceptions, 
appraisal and the management of risks.  
 
In the past, the evolution of nuclear energy has frequently experienced periods of 
“renaissance” and great expectations, associated with the promise of new, more 
efficient and less costly technologies such as fusion and fast breeder reactors. While 
the visions of the exploitation of nuclear fusion are situated in a relatively distant 
future, the fast breeder technology, by contrast, might become viable at a large scale 
within a few decades, provided that sufficient institutional support is in place. Yet, as 
the history of fast breeder reactors both in France and elsewhere has shown, the great 
expectations have often been followed by periods that have proven difficult – even 
traumatising – for the nuclear industry. However, we do not postulate determinism: 
hype-deception cycles are an outcome of a complex interplay of actors situated in 
their historical and social context. 
 
This report explores the evolution of the fast breeder nuclear reactor programmes in 
the UK, from the period of great promises and expectations in the 1950s and 1960s 
towards their progressive abandonment in the 1980s and 1990s. The project, of which 
this report is an element, aims thereby to draw lessons relevant for the current 
“nuclear renaissance” and medium-term planning on the future of nuclear power. 
Given that the fast breeder programmes were closely interlinked with the general 
evolution of nuclear power in the UK, this report includes a fairly detailed historical 
description of this more general ‘nuclear context’. This primarily chronological 
description of the evolution of the UK fast breeder programmes provides a basis for a 
comparison between the evolution of the British and French fast breeder reactor 
programmes. A central question in such a comparison concerns the lateness of the 
abandonment of the fast breeder programme in France, as compared to most other 
countries developing this technology. The cross-country comparison will explore the 
relative influence of the contextual and historical conditions within which the nuclear 
technologies have evolved in France and the UK on the one hand, and the ‘universal’ 
factors common to the evolution of socio-technical systems in general on the other. 
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This exploratory research was based on documentary analysis and eleven interviews 
of experts involved in, or with knowledge of, the UK fast breeder reactor (FBR) 
programmes. The interviewed persons and their primary affiliations (rationale for 
their selection as interviewees) were as follows: 
 
UK AEA 
1. Gregg Butler, University of Manchester 
2. Christine Brown 
 
CEGB 
3. Leslie Mitchell 
4. An anonymous former CEGB employee 
 
Academics 
5. Steve Thomas, University of Greenwich, economics and energy policy 
6. Gordon MacKerron, SPRU, economics 
7. Andy Stirling, SPRU, science and technology studies 
8. William Walker, University of St. Andrews, Professor in International 
Relations 
9. William Nuttall, University of Cambridge, Judge Business School, 
engineering and technology policy 
10. A social scientist wishing to remain anonymous 
 
Independent consultants/experts 
11. Alex Henney 
12. Walt Patterson  
 
An obvious challenge was of ‘temporal’ character: it was not always easy to find 
individuals that would have information and experience concerning the programme 
that was terminated almost two decades ago.  
 
Section 2 of the report traces the evolution of the UK civil nuclear programme since 
its origins in the 1940s. The report then explains the early development and the 
challenges in the construction and operation of the experimental and prototype fast 
breeder reactors in Dounreay. The chronological description ends by a presentation of 
the plans to construct a commercial fast breeder reactor – plans eventually abandoned 
in 1994. The report then concludes by a exploring a number of different explanations 
suggested by the interviewees and present in the documents concerning the reasons 
for the ups and downs in the evolution of the UK fast breeder programme. 
 
The historical description of the history of the UK nuclear and fast breeder history is 
largely based on works by two authors. The period from 1940 to the mid-50s relies 
mainly on Margaret Gowing’s works, whereas information for the subsequent years 
stems primarily from Walt Patterson’s books and publications. Gowing, a historian, 
was commissioned by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority to write a 
history of the UK nuclear power sector from its start up to the early 1950s, in “Britain 
and Atomic Energy 1939-1945” and a two-volume series “Independence and 
deterrence: Britain and atomic energy, 1945-1952”. Patterson, in turn, is an 
independent energy analyst, and a former NGO activist (founding member of the 
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Friends of the Earth UK), whose books (1984; 1985) and a more recent summary of 
FBR development in the UK (Patterson 2010) provide a narrative of the nuclear 
power programme, drawing facts from sources such as official records, scientific 
journals, and the media. Numerous articles critical towards the UK nuclear policy and 
fast breeder programme were also used as basis for the report. Patterson was also one 
of our interviewees. 
 
On the whole fast breeder reactors did not seem to have occupied a central position in 
the UK debate on nuclear power, let alone the debate on energy policy in general. 
Instead, key topics of public and political debate concerned the choice between coal 
and nuclear, the choice of the preferred thermal reactor technology especially in the 
1970s, and the desirability of reprocessing of nuclear waste. The period of most lively 
discussion on the FBRs was certainly in the 1970s and early 1980s, not least because 
of the numerous committee reports and inquiry processes, which helped bring to the 
public arena notable cost estimates concerning of the construction of FBRs. In the 
relatively scarce academic literature on the topic, economic analysis seemed to 
dominate, with the journal “Energy Policy” as a major outlet and most of the authors 
rather critical towards the fast breeder policy in particular and UK nuclear energy 
policy in general (e.g. Rush et al. 1977, Collingridge 1984, Henney 1987; 1989; 1994, 
Sweet 1982; 1990, Holmes 1987). More political discussions were reported in 
professional and specialised press such as the “Bulletin of Atomic Scientists” and 
“New Scientist”, or in general science journals such as “Nature and Science”. Later 
analysis, following the practical termination of the UK FBR programme, has touched 
upon the issue from a broader perspective of social and political sciences (e.g. Parker 
and Surrey 1995; Walker 1999; 2000) and energy forecasting (Utgikar and Scott 
2006). Finally, a substantial body of literature consists of articles written by FBR 
advocates, many of whom were staff employed by the AEA (e.g. Cutts 1977, Hirsch 
and Farmer 1986, and Judd and Ainsworth 1998). 
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II. THE INCEPTION OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME 
(FROM 1940) 
 
Figure 1: General UK Nuclear Programme Timeline 
 
Sources: Patterson (1982; 2010), Gowing & Arnold (1979), World Nuclear Association (2011),  
NDA (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
2.1 Military ambitions 
 
The development of civil nuclear power in the UK was intimately linked with the 
country’s ambitions to develop an atomic bomb in the early 1940s. At the early stages 
of the programme, the harnessing of “the atom” for energy production was generally 
seen as an example of the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes – in the 
post-war atmosphere a powerful image of new technology converted into socially 
useful purposes. The link between military and civilian uses of nuclear energy was 
also an essential determinant for the subsequent evolution of the fast breeder 
programme.  
 
2.1.1 The early pioneers (early 1940s) 
 
Nuclear fission research was initially suggested in the memorandum ‘on the properties 
of a radioactive “superbomb”’, prepared by two British physicists from the University 
of Birmingham, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls. The report proposed that uranium 235 
(U235) could be separated through an industrial process and used to create an atomic 
bomb. This so-called Frisch-Peierls memorandum was forwarded to the Scientific 
Survey of Air Defence and of Air Warfare, which established the so-called Maud 
Committee, thereby marking the beginning of Britain’s atomic research. The Maud 
Committee, formed to investigate the possibilities of creating an atomic bomb, 
collaborated with the French scientists von Halban and Kowarski in Cambridge on 
‘slow chain reactions’ research, and discovered plutonium, which could be used for 
developing nuclear weapons and energy (Gowing & Arnold 1979, 14).  
 
The Maud Committee published a report in 1941 reiterating the feasibility of 
developing the atomic bomb by making U235 through the enrichment process and/or 
plutonium with nuclear boilers. The report convinced the Americans to restructure 
their previous uranium programme and proposed to establish a joint British-American 
project, but the British were less keen to move their project to the US. Thus the 
Americans carried on independently establishing the Manhattan Project in June 1942, 
which due to its massive scale was run by the army. In August 1942 the US succeeded 
in separating the first pure form of plutonium based on the knowledge from the Maud 
Report. The American efforts had quickly outpaced the British, who came to the 
realisation that in order to progress with their own atomic research, they would have 
to collaborate with the US. However, the Americans were less than enthusiastic to 
join forces and sought instead to secure their own source of uranium by stockpiling 
the entire uranium output from the Eldorado mines in Canada. Eventually Churchill 
and Roosevelt signed the Quebec Agreement in 1943 creating a Combined Policy 
Committee that was to allocate uranium supplies according to each nation’s 
requirement. The Quebec Agreement stipulated that atomic weapons information 
could not be disseminated or used against third parties unless agreed by both 
countries. A year later, in 1944, a draft agreement was presented to the Combined 
Policy Committee proposing that Americans, British, and Canadians collaborate in 
order to secure uranium supplies during the war. As a result, the “Combined 
Development Trust” was established as a collaboration between the US, the UK, and 
Canada (Gowing 1964). 
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In the early 40s, Britain sent as many scientists as possible involved in U235 and fast 
neutron bomb research to join the research project in the United States in order to 
quickly produce an atomic bomb.  However, suspicious about Britain’s motives, 
Americans denied British scientists access to plutonium production sites and some 
sections of the project. Moreover, the Halban and Kowarski’s team working on slow 
chain reaction was moved to Canada to develop a nuclear boiler using heavy water as 
a moderator. Canada’s relative proximity to the US would better facilitate the flow of 
ideas and resources. Thus in a brief time the core team involved in Britain’s early 
atomic research work was dispersed throughout North America (Gowing & Arnold 
1979; Gowing 1964, 71, 135, 269; Edwards 1996).  
 
2.1.2 The Atomic Project (mid-1940s) 
 
Britain, concerned with maintaining a good relationship with the US, was hesitant to 
divert its scientists away from the joint research project before reaching its military 
objectives. However, not all aspects of the research were directed towards war efforts. 
In particular, some streams of Britain’s research in the US on electromagnetic 
separation were geared towards non-military applications. Although the primary 
objectives were of purely military nature, Britain wished to develop its own nuclear 
plants after the war and establish a nuclear energy project for both civil and military 
purposes. This would require a continuation of the British-American collaboration 
even after the war.1  
 
Meanwhile, Britain did not wish to passively wait until the end of the war before 
establishing a nuclear power production facility. Churchill announced to the House of 
Commons in November 1945 that Britain would develop its own atomic bomb. But at 
that point, no ministerial committee existed to oversee nuclear-related issues. A semi-
formal group of Cabinet Ministers known as ‘Gen 75’ gathered on an ad hoc basis to 
address atomic energy issues including domestic policy development, international 
atomic control, and British-American cooperation. In October 1945 a formal research 
institution, the Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) was established with 
members originating from the British-American research team. AERE was overseen 
by the Ministry of Supply, an existing department responsible for coordinating 
military supplies and had industry links in the chemical and engineering sector.  
 
In November 1946, the Ministry of Supply’s authority over Britain’s civil and military 
atomic project was formally legalised in the Atomic Energy Act. Fast reactors had a 
key long-term role in this programme (Judd and Ainsworth 1998, 609). Several 
months later, in December, the Ministers granted approval for the development of 
experimental graphite reactors or ‘piles’2 for plutonium production. The research 
facility was built in AERE’s establishment in Harwell, Oxfordshire and lead by 
Professor John Cockcroft. A zero-energy test assembly, ‘ZEPHYR’, was built at 
Harwell and used for basic fast reactor neutron physics studies (Judd and Ainsworth 
1998, 609). The production unit, with both military and non-military objectives, was 
located in Risley, Lancashire, and was headed by Christopher Hinton (Gowing 1964; 
                                                
1 An example of such collaboration was the Hyde Park Aide-Mémoire, signed in September 1944 
between the US and Britain, to develop tube alloys for military and non-military applications. 
2 A ‘pile’ is the early nuclear reactor with a core built with layers of graphite and intermittent layers of 
uranium oxide (Atomic Archive 2011). 
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Gowing 1974b). From the onset, Harwell was given special privileges due to the 
perceived significance of the expected research outcomes. Cockcroft himself was also 
offered a privileged position and would only have to report to the Minister and his 
Permanent Secretary within the Ministry of Supply. Harwell’s research and 
development laboratory, run mainly by physicists, was thus secured to freely choose 
its research topics, guided by its own interests, although the laboratory’s main purpose 
was to provide information for the experimental piles. In order to drive scientific 
discoveries, the establishment was to draw from the top scientists, institutions and 
universities, requiring flexible administrative process and readily accessible funds. As 
a result, there was little control over expenditures and the manner in which funds were 
distributed. 
 
Figure 2. Location of AEA sites at the end of 1990s.  
(At this time the AEA’s activity had already been strongly phased down, including the 
closure of the Springfield site in Lancashire) 
 
 
Source: HSE 1998, 6 
 
The research establishment at Harwell would essentially function as an academic 
research laboratory, publishing work without compromising military security. The 
production branch of Britain’s atomic project in Risley was run by an acclaimed 
engineer, Christopher Hinton. He took charge of the design, construction and 
operation of the large-scale production plants, despite Britain’s initial reservations to 
avoid large fissile production facilities. 
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The relationship between Risley and Harwell was precarious from the start. The 
research establishment focused on programmes based on ‘curiosity-oriented research’, 
where there were no specified areas identified for practical future uses and there were 
no expectations set to produce results that would lead to benefits (Gowing 1974a, 
207). On the other hand, the production organisation, dominated by engineers, was 
more interested in ‘action research’, which focused on working towards specific 
applications that would lead to an intended benefit and not only on furthering 
knowledge (Gowing 1974b, 237). However, at least initially, the industrially oriented 
organisation also had to depend on Harwell’s research.  Harwell’s scientists were also 
at times reluctant to accept general programmes (orders, commands and timetables) 
by Risley’s engineers, who needed to meet plant deadlines. Furthermore, when 
projects succeeded, Harwell publicly took credit for the achievements since Risley’s 
involvement had military implications and could compromise national security. 
Eventually, Risley set up its own applied research and development capabilities in 
1949 and Harwell its own industrial engineering branch (Gowing 1974a). 
 
The first pile constructed at Harwell was the 3kW Graphite Low Energy Experimental 
Pile (GLEEP), which went critical3 in August 1947. The pile was based on work 
completed by the British-Canadian research team and was built as an experimental 
pile for testing instruments and designs, as well as making radioactive isotopes. 
Following the construction of GLEEP, the British Experimental Pile ‘0’ (BEPO), an 
air-cooled, graphite moderator fuelled by natural uranium, was built in June 1946 with 
6000kW of operating power. Only two years later, in July 1948, BEPO went critical 
with relatively little difficulties. This success gave British engineers and scientists the 
confidence to scale-up BEPO and to build ‘super-Harwell’ piles, thereby paving the 
way for Britain’s first commercial reactor. Crucially, Britain’s brief experience with 
the experimental piles at Harwell would set the design for fast breeder reactors over 
the next two decades (Gowing 1964; Gowing 1974b). 
 
While work was underway on the experimental piles at Harwell, the Ministers 
formally approved the production of atomic bombs in January 1947. Britain sensed an 
urgency to develop atomic weapons in order to prevent the Americans from 
monopolising atomic weapons production, particularly with the deterioration of the 
British-American cooperation, aggravated in 1946 by the McMahon Bill passed in the 
United States. The McMahon bill placed restrictions on sharing scientific and 
technical information on nuclear technology with other countries, including US allies. 
Britain also feared Russia’s progress in developing an atomic bomb.4 Mounting 
pressure to catch up with the Americans and Russians became an issue of national 
pride and a need to retain a balance of power. The British politicians reasoned that if 
                                                
3 In nuclear fission, criticality occurs when the critical mass, i.e. the smallest amount of fissile material 
needed for a sustained nuclear chain reaction, is achieved. The number of neutrons produced from the 
fission process as well as the power generated in the system remains constant. 
4 According to the report published by the Joint Technical Warfare Committee of the Chiefs of Staff in 
1946, it would have taken several hundred atomic bombs to devastate Russia but only 30 to 103 atomic 
bombs from Russia to bring down Britain – although the report did not explicitly define Russia as an 
enemy. 
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the UK succeeded in producing the atomic bomb, the Americans would view them 
more favourably and consider them as their special ally (Gowing 1974a, 15).  
 
The initial atomic plan was to focus on plutonium production for military needs. 
Hence, in March 1946 the decision was made to construct the Springfield uranium 
metal processing plant in Preston under Hinton’s leadership. The uranium processing 
plant would convert uranium ore to canned uranium metal slugs, feed material for the 
Windscale piles and Magnox reactors, which would in turn produce plutonium (see 
Figure 3 for UK’s plutonium and uranium-235 production route). 
 
Figure 3: Production of fissionable materials: the plutonium route and the 
uranium-235 route 
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Sources: Patterson (1984; 1985; 2010); Gowing (1974); Hinton (1953); Westinghouse (2006); NDA (2011). Henney 
1989; World Nuclear Association, 2010 
 
Windscale Gas-cooled Piles 
(1950-startup): (Piles No. 1 & 
No. 2) Military use- uranium 
metal as reactor feedstock for 
plutonium production 
  
Conversion & Fuel 
Fabrication  
Reprocessing PLUTONIUM OPTION  
Nuclear Boilers    
NUCLEAR BOILERS 
Plutonium Use 
Military use 
(bombs) 
Civilian use 
B205 chemical separation 
plant at Windscale (1964 
start up)-  reprocess spent 
metal fuel from 
commercial Magnox 
reactors. Built for civil 
fuel but also used for 
plutonium for weapons   
B204 military metal 
reprocessing plant and 
finishing plant at 
Windscale (1952 start up)-  
separate plutonium, used 
uranium, and uranium 
fission products from 
Windscale and dual use 
Magnox Reactors 
(reactors in Calder Hall) 
Springfield uranium metal 
processing plant: convert 
yellowcake to uranium metal 
(rods and prepare slugs) 
Springfield plant (1946): 
convert uranium yelllowcake 
into uranium  hexafluoride 
(UF6)  
Pilot-scale 
reprocessi
ng plant at 
Dounreay 
(1958) - 
for DFR 
and 
DMTR 
THORP 
reprocessin
g plant 
(1989-start 
up)- 
reprocess 
high burn 
up oxide 
fuel from 
AGR, and 
URANIUM OPTION  
Enrichment 
Capenhurst (1984 start up) – 
high separation gaseous 
diffusion plant enrichment for 
nuclear fuel. Enrich uranium 
up to 3-4% fissile U235 for 
AGRs and the PWR 
Capenhurst (1952 start up)- 
low-separation gaseous 
diffusion plant to  re-enriched 
pure uranium separated from 
the irradiated slugs in the 
Windscale B204 reprocessing 
plant for duel purpose use 
(re-enriched from ~0.4% 
fissile U235 to the natural 
level of 0.7%) 
PWR Pressurised Water 
Reactor (1994-startup) at 
Sizewell B: enriched uranium 
as fuel (spent fuel stored 
onsite until 2015) 
AGR Advanced Gas-cooled 
reactor – prototype (1963 first 
power producton) – 7 
commercial twin units  (1976- 
first power production): 
enriched oxide as fuel 
DFR Dounreay Fast Reactor 
(1959 start up) – 60 MWth, 
mixed oxide 
uranium/plutonium as fuel. 
DMTR Dounreay Materials 
Test Reactor (1958 start up) 
25 MWth, mixed oxide as 
fuel.   
PFR Prototype Fast Reactor 
(1974-went critical) –
660MWth mixed oxide as 
fuel 
Magnox reactors (1956 start 
up): built for duel military and 
civil use with a total of 26 
reactor. Uranium metal as 
reactor feedstock for 
plutonium production 
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With the decision to make the atomic bomb, Britain also contemplated on building a 
gaseous diffusion plant in the mid-1940s to produce enriched uranium - though the 
plant would be constructed only in the 1950s. The choice to build a U235 plant was 
based on the assumption that uranium supplies would be limited, on economic 
calculations, and on the need to secure a long-term future for nuclear energy 
production. Expected shortages of uranium supplies meant that recycling was seen as 
an attractive option either by mixing the used uranium from the ‘irradiated fuel 
elements’ and adding in enriched uranium in a gas diffusion plant or through 
‘seeding’, that is, by adding plutonium with the fuel elements. Adding U235 for re-
enrichment, however, would produce almost three times more military grade 
plutonium compared to seeding with plutonium. The uranium plant would also 
provide an economic means of supplying raw materials for the atomic bomb. 
Crucially, research and development for the use of U235 was expected to lead into 
further research for nuclear power development with the fast reactor which would 
produce more fissile material than it would consume. The decision to start uranium 
enrichment was therefore based on the logic that was to underpin the subsequent 
development of fast breeder reactors, i.e. the belief that “any large-scale exploitation 
of atomic energy” should “ultimately depend on this breeding” (Gowing 1974a). 
Although the uranium processing plant in Springfield was built with military needs in 
mind, scientists and engineers had already thought of using U235 for fast breeder 
reactors to produce energy (Gowing 1974a; Henney 1989; World Nuclear Association 
2011).  
  
Therefore, developing an atomic bomb independently from the United States was not 
only an issue of national pride and self-sufficiency, but also an investment in a future 
technology that would strengthen Britain’s power industry. This was particularly 
important, since sourcing labour for mining coal was becoming increasingly difficult.  
Consequently the Directive on Priority for Atomic Energy was set in 1947, 
emphasising the importance of nuclear energy development in the UK.  
 
2.1.3 Windscale reactors (from late 1940s to 1950s) 
 
As work proceeded at Springfield, plans went ahead for a large-scale production 
programme. Initially, Britain considered building a water-cooled pile for plutonium 
production, similar to the design used in the Manhattan project. The water-cooled 
piles presented certain technical difficulties and safety concerns due to corrosion. The 
pile also required large quantities of pure water.  The only appropriate location for a 
large-scale water-cooled pile was identified near the Morar River in the west of 
Scotland, which nevertheless lacked transportation routes and facilities. Hinton 
proposed to build one air-cooled pile and another pressurised gas-cooled pile. The 
first pile would produce plutonium and draw on the experience from the experimental 
gas-cooled piles while the second, modified from the original gas-cooled pile, would 
operate at high temperatures enabling the generation of power and the production of 
plutonium. The pressurised gas-cooled pile would require more time to construct, but 
Hinton argued that the design was superior to the water-cooled pile. However, the 
ministers were hesitant to build the pressurised gas-cooled pile, which would slow 
down construction and plutonium production but would speed up the overall 
development of atomic energy technology. Despite the gas-cooled piles’ higher 
capital and operating cost, relative to other reactors, Britain pushed forward with a 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
large-scale gas-cooled piles programme in May 1947, abandoning the water-cooled 
and pressurised cooled pile design.  
 
The gas-cooled piles and its auxiliary plants were built at Windscale and the uranium 
metal processing plant in Springfield built in 1946 would provide the fuel for the 
piles. The first uranium casts were produced at Springfield uranium metal processing 
plant in 1948. Approval to build a third Windscale pile was granted in February 1949 
along with the Capenhurst low-separation gaseous diffusion plant in 1950, but work 
on this third pile was put on hold at the end of 1949.  
 
Windscale pile No. 1 went critical in 1950 and pile No. 2 in 1951. However, 
overheating issues at pile No. 1 lead to the decision to shut down the plant in 1952. 
Nevertheless, progress continued with the programme and in 1952, the B204 military 
reprocessing plant and finishing plant was commissioned at Windscale followed by 
the B205 chemical separation plant in Windscale that started up in 1964. In October 
1952 Britain tested its first atomic bomb in Monte Bello, Australia, thereby 
demonstrating to the world that it possessed the military and industrial capabilities to 
pursue its own atomic programme. Monte Bello was seen as an important 
accomplishment and a significant step towards establishing the foundation for nuclear 
energy generation over the next decades (Gowing 1974a; World Nuclear Association 
2011).  
 
 
2.2 The civil nuclear power programme 
 
After the war, the civil use of nuclear power gradually gained importance along with 
the military objectives that had until then dominated research and development in the 
area. 
 
2.2.1 Motivations for the nuclear programme and the creation of the AEA 
(1950s) 
 
Britain’s involvement in the production of the atomic bomb helped establish the 
necessary institutions, research organisations, and technological infrastructure needed 
to develop a civil nuclear power programme. However, a number of technical 
challenges, institutional conflicts, and external political and economic events 
significantly influenced the technological pathway of nuclear reactors. Although 
Harwell and Risley encountered numerous issues related to technology, costs, 
efficiency and timeliness, the nuclear programme was perceived to progress well early 
on. There was limited transparency despite the fact that Harwell, in theory, was to 
function like an academic institution. In practice, the research and production 
laboratories were forbidden to openly discuss their problems and challenges. As a 
consequence, “the task seemed deceptively smooth and easy, so much so that 
disillusionment was to lie ahead” (Gowing 1974b).  
 
Nevertheless, British scientists and engineers won the government’s support for the 
development of the atomic bomb and also saw the potential in producing energy from 
plutonium production. Ministers, most notably Lord Cherwell, one of the first 
ministers knowledgeable on science and technological implications associated with 
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nuclear power, recognised that just as the atomic bomb had transformed warfare, there 
was potential for nuclear power to revolutionise energy production for industrial 
needs. Thanks to the political backing, nuclear research and development received 
significant funding and after the war, the military motivations slowly gave way to 
large-scale nuclear power production as the main focus of the country’s nuclear 
programme. 
 
Early in the 1950s Lord Cherwell was advocating the establishment of a new special 
organisation that would be ‘more flexible than the normal civil service system’ to 
replace the Ministry of Supply’s responsibility over nuclear energy. In April 1953, 
Churchill announced that a new organisation would be established. He therefore 
convened an advisory committee that subsequently produced an influential report 
“The Future Organisation of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Project”. Following 
the report’s recommendations, the Atomic Energy Act was passed in 1954, leading to 
the establishment of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (AEA). The AEA 
took responsibility for the development of nuclear reactors for the new civil energy 
programme as well as the military defence programme (Henney 1989; World Nuclear 
Association 2011). In 1954 the AEA had nearly 20,000 employees – but by 1961 the 
number of staff had more than doubled to 41 000.5 
 
2.2.2 British reactor technologies (1950s to 1980s) 
 
The launching of a civil nuclear energy programme was officially announced in 1953. 
The Windscale piles served as a transient rector that would shift the military atomic 
programme to a primarily civil one. The new reactor was to be built on the existing 
Windscale design, with three main alterations:  
 pressurised cooling gas was used in order to increase the electricity output and 
temperature, and to improve thermal efficiency to drive the steam turbine;  
 gas (carbon dioxide) instead of air was used as a coolant due to its good heat-
transfer capabilities and minimal neutron absorption; and 
 magnesium was used as the cladding.   
 
The new Magnox (Magnesium non-oxidising) reactor was the first dual purpose 
commercial reactor built in the UK. The first order commissioned was the 70MW 
twin whose construction began at Calder Hall, Windscale, in August 1953. Only three 
years later, in 1956, Queen Elizabeth opened the world’s first commercial reactor. The 
push for Magnox reactors was supported by the White Paper 'A Programme of 
Nuclear Power’ published in February 1955, which declared the first wholly 
commercial nuclear energy programme. The paper identified immediate, mid-term, 
and long-term reactor designs. First, the gas-cooled reactor programme would be 
developed under the responsibility of the Central Electricity Authority, using the 
Magnox design to build a capacity of 1400-1800 MWe by 1965. The Magnox reactors 
would produce plutonium and heat that could be used for energy (Patterson 1985; 
Ham and Hall 2006).   
 
The next planned reactor design would be a liquid-cooled design, capable of reaching 
higher temperatures. These reactors were expected to be initially more costly to build 
                                                
5 http://www.caithness.org/fpb/dounreay/history/ 
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but would eventually become more economical. The fuel for the liquid-cooled design 
would derive from enriched uranium and plutonium from the Magnox reactors. The 
third reactor programme would be based on long-term research and development 
towards fast breeder reactors using fuel from the first Magnox reactor programme 
(Hirschfelder 1955). The Suez crisis in 1956 and mounting worries over the 
availability of coal and oil further drove the Magnox programme. Another White 
Paper released in April 1957 proposed to expand the nuclear power programme to 
around 5000-6000 MWe. The electricity would be produced by 19 Magnox stations, 
expected to be built by 1965. This was anticipated to make up around 25% of UK’s 
generating capacity, at an expected cost of 750 million GBP (Ham and Hall 2006). 
 
The Central Electricity Authority was transformed in September 1957 into the Central 
Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) and Hinton was appointed to lead the utility – a 
position he came to hold until 1964 (Cisler 1991). The ambitions of the Magnox 
programme were scaled down, for a variety of reasons. The reactor was costly, had 
low thermal efficiency (22-28%), required significant amount of graphite, and also 
needed reprocessing, because of corrosion in the magnesium alloy cladding when the 
spent fuel was stored in water.6 Eventually a total of twenty-six Magnox stations were 
built and started up between 1962 and 1971 for power generation (around 4200 MWe) 
and plutonium production. Furthermore, each reactor was built as a standalone 
prototype by private consortia,7 which limited the ability to learn and correct mistakes. 
Consortia were needed in the UK nuclear industry as there were no existing segments 
of the industry that possessed all the capabilities needed to build new nuclear stations 
(e.g. electrical and civil engineering, boiler production, reactor physics). Also, the 
consortia were to compete for tenders to build nuclear plants in the new nuclear 
programme (Henney 1989; Ham & Hall 2006; World Nuclear Association 2011; 
Patterson 1985). 
 
Although the Magnox was initially perceived as a promising technology, the reactor 
later proved to be more costly than anticipated. According to CEGB figures, the 
Magnox construction costs often exceeded budgeted costs (see Table 1). Furthermore, 
according to Patterson (1985, 10), electricity generation prices for Berkeley and 
Bradwell increased from the original tender price of less than £150/KW to £167/KW 
even before the plants began to operate in 1962. 
 
A further problem for the UK nuclear programme appeared in October 1957 when a 
fire broke at Windscale, producing the most serious nuclear accident in the UK. The 
fire “brought the euphoria of the first age of nuclear energy to an abrupt end”, as both 
Windscale Piles were shut down following the accident, never to be re-started.8 The 
fire permanently tarnished the reputation of the Windscale complex, and eventually 
                                                
6 The magnesium alloy, used in cladding unenriched uranium metal fuel with a non-oxidising covering 
to contain fission products, was easily corroded in water, and therefore prevented long-term storage of 
spent fuel in water. 
7 “Four consortia, each led by one of the country's major manufacturers of heavy electrical plant – 
Associated Electrical Industries (AEI), the General Electric Company (GEC), English Electric and C. 
A. Parsons – had been set up by 1955; another was added in 1956. The Authority provided design 
information and held courses to train staff from the consortia in the subtleties of nuclear engineering.” 
(Patterson 1985, 5) 
8 Munn, Andy: UKAEA – The first fifty years. http://www.caithness.org/fpb/dounreay/history/ 
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prompted in 1981 the decision by the British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) to try and wipe 
away the bad memories by changing the plant's name to Sellafield (Walker 2007).9 
 
Table 1: Costs of selected Magnox reactors10 
 
Reactor Budgeted cost  
(£ millions) 
Actual cost  
(£ millions) 
Cost overrun 
(%) 
Berkeley 144 185 28% 
Bradwell 143 175 22% 
Hinkley Point A 120 154 28% 
Trawsfynydd 123 158 28% 
Dungeness A 119 119 0% 
Sizewell A 101 106 5% 
Oldbury 108 114 6% 
Wylfa 118 124 5% 
 
Sources: CEGB 1967 & 1977 cited in Henney, 1989 
 
The Second Nuclear Power Programme announced in April 1964 aimed to generate 
5000 MWe of nuclear electricity between 1970 and 1975 and assigned the CEGB the 
responsibility to choose a new reactor design. The reactor choice was between the 
AEA's advanced gas-cooled reactor based on the prototype Windscale Advanced Gas-
cooled Reactor and the American-designed water-cooled reactors, which was 
favoured by the CEGB. The CEGB and the AEA disagreed over the reactor choice but 
eventually the AGR was chosen as the standard UK reactor in May 1965. According 
to Winskel (2002, 443), “the AGR was essentially an upgraded Magnox design, using 
enriched uranium fuel and higher operating temperatures.”11 The AGRs were also 
built with graphite and used carbon dioxide as coolant but unlike the Magnox 
reactors, which used uranium metal fuel, the AGRs used enriched oxide fuel in a 
ceramic state, increasing thermal efficiency to around 40%. But since competing 
industry consortia were building the different AGRs, the process was hampered by the 
same lack of standardisation that had undermined the success of the Magnox 
programme. The construction of the AGRs also ran behind schedule and was 
burdened with problems of financing. In total, seven stations with twin reactors were 
built and brought on-line between 1976 and 1989.  
 
The 1970s were a period of confusion and upheaval in the UK nuclear policy, with the 
choice of the thermal reactor design at the forefront of discussions. To add to the 
complexity of choices between the Magnox, AGR and PWR, in the 1970s the AEA 
proposed a new reactor type, the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR). 
After long and complicated processes of decision-making, the SGHWR was 
                                                
9 In fact, the Sellafield site in Cumbria had been renamed Windscale in 1946, when it was designated as 
the new atomic energy site. In 1981, the BNFL portion of the Windscale site, covering the production 
activities, was renamed Sellafield, while the UKAEA part of the site [the Windscale Piles and the 
prototype Windscale Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (WAGR)] retained the Windscale name. 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf84a_nuclear_development_UK. 
10 According to one of our economist interviewees, the figures in this table are greatly underestimated 
and the true cost overruns were therefore substantially higher. 
11 Williams (1980) argues that the choice was a manifestation of ‘technological momentum’ that the 
AEA had managed to build up behind the technology, as well as of the broader desire for home-grown 
technology. 
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abandoned since the technology was considered as excessively complex and costly. 
The government instead recommended the launching of a new nuclear programme, 
with the AGR and the American-designed PWR. The government of Margaret 
Thatcher, which came into power in 1979, favoured the PWR design, but nevertheless 
pursued with the construction of two AGRs and one PWR, which had been approved 
by the preceding Labour government in 1978. 
 
The choice between coal and nuclear was one of the very key discussion topics in the 
UK energy policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with each energy source 
supported by its own lobbies (see e.g. Merrick 1976; Pearson 1978; Parker and Surrey 
1995). The Thatcher government clearly took side in favour of nuclear, largely in 
order to reduce the political power of the coal miners’ unions. 
 
Despite mounting criticism concerning the cost and risks of nuclear technology, the 
government announced a new nuclear programme in 1982. Ten PWR reactors, 
providing a further 15,000 MW of capacity (Greenaway 1992, 130), were to be built, 
officially to enhance energy security, but allegedly also to crush the political power of 
the coal miners’ union (Hall 1986, 173, in Twena 2006, 12). The first plant was to be 
constructed in Sizewell, Suffolk, and – in keeping with the environment minister’s 
promise – became the subject of one of the first broad public inquiries in UK’s 
nuclear history (Greenaway et al. 1992, 130). Indeed, the consultation was 
exceptionally long, lasting from January 1983 to March 1985.12 Yet the opposition 
criticised the process for having been a “meeting of closed minds” as the CEGB’s 
construction plans were approved without any major modifications (Kay 2001). The 
nuclear programme ran into problems also due to technical problems in the AGR 
plants, the deteriorating relations between the CEGB and British Nuclear Fuels 
(BNFL), and chronic underestimations in cost calculations (Rough 2009, 18), due in 
large part to over optimistic assumptions about the future development of technology, 
but presumably also conscious efforts to hide uncertainties and conceal the total cost 
of FBRs (e.g. Henney 198913).  
 
2.2.3 Plan to privatise the electricity industry... 
 
The changes in the energy policy environment in the early 1980s contributed to a 
greater emphasis given to market forces in the British energy policy. Energy security 
concerns declined together with oil prices during first half of the 1980s, the rapidly 
increasing exploitation of domestic gas and oil resources in the North Sea,14 and 
falling uranium prices. In line with the overall government policy of economic 
liberalism, attempts were made in the UK energy policy to reduce government 
                                                
12http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=5747&CATLN=3
&accessmethod=5&j=1 
13 Report commissioned by Greenpeace. 
14 Oil and gas had first been discovered in UK waters in the North Sea in the late 1960s, and the first oil 
crisis made exploration economically viable. In 1978, UK North Sea oil production exceeded for the 
first time one million barrels per day, in 1981 the production exceeded domestic consumption, and 
production increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s as a result of new major discoveries (SPICe 
2002). Since the late 1990s, especially the gas production has declined and the UK has become a net 
gas importer. 
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steering and emphasise instead economic efficiency through the provision of 
appropriate market signals to consumers and producers. Emphasis was placed upon 
private enterprise, efforts to introduce market discipline in order to reduce the power 
of state monopolies, and the need to base investment on strictly commercial criteria 
instead of security of supply considerations. Furthermore, the explicit government 
policy did not mention “the strategic significance of periodic fundamental 
disequilibrium in international energy markets or of environmental or other 
externalities, the reasons usually given for energy policy” (Parker and Surrey 1995, 
821-822).15  
 
A more fundamental reform of the energy policy took place only once the Thatcher 
government entered its third successive term in 1987, making a commitment to 
privatise the electricity supply industry (ESI) all the while securing the future of 
nuclear power in the UK. The CEGB – notably its chairman Walter Marshall – 
continued to express confidence in new coal and nuclear plant throughout 1987 and 
1988 in the future privatised ESI, and rejected the need for government subsidies. 
However, views were divided concerning the structure of the future ESI, with CEGB 
– flanked by the electricity sector trades unions and the Labour Party energy 
spokesman John Prescott – strongly opposing the planned splitting up of CEGB into 
several competing units and unbundling of ownership of transmission network from 
generation. While a number of independent analysts saw such a fundamental 
restructuring as a prerequisite of a successful privatisation, the opponents of 
restructuring – mainly established interests in the industry – argued that restructuring 
would jeopardise the possibilities of prioritising the nation’s use of resources 
according to a system of ‘merit order’, and thereby compromise economic efficiency, 
increase prices and threaten security of supply (Winskel 2002). 
 
The Department of Energy White Paper from 1988, Privatising Electricity, proposed 
to decentralise and remove electricity supply and generation from public ownership 
(Department of Energy 1988; Nuttall 2005). The plan included three main elements 
(Parker and Surrey 1995; Winskel 2002). First, ownership of the national transmission 
grid was to be transferred from the CEGB to a newly created transmission company 
(known later as the National Grid Company) to be jointly owned by the twelve 
Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) – the former Area Distribution Boards.  
 
Second, generation assets of the CEGB were to be divided between two generating 
companies (known later as National Power and PowerGen), with 70% and 30% of the 
Board’s generation assets, and the National Power owning all the CEGB’s nuclear 
stations. The old system operating on the basis of ‘merit order’ – aimed at minimising 
system variable costs whereby the CEGB passed on all its costs, via a bulk supply 
tariff, to the Area Boards – was replaced by an electricity pool pricing system based 
on competitive bidding at half-hourly basis. The privatised generators hence had no 
statutory obligation to supply.  
 
                                                
15 However, Surrey and Parker (1985, 822) remark that despite his apparent commitment to free 
market, the energy secretary Nigel Lawson praised the large French nuclear programme and expressed 
confidence in the proposed British PWR programme, “which were the product of central planning 
rather than market forces”. 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
Third, to accommodate the high costs and risks of nuclear power, and in recognition 
of the strategic role of nuclear power in ensuring diversity and security of supply, 
National Power was given a 70% share of generation, and the distribution companies 
were required to buy the output of the nuclear stations through a Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation (NFFO).16 Furthermore, a provision of up to £2.5 billion was introduced in 
the Electricity Act to cover liabilities for decommissioning existing nuclear stations. 
Winskel (2002) sums up the thrust of the proposals as that of “transferring power 
from the production side to the retailing side”. He further argues that National Power 
was “widely regarded as the privatised successor to the CEGB”, with Lord Marshall 
appointed as its to-be chairman soon after the publication of the White Paper (Winskel 
2002). 
 
It was widely recognised at the outset that due to their poor reliability record and 
highly uncertain waste treatment and decommissioning costs, privatising the UK’s 
nuclear power stations would be difficult. Equally difficult under a privatised ESI 
would be the construction of a series of new PWRs, notably because of their high 
capital cost. Indeed, a number of independent analysts argued from an early stage that 
the British nuclear plants were not commercially viable, and should be withheld from 
privatisation (e.g. Henney 1987; Holmes et al. 1987). Other experts (e.g. Helm 1988) 
saw no obstacles to the privatisation of the industry along the lines of the White Paper 
proposals. Indeed, in addressing Parliament, the Energy Secretary Cecil Parkinson 
indicated in November 1988 that the Government was facing difficulties with the 
privatisation, because “the question of nuclear economics” was “extremely hard to 
settle”. In consequence, the Electricity Bill, published later in the same month, while 
adhering to all of the White Paper proposals, contained an anticipated additional 
concession to nuclear power – a Fossil Fuel Levy on all electricity bills “to recoup the 
extra costs incurred by the RECs in meeting the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation” 
(Winskel 2002). The Levy was seen as a tacit recognition by the government of the 
extra cost of nuclear power. Parkinson’s statements from April 1989 represented a 
further affirmation of the secrecy that had prevailed over the ‘true’ cost of nuclear. 
While adhering to the view that nuclear power was vital to the diversity and security 
of electricity supply, he stated that ‘for the first time, as a result of our proposals, the 
public is being told what nuclear costs are’ (Winskel 2002, 450). Parkinson then went 
further in his attack on nuclear power under nationalisation, arguing that: 
“The history of the British nuclear programme . . . is littered with appallingly 
wrong and bad decisions.  [...] There was a total lack of financial discipline 
and management. [...] In the future the generating companies will be able to 
build power stations only if they can find a customer for the electricity. [...] In 
the past, because they had the obligation to supply, they decided on the 
technology, the site, and the size.” (Winskel 2002, 450) 
 
2.2.4 ...and the withdrawal of nuclear from privatisation 
 
At the end of July 1989, the oldest Magnox reactors were withdrawn from 
privatisation, on the grounds that the reprocessing and waste treatment costs of spent 
fuel from these plants would be considerably higher than had “been charged in 
                                                
16 Under the NFFO, the RECs were obliged to take 20% of their power requirements from non-fossil 
fuel sources – in practice mainly nuclear power. 
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electricity prices and provided for in the accounts of the CEGB and SSEB”.17 This 
was still considered insufficient by a number of analysts and some members of 
Parliament, and in November 1989, the new Energy Secretary John Wakeham 
declared that all commercial nuclear plants in England and Wales were to be kept 
under public ownership. All nuclear plants would hence be put under the control of 
two new public corporations, Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear (Parker and 
Surrey 1995, 839; Winskel 2002, 450). These decisions essentially meant the 
cancellation of the proposed PWR programme (as the NFFO would be set at a level 
not requiring the construction of any nuclear stations), and a moratorium on new 
nuclear until 1994. As a consequence, Walter Marshall resigned in December 1989 
from his positions as the chairman of the CEGB and as the designate chairman of 
National Power, arguing that his position had become untenable, given the mandate 
he had been given as the future head of National Power, that is, building new nuclear 
power in the UK. Marshall vehemently attacked government policy, accusing it for 
prioritising short-term financial criteria over the long-term good for the society. 
Marshall argued that the benefits from nuclear power accumulate over a period of half 
a century, and that it was impossible to introduce new nuclear power into the 
prevailing environment “driven by short-term market considerations and fierce 
competition” (Winskel 2002, 451).  
 
Parker and Surrey (1995, 839) recall the reasons given by the government for the 
policy reversal: the presumably 'unprecedented financial guarantees' that the National 
Power (still part of the CEGB at the time) was asking as a condition for building new 
nuclear plants (far beyond the £2.5 billion already provided for decommissioning 
liabilities), and the revelation of the hitherto hidden cost levels that the attempt to 
privatise nuclear power had disclosed. Given the cheaply available gas resources, the 
government was unwilling to provide the guarantees that the National Power / CEGB 
asked for, in particular since the combined cycle gas turbine technology provided an 
alternative means of enhancing diversity of supply and reducing pollution, thereby 
undermining the strategic importance of nuclear power (Winskel 2002). In summary, 
the size of the potential liabilities threatened to make National Power unsellable 
without the 'unprecedented guarantees' (Parker and Surrey 1995, 840). 
 
Parker and Surrey (1995, 840) explain how the chairman of the CEGB and of the then 
embryonic National Power, Walter Marshall, provided far higher cost estimates than 
before in his evidence to the Energy Committee in 1990, showing levels of nuclear 
costs two to three times higher than previously revealed and hence totally 
uncompetitive with fossil fuel generation. The Committee concluded that the CEGB 
had been guilty of unjustified and sustained optimism in its estimates of nuclear costs 
over the years. The Committee also criticised the government for having failed to 
insist on the publication of nuclear cost information and establishing the ‘true’ costs 
and risks until it was too late to modify the proposed structure of the ESI (HC 205, 
1990, para 104-108, in Parker and Surrey 1995, 840). Two years earlier, in July 1988, 
the Energy Committee had vehemently criticised the privatisation plans as it found no 
evidence that privatisation would bring down electricity prices, considered 
government’s plans as excessively sketchy and incomplete and the timetable as 
                                                
17 HC Debates, Vol. 157 (1988–89), c746, cited in Winskel (2002, 450). 
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'frighteningly tight’, and thought that 'the nuclear tail seems to be wagging the ESI 
dog' (HC 307, 1988, paras 41 and 176, in Parker and Surrey 1995, 839).  
 
Walker (1999, 31-32, 38) sums up the economic and financial consequences of the 
attempted privatisation of the nuclear industry in 1989. The investment in nuclear 
generating capacity came to a halt, mostly because of the substantial uncovered 
liabilities in the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, notably reprocessing. In order for 
nuclear to flourish in the private sector, returns on nuclear investment would have had 
to more than doubled. However, in the privatised electricity sector, the utilities no 
longer had an obligation to supply; and both the short and long term financial risks 
were no longer carried by the state but by the new companies’ shareholders. Under 
pressure from the City, the BNFL was compelled to reveal the true costs of 
reprocessing, including the costs of decommissioning. Finally, the “cost-plus” 
reprocessing contracts18 would now be replaced by fixed-price contracts, which would 
transfer the risks of cost increases to the BNFL. 
 
The consequences of the attempted privatisation of the nuclear industry could be 
described as that of changing goalposts for economic appraisal. As the Energy 
Secretary John Wakeham argued, the price increases affecting nuclear power did not 
result from a change in intrinsic costs, but instead from changed accounting practices 
associated with privatisation. Hence, he remarked that  
‘there was no one date . . . that [the technology] changed from being economic 
to uneconomic...if the CEGB had gone on for another 25 years...the whole 
thing would have gone along happily without any great drama’.19 
 
The most important changes, Wakeham stated, were the use of ‘current’ rather than 
‘historic’ costs, and the adoption of a higher required rate of return, or ‘discount rate’, 
which made capital-intensive nuclear technology less competitive than fossil-fuel 
technology (Winskel 2002, 451). In addition, the reassessment of the price of nuclear 
energy by National Power resulted from a change from cost plus to fixed price 
contracts with BNFL. While the cost plus contracts had allowed the BNFL to easily 
pass on cost increases to the CEGB, to the Area Boards, and ultimately the electricity 
consumer, the introduction of fixed price contracts prompted the BNFL to greatly 
increase the prices to National Power in order to minimise its risk exposure. 
Furthermore, the plant decommissioning cost estimates were increasing dramatically 
as a consequence of more stringent standards, and the first early experiences of actual 
decommissioning.20 According to Parker and Surrey (1995, 839-840), the cost 
increases that had now come to light represented partly increases in real costs and 
stemmed partly from changes in the perception and allocation of risks in the context 
of ESI privatisation. The real cost increases included higher costs of capital, 
decommissioning and reprocessing, in particular: 
                                                
18 In a cost-plus contract, parties had to meet any escalation in costs by paying higher prices for 
services (Walker 1999, 39). 
19 House of Commons Energy Committee, The Consequences of Electricity Privatisation: Minutes of 
Evidence, HC96 (1989–90), in Winskel (2002, 451). 
20 A detailed analysis of the changing economics of nuclear power in the course of ESI privatisation is 
provided by Gordon MacKerron, ‘Nuclear Power Under Review’, in Surrey, J. (ed.), The British 
Electricity Experiment: Privatisation: The Record, The Issues, The Lessons. London: Earthscan, 1996. 
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- CEGB had used a discount rate of 5% for its nuclear plants under 
nationalisation, instead of the 10% used by coal and gas industries; 
- Magnox decommissioning costs were raised in 1989 from £312 million to 
£599 million per station – an increase of £2.3 billion for all eight of the 
CEGB's Magnox stations (HC 205, 1990, para 19); 
- Over the ten years to 1988, Magnox reprocessing costs had risen fivefold 
because of more stringent safety and environmental regulations which 
necessitated heavy expenditures by BNFL; 
- Policy until 1988-89 had not envisaged decommissioning and clean-up of 
Sellafield. When the policy was changed (in the run up to ESI privatisation) 
the accumulated provisions were far too small and, since there was no 
experience of nuclear decommissioning, large contingency allowances were 
added to the estimated engineering costs. 
 
In anticipation of privatisation, the shareholders got a flavour of the risks they would 
be faced by with a privatised nuclear industry – risks whose costs had thus far been 
passed on to the consumer or carried by the government. These included risks of 
“nuclear accidents (to the extent the full liability was not covered by the state), 
variable reactor operating performance, continued tightening of safety and 
environmental regulations leading to design modifications, retrofitting or capacity de-
rating of reactors, and the possibility that decommissioning might be required to take 
place as soon as sufficiently safe rather than after a delay of 100 years or more” 
(Parker and Surrey 1995, 840).  
 
Meanwhile, in his evidence to the Energy Select Committee in mid-1990, Walter 
Marshall continued to argue that, fundamentally, both AGR and PWR technologies 
remained economical, but that the withdrawal of nuclear power from privatisation 
reflected weaknesses in the government’s proposals rather than the economic failure 
of nuclear technology. Had the government decided to retain generator’s obligation to 
supply, the PWR programme could have progressed successfully alongside 
investment in combined-cycle gas turbine plants (Winskel 2002). The privatisation 
plans triggered diverging assessments also from different independent experts, as 
reported by Winskel (2002). While some argued that privatisation was quite viable 
and that the government should have accepted to provide the guarantees required by 
National Power – simply as the price to pay for privatisation – others maintained that 
a privatised industry would be neither able nor willing to carry the risks and 
uncertainties involved. Lazard Brothers, investment advisors to CEGB/National 
Power, told the Energy Committee that their advice had always been that privatising 
nuclear was very problematic, due to ‘unlimited liabilities’ arising from waste fuel 
management and plant decommissioning, as well as the numerous risks, most of 
which they regarded as unquantifiable. 
 
Eventually, after the debates and policy reversals involved in the preparation of 
privatisation, the process proceeded relatively smoothly after 1989. The entire nuclear 
industry was retained in public ownership, but successfully floated in the financial 
market. With the entire nuclear industry retained under public ownership, National 
Power, PowerGen, National Grid, and the Regional Electricity Companies were 
vested at the end of March 1990, and successfully floated between December 1990 
and March 1991 (Winskel 2002, 452).  
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After privatisation, while the nuclear industry continued to enjoy market guarantees 
and subsidies, it was placed under much greater commercial pressures than ever 
before. Under such pressures and scrutiny the nuclear industry improved its technical 
and economic performance: more economical AGR reactors were introduced, the 
three oldest Magnox reactors were shut down, more commercial accounting and 
management practices were introduced, staff levels were drastically reduced, and 
more attention was given to and experience gained on decommissioning. Encouraged 
by this improved performance, the government planned in 1995 to privatise as a 
single company the seven AGR nuclear power stations belonging to Nuclear Electric 
and Scottish Nuclear, as well as the Sizewell PWR. At the end of 1995, the thereby 
created British Energy, still in state ownership, announced that it would not proceed 
with the early construction of any new PWR plants – an announcement that was 
reported as a death knell to the UK nuclear programme (Winskel 2002, 454). To 
justify its withdrawal, British Energy evoked commercial reasons and government’s 
refusal to provide funds for the construction. Independent analysts, in turn, argued that 
the BE’s decision reflected the judgement that private investors would not be keen to 
invest in a company that would build new nuclear plants. In mid-1996, British Energy 
was successfully floated, but in the absence of strong economic and financial 
incentives (e.g. carbon tax) and with the waste disposal risks remaining significant, 
prospects for new nuclear stations were bleak (Winskel 2002, 454). 
 
 
2.3 Summary of the evolution of the UK nuclear sector 
 
The commercial UK nuclear programme encountered serious technical and economic 
problems since its beginning in the mid-1950s. These technical issues and cost 
overruns gradually eroded AEA’s credibility over the next two decades. Hence, the 
UK already had experience of the ways in which very optimistic initial expectations 
about the potential of a technology can deepen the disappointment and disillusionment 
once the expectations fail to come to fruition. This experience contributed to the 
difficulties of the AEA to push forward the fast breeder programme during a critical 
period in the 1970s. Arguably, the public and especially political/industry support for 
fast breeder reactors was weaker than it would have been, if the experience with 
thermal reactors had been more positive. The wrangling and indecisiveness 
concerning the choice between competing reactor designs in the 1970s was a 
particularly serious handicap for the industry as a whole. The slowly emerging 
‘discourse of fear’ around nuclear energy was buttressed by increasingly critical 
media reporting. In 1983, a TV programme revealing child leukaemia rates twelve 
times the national average among Sellafield families led to media and public demands 
for an investigation (Dalquist 2004, 22; Twena 2006, 16). The earlier positive and 
enthusiastic media reporting was by the 1970s increasingly replaced by critical 
accounts by environment journalists, echoing views from the rising environmental 
movement. According to Williams (1980, 337-338, in Twena 2006, 15), the period 
between 1975 and 1978 was a turning point in media activity, as for the first time 
there were “innumerable” radio and TV debates, as well as several major public 
seminars and hearings on the topic. Public inquiries for the first time exposed the 
economic, technical and safety problems involved in the use of nuclear power. 
Parliament gradually emerged as an actor in decisions concerning nuclear energy 
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(Twena 2006). While the public opinion remained predominantly positive towards 
nuclear energy (Rough 2009), the AEA and the nuclear industry, notably the BNFL, 
were greatly weakened by the rising public doubt and opposition (Twena 2006). The 
financial sector actors gained a central position at this period, while, despite the rising 
public fear and scepticism, the anti-nuclear NGOs remained weak.  
 
Finally, the entry in power of the conservative government of Margaret Thatcher 
proved to be a crucial turning point. While Thatcher had a generally positive attitude 
towards nuclear power, her primary objectives were political and ideological: fast 
breeder reactors would be acceptable or even desirable, on the condition that they 
were financially and economically viable within the framework of a liberalised 
market. Since fast breeder reactors would not be useful in breaking the power of the 
coal miners’ unions – one of Thatcher’s primary political objectives – they stood little 
chance of obtaining government support under Thatcher era. The privatisation of the 
electricity industry and the failed attempts to privatise the nuclear industry in 1989 
revealed the financial and economic risks associated with privately operated nuclear 
plants. Once the industry came under the economic appraisal by the City its reputation 
as a cheap source of electricity dissipated, and the privatised industry had no incentive 
to build new plants. Winskel (2002, 457-458) sums up the consequences that the 
changing of goalposts of economic appraisal caused for the nuclear sector. Subject to 
new economic and regulatory imperatives, the individuals and institutions advocating 
nuclear power were marginalised, and were unable to impose any preferred 
technology on the industry, and the “arbiters of technology investment were no longer 
engineers, but rather investors and shareholders who employed financial rather than 
technical criteria”. This process whereby the nuclear industry and the organisations 
promoting nuclear power gradually lost their autonomy and political power also 
eroded the confidence and support for fast breeder reactors.  
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III. THE FAST BREEDER REACTOR DREAM: EXPECTATIONS 
FOR THE FUTURE  
 
Figure 4: UK Nuclear fast breeder timeline 
 
 
Sources: Patterson (1985; 2010); AEA (2004).  
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3.1 FBR as the long term goal 
 
Research into fast breeder technology began in the late 1940s, almost as early as 
fission research. Although no dedicated FBR programme existed in the 1940s and 
1950s, there was a strong interest among scientists and engineers to develop a reactor 
that could potentially revolutionise nuclear energy production with its efficient use of 
uranium and reduced generation of waste. Furthermore, the expected scarcity of 
uranium resources enhanced the support for the future development of fast breeders. 
 
“On a long-term view the main argument for U-235 was that it was 
needed for research and development on the most promising future 
nuclear power development – that is, fast neutron reactors with no 
moderator operated with concentrated fissile material instead of natural 
uranium. These reactors would produce power and also produced more 
fissile material than they consumed. Any large-scale exploitation of 
atomic energy must, it was thought, ultimately depend on this breeding. 
Development in this field would involve a considerable research 
programme which would be dependent on the possession of an 
appreciable amount of fissile material in rather concentrated form” 
(Gowing 1974, 177). 
 
This underlying conviction about the “unavoidability” of fast breeders as the 
cornerstone of nuclear energy was confirmed by our interviewees, and perhaps best 
encapsulated in a statement of a former AEA scientist: “anyone who is really thinking 
and is looking for a world role over hundreds of years for nuclear power, if they 
haven’t got fast reactor in their thoughts, it’s because they haven’t thought enough”. 
At the political level, this belief was expressed for instance in the first report of the 
Select Committee on Science and Technology, published in October 1967, which was 
very optimistic about the future of FBRs as the key pillar of nuclear energy (Patterson 
2010, 75). 
 
The British strategy of developing nuclear power advanced along a two-track route. 
The first one was to reach the immediate nuclear power and military goals by using 
existing competencies and knowledge from the thermal reactors developed early on in 
the atomic programme. However, since thermal reactors were viewed as an interim 
solution, ultimately to be taken over by FBRs, the second track entailed the 
development of a long-term programme for fast breeder research. The assumption that 
plutonium-fuelled fast breeder reactors would be “the key to any long-term civil 
nuclear programme” prevailed among the British nuclear establishment (Patterson, 
1985; Ham and Hall 2006). This view, affirming the urgency of fast breeder 
development in the UK, was encapsulated in a statement made in 1977 by Burt Cutts, 
Head of Central Technical Services at AEA’s Risley research institute (Cutts 1977): 
  
“Any nuclear programme which relies exclusively on thermal reactors 
and therefore on a continuing large uranium supply will thus be 
increasingly at risk to increased prices and to a potential interruption of 
supplies. In the UK it would imply a renewed commitment to large-scale 
importing of energy from abroad at the expense of foreign exchange – a 
situation from which North Sea oil is about to rescue us, though on a 
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temporary basis. The fast reactor will release us from this burden for the 
conceivable future and its successful development is more urgent than is 
sometimes argued.” 
 
3.1.1 Dounreay Experimental Fast Reactor, DFR (1950s to mid-1960s) 
 
Three years prior to the setting up of the AEA, initial steps were taken to establish the 
fast reactor programme, as the Fast Reactor Design committee held its first meeting in 
October 1951. 21 This committee would meet sixty-five times in total over the seven-
year period from October 1951 to November 1958. They scrutinised 277 papers, 
reports and drawings, “mostly all written in great scientific and engineering detail, 
many accompanied by bewildering equations and formulae.”22 
 
Despite the doubts and hesitations notably among the Risley engineers, at the official 
level the trust in fast breeder technology as the future of nuclear energy gained 
strength. Therefore the construction of an experimental fast breeder power station 
started in March 1955 at the AEA's new Dounreay Experimental Reactor 
Establishment, at an abandoned war airfield on the north coast of Scotland (Patterson 
1985, 98). The remote location was chosen largely because of the accident risks23 
(Patterson 1985), and also because in an economically declining region that was 
losing its young population, an industrial project of the calibre of the DFR was 
welcomed by local politicians and populations (Brown 2007; AEA interview).24 The 
Dounreay site had two reactors, the Dounreay Materials Test Reactor (DMTR) and 
the Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR). Over a period of more than three years, as many as 
3000 persons worked at the various installations on the site, including fuel fabrication 
plants, a plant for reprocessing the fuel from the DFR, laboratories, waste stores, 
workshops, and offices. About half of the personnel were locals from Caithness 
(Brown 2007).   
 
Both the construction and operation of the DFR were plagued by a series of technical 
problems as well as unexpected external events. Work at Dounreay was stalled 
because of the Windscale fire, preventing the DFR from going critical until 1959, two 
years behind the schedule.  In August 1961, the reactor reached an output of 1.5 MWt 
– a fraction of the expected 60 MWt. The output increased to 11 MWt in December 
the same year. But progress was halted again when the reactor had to be shut down to 
                                                
21 Committee members included Sir John Cockcroft, Sir William Penney, R.R. Matthews (to become 
Dounreay’s second director), and C.R. Tottle, who later became head of reactors at Dounreay. 
22 http://www.caithness.org/fpb/dounreay/history/fastbreeder/ 
23 Patterson (1985, 98) describes how, in its first annual report from 1956, the AEA notes that an 
“accident in the reactor might lead to a rapid rise in temperature which in turn might cause the melting 
of the fuel elements. If this should happen there might be an escape of fission products from the core.”  
To avert the risks a 140 feet steel dome was placed over the reactor. 
24 Brown (2007) describes the expectations of local populations at Dounreay as follows: “Fishing, 
flagstone industry and agriculture were all in decline and mechanisation was reducing the labour force 
required. Caithness had long been exporting its major asset – people.  Establishing the UK’s Fast 
Reactor project at Dounreay changed all that – it brought back exiles and introduced a new breed of 
resident – the Atomics.” She further notes that Dounreay faced competition from another site in 
Speyside, but that “heavy rains and strong winds on the day of the official visit turned the decision in 
favour of Dounreay!” 
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allow the replacement of the fuel core with an upgraded design. In July 1963, the DFR 
reached its maximum output of 60 MWt (Patterson 2010, 74).  
 
Opinions diverge on the success of the reactor once in operation. Herbert (1962) 
evoked the numerous difficulties faced during the early years of operation of the DFR, 
most of which were associated with the sodium coolant system (e.g. formation of 
oxides and hybrids, which resulted in frequent blockages in the reactor). Herbert 
repeated the argument that would in the subsequent years be frequently evoked by 
FBR advocates: most of the problems were mechanical – the people responsible for 
the working of the reactor emphasised that the physics of the reactor had “gone like a 
dream”, and the ‘bugs’ at Dounreay had been involved with attempts to get the heat 
away from the core, not in producing it. Herbert considered that the end of the 
engineering troubles was finally “well within sight”. As a consequence of the 
experience from the DFR, some of the equipment in the prototype reactor would be 
simpler, because a lot of the problems with the DFR could be attributed to the 
existence of complicated automatic machinery. Finally, Herbert considered the 
challenges faced by the construction of a commercial reactor: in particular, finding a 
suitable site for the reactor and connecting it to the grid would not be easy.  
 
While Judd and Ainsworth (1998, 609) refer to the “inevitable teething troubles” 
notably during the construction of the reactor, they argue that once the reactor was in 
full power, “things went very smoothly”, the reactor being “stable in operation” and 
“all the major components” working with little trouble. They nevertheless recognise, 
as the “only major interruption”, a leak in one of the main primary coolant pipes – 
which did not cause significant release of radioactivity, but was difficult to repair 
(ibid.). Simnad (1998, 528) provides an equally positive overall judgement of the 
performance of DFR, noting that the “reactor served as a most productive test-bed that 
led to many important advances in FBR technology and MOX fuel”. He highlights in 
particular the discovery made in the DFR in 1966 “relating to the phenomena of 
irradiation swelling and creep in stainless steel cladding”, which “led to the 
development of advanced fuel and structural materials for FBR cores.” 
 
By contrast, Patterson (1985, 101) deems these problems as significant, noting that 
500 damaged elements in the outer breeder section had to be removed, and special 
cutting tools and removal equipment had to be manufactured to do the work. In May 
1967, the DFR primary cooling circuit leaked but the AEA said reassuringly that the 
molten sodium leak was small. Only a few months later, in July, the DFR was shut 
down for a period of more than a year, until June 1967. In 1966, the phenomenon of 
irradiation swelling due to neutron-induced ‘voidage’ in stainless steels was 
discovered – a problem that was to cause major headaches for the engineers and 
scientists working on fast breeders, and have a profound effect especially on the 
development of fuel and structural materials for fast reactors (Judd and Ainsworth 
1998, 611). 
 
Although far from reaching its expected output and marred with problems, the DFR 
became the world's first fast breeder reactor to provide electricity to the national grid 
(UKAEA 2006). Even critics such as Patterson (1985, 114) acknowledged that 
"Britain could claim with justice in the 1960s that it led the world in fast breeders." 
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The DFR was intended as an essential early step towards a large 1000 MWe 
commercial FBR, expected to go online by the 1980s. In pursuit of this objective, the 
AEA pressed forward towards the next design stage, the Prototype Fast Reactor 
(PFR). 
 
3.1.2 Prototype Fast Reactor, PFR (mid-1960s to 1970s) 
 
During the second nuclear programme in the mid-1960s, alongside with the 
development of the AGR design, the AEA was also drawing up designs for a new 
prototype fast breeder reactor. The PFR was intended for commercial use, with an 
expected output of 600 MWt – equivalent to 250 MW electricity. In August 1965, the 
AEA was already drawing up detailed designs for the plant and civil engineering 
contracts, well ahead of the official approval for the PFR in February 1966 (Patterson 
1985, 99). Scientific exchange through a series of international conferences ensured 
that PFR was very similar to prototype reactors in other countries, including the 
Phénix in France and BN-600 in Russia (although the latter was considerably larger) 
(Judd and Ainsworth 1998, 611). According to Judd and Ainsworth (1998, 613) the 
collaboration with the US was particularly fruitful in the development of the prototype 
reactor. 
 
The AEA would have wished to place the PFR in a less remote location – to 
demonstrate the innocuousness of the reactor and to avoid long and costly 
transmission of electricity from a remote production site to consumers. However, 
seeking to win a seat in the upcoming elections, the Labour government had already 
decided to place the PFR in Dounreay, which already had a pilot reprocessing plant. 
But the separated plutonium would still need to be transported to Windscale for fuel 
fabrication. The government was also keen to keep the jobs in Dounreay, where fast 
breeder R&D had given a major stimulus to the local economy.  
 
3.1.2.1 Delays and technical problems 
 
Numerous problems and delays were encountered in the construction of the PFR. One 
of the first difficulties concerned the complex rotating 'roof' of the reactor, which 
proved much more difficult to fabricate than the AEA had anticipated. While 
conceding that the roof construction problems would delay the entry in service of the 
PFR beyond the foreseen date of 1971, the AEA considered the problems of 
conventional engineering nature, and unrelated to the fast breeder aspects (see e.g. 
Valéry 1974). Nevertheless, the early years of operation of PFR were marred by many 
leaks in the steam generators due to 'stress-corrosion cracks' (Judd and Ainsworth 
1998, 613; Brown 2007). Formidable challenges were faced by AEA scientists and 
engineers trying to find materials able to withstand the demanding environment in the 
fast reactor core, notably to prevent the so-called void-formation problem.25 
Presumably some of the technical problems were caused by the desire to prepare for 
                                                
25 The problem stemmed from the intense high-energy neutron radiation for lengthy periods that the 
structural materials containing and supporting the fuel had to resist. Hence, the “fast neutrons knocked 
atoms out of place in the stainless steel, leaving 'voids' that weakened the crystal structure and 
deformed the components made from it” (Patterson 1985, 102). 
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the scaling-up from the PFR directly to a commercial reactor by building the PFR as a 
“big reactor run small” (Valéry 1974, 424). Hence, for example the fuel configuration 
was optimised for 1000 MWe rather than 250 MWe, and the primary pumps and other 
components were designed to “oversize” in order to facilitate the scaling-up (ibid.). 
 
The late 1960s was a period of great expectations and firm faith in fast breeder 
technology as the logical final objective of the development of nuclear energy. The 
mounting expectations gave further impetus to the PFR project. The Select Committee 
on Science and Technology, in its October 1967 report, expected the 250 MWe 
prototype to be on power in 1971. In 1969 the AEA stated that it would start building 
commercial FBRs as quickly as possible once the PFR would be in operation. For the 
government, FBRs would be “the major event of the rest of the century” (Patterson 
1985, 101). The AEA remained confident. Hawkes (1971, 682) reported on an 
optimistic declaration by R.V. Moore, head of the AEA's fast reactor effort: “We're 
into the finishing straight. Testing and commissioning starts early next year and 
criticality is expected towards the end of 1972. We're not going to rush the start-up 
program.” 
 
The PFR did not go online as expected by 1971. The sodium pumps were failing to 
perform during a test in 1973. The reactor finally reached criticality in 1974, 
opportunely just a week before the start of a high-profile international conference on 
'Fast Reactor Power Stations' hosted by the British Nuclear Energy Society. The 
conference, attended by a number of European countries – notably France – the US, 
the Soviet Union and some developing countries, became a stage for an Anglo-French 
rivalry in nuclear technology. At the end of the conference the French announced that 
their Phénix fast breeder had just attained full power. According to Valéry (1974, 
424), the PFR had cost £20 million less than Phénix, but had on the other hand taken 
considerably longer to build. Conference papers hailed the FBR success and 
downplayed the technical difficulties (Patterson 1985, 105). However, at least one 
significant dissenting voice was heard in the conference, from the CEGB.26 The 
CEGB argued in particular on the basis of assessments concerning the economic 
viability of fast breeders. The CEGB hence noted that the savings from FBRs would 
hardly be greater than 5% of the overall costs of a nuclear system, and even this only 
in “the unlikely event of capital costs of fast and thermal reactors being equal” 
(Patterson 1985, 105). The CEGB contributors estimated that FBR orders could not be 
placed before 1977-1978 (Patterson 1985, 105). 
 
The AEA continued the work at Dounreay, undisturbed by the CEGB's scepticism. 
But small leaks occurred in 1974 in the steam generators – a complex boiler system 
where hot molten sodium flowed through thousands of tubes in order to boil water. 
The leaks were problematic due to sodium's reactivity with water. Eventually the 
problem parts had to be taken out of the reactor in order to plug the leaks. Yet the 
AEA claimed that the reactor itself was stable and performed well, and that the 
numerous problems encountered only concerned ‘ancillary’ elements or the 
‘conventional’ part of the plant (Judd and Ainsworth 1998, 612; Brown 2007), such as 
the secondary sodium circuits, the steam system and the materials used to build the 
                                                
26 Presentation by Eric Carpenter, head of reactor physics at the CEGB's Berkeley Nuclear 
Laboratories. 
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units (Valéry 1974; Judd and Ainsworth 1998, 612; Patterson 1985, 106). Hence, the 
argument by the AEA and other FBR advocates was that “the reactor itself was stable 
and predictable” (Brown 2007). The reactor itself was “a model of good behaviour” 
(Valéry 1974, 424), and the difficulties were “minor” (Kenward 1974, 425) and not 
inherent to the fast breeder technology (Patterson 1985, 106), and that the “small 
leaks” that had appeared were considered as “nothing as hazardous” (Valéry 1974, 
424). Simnad (1998, 528-529) acknowledges the problems – the extension of the 
construction time because of “difficulties in welding the large reactor roof and in 
making the tubeplate welds in the steam generators”, as well as “delays to 
accommodate new information on neutron-induced swelling of the stainless steel 
cladding and core structural components.” Furthermore, Simnad argued that even 
these minor problems had been effectively solved by the late 1990s.27 However, not 
only does Simnad echo the view that the technical problems concerned only the 
conventional part of the plant, but uses a similar argument also to reassure those 
concerned about safety:  
”accidents and safety issues have related to non-nuclear components of 
nuclear reactors in general and FBRs in particular, and that all concerns will 
be adequately addressed with the successful design of passively safe nuclear 
reactors, which should be immune to the types of failures that occurred at 
Chernobyl and at Three Mile Island” (Simnad 1998, 523). 
 
Symptomatically, Valéry (1974) attributes most of the delays at Dounreay (PFR) to 
what he calls “the traumatic reorganisation” that according to him had “been racking 
the British nuclear boiler and heavy electrical industries over the past six years”. 
Halfway through the project, the responsibility for the construction of the PFR was 
surrendered by the AEA to the industry (TNPG). Valéry further argued that the on-
going merger of the two nuclear constructors – TNPG and the British Nuclear Design 
and Construction – into Nuclear Power Company would lead to the desirable situation 
in which all crucial experience would reside within the industry itself rather than 
within the AEA alone. 
 
3.1.2.2 Set-backs in public relations 
 
The technical problems encountered by the PFR were compounded by embarrassing 
public relations failures. Since the rest of the reactor seemed to be behaving well, the 
AEA organised a major press visit, flying some seventy journalists to Dounreay on 30 
October 1974. The visit turned out to be devoid of much journalistic interest, leaving 
the journalists wondering about its purpose. Apparently, the AEA had planned to 
connect the PFR to the national grid on that day, but a fierce storm in the North 
Atlantic the preceding week had apparently uprooted hundreds of tonnes of seaweed, 
which had been sucked into the reactor's cooling-water intake, forcing a shutdown of 
                                                
27 “For example, small leaks in the evaporators led to the insertion, brazing and explosive welding of 
sleeves in the ends of all 3000 tubes, which proved to be a very effective solution. The reactor itself 
operated almost faultlessly, with a stable and predictable performance. The irradiation distortion of the 
fuel assemblies was minimized by rotating them periodically during their irradiation lives. Fuel burn-up 
targets were eventually increased to 20% with high nickel cladding. The very few fuel pin failures in 
the PFR behaved in a very benign manner, so that operation of the reactor could continue until the next 
convenient shutdown.” (Simnad 1998, 528-529) 
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the reactor until the seaweed could be cleared away. To avoid embarrassment, the 
AEA chose not to say anything about the event to the journalists (Patterson 1985, 
104). 
 
Another unfortunate PR setback occurred at the end of April 1975, during a site visit 
to Dounreay following the inaugural conference of the newly-formed European 
Nuclear Society in Paris. A month earlier the reactor had generated its first electricity, 
but consistent trouble with the cooling system and turbine bearings had prevented the 
PFR from reaching more than 12% of its full thermal capacity. The AEA staff argued 
that the reactor was working fine; however, just before the visit of the European 
nuclear experts, small leaks appeared in a section of the only operative cooling circuit 
– a source of further embarrassment to the AEA (Patterson 1985, 104). 
 
In 1975, the PFR operated on average at only about one-tenth of its full power. Even 
voices within the international nuclear energy community remained sceptical, with the 
Nuclear Engineering International predicting in February 1976 that the PFR would 
not reach its full power until several months. The same publication finally reported 
somewhat better news in September 1976, noting that during most of the previous 
month, the PFR had been "operating on all three of its coolant loops with all of the 
early heat exchanger problems now remedied." The publication expected the reactor 
to reach full power by the first week in September, but at the same token implied that 
the reactor was still a long way from demonstrating that fast breeders could fulfil what 
Patterson (1985, 107) describes as "the CEGB's requirements that they be reliable, 
built on schedule and within budget." 
 
Yet the AEA continued to press forward. In 1977, there was an explosion in a disposal 
shaft for contaminated waste. The experimental reactor, DFR, was closed in March 
1977 – as a further indication of the AEA’s confidence in PFR’s performance. Hinton 
also supported the FBR stating that the AEA would build a full-scale fast breeder “not 
later than the end of this year [...] the aim should be to commission it before 1985”. 
However, leaks and technical problems persisted, and the PFR’s capacity factor 
remained at an average of about 10% during the first ten years after starting up 
(Patterson, 1985, 108). Yet, while recognising the low load factor during the first half 
of the PFR’s lifetime, Judd and Ainsworth (1998, 612) point out that the load factor 
improved greatly after 1984, reaching 80% in its final operating year, 1994 (Simnad 
1998, 529). 
 
3.1.2.3 PFR in balance: a success after all? 
 
The PFR failed to meet the expectations on its performance and capacity factor, a fact 
eagerly pointed out by its critics. Patterson (1985, 101-108) disparagingly called the 
PFR “the ten-percent reactor”, referring to the analysis published in October 1984 in 
Nuclear Engineering International, which estimated the total lifetime capacity factor 
of the reactor for its ten first years of operation at 9.9%. The AEA, by contrast, 
considered that the project had made some “major contributions” to the UK fast 
reactor project. The fast breeder advocates have consistently argued that the technical 
problems associated with the functioning of the PFR were a matter of “conventional 
materials physics” rather than being linked with the fast breeder technology (see e.g. 
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Judd and Ainsworth 1998; Brown 2007).28 The positive contributions of the PFR 
included the demonstration that it was possible to achieve a fully closed nuclear fuel 
cycle from breeding of plutonium, through its separation through reprocessing and 
finally to its use for manufacturing fresh fuel – all within the same reactor (Brown 
2007). Judd and Ainsworth (1998, 613) consider the PFR to have been “a test facility 
for the improvement of fuel performance”, as the fuel burn-ups improved from the 
original 7.5% to as high as 20% (see also Brown 2007). Hirsch and Farmer (1986, 
297-300) present the AEA view on technical performance, noting that the UK plant 
demonstrated the viability of “the basic PFR plant design style with all the primary 
circuit components in a single tank”, deeming it likely that this solution would “be 
adopted throughout Europe”. In their view, the “large scale operational experience” 
had helped validate calculation methods and data concerning “reactor and fuel 
performance, control and safety, materials properties and design codes” (ibid.). 
Importantly, the authors claimed that sodium had “proved a highly satisfactory 
coolant, capable of being used with high temperature, high thermal efficiency steam 
cycles”, adding that “[e]ven its disadvantage of opacity has been minimised by the 
development of ultrasonics based under-sodium viewing devices.” While 
acknowledging the “considerable problems with water leaks from welds in the steam 
generator, which reduced station availability”, they underline the achievements, 
including the advancements in burn-ups (11% in standard fuel, 13% in experimental 
fuels and the future prospects of up to 20%), demonstration of reprocessing to a high 
standard of safety, plutonium accountability and effluent discharges, and the 
presumably low fuel cycle costs – approximately 70% of those for PWRs with the 
“very low” uranium prices prevailing at the time. 
 
Judd and Ainsworth (1998, 613) also underline the “significant contributions” the 
PFR made to reactor safety, including the demonstration that the reactor posed very 
low radiation hazard and that in the event of complete failure of the coolant pumps, 
natural convection of the primary sodium would remove the decay heat without 
excessive temperatures in the core. Furthermore, Judd and Ainsworth (1998, 613) 
stress as a particularly strong demonstration of safety the fact that the safety case 
withstood “careful scrutiny against the criteria applied to commercial thermal 
reactors”, as the reactor was for the first time licensed by the Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate (NII), in 1991. Indeed, at the time of the creation of the AEA, no 
licensing regime for nuclear sites existed in the UK. Such a requirement was only 
introduced with the Nuclear Installations Act in 1959, as recommended in the report into 
the Windscale fire two years earlier (HSE 1998, 1). The Act stipulated the setting up of a 
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), and contained provisions for the licensing of 
users of nuclear installations (ibid.). However, the AEA – and therefore also the fast 
breeder reactors – was exempt from the licensing requirement until 1990, when it was 
brought into the licensing regime, now governed by the newly formed Health and Safety 
Executive, HSE (ibid.). The Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), established 
                                                
28 A newspaper article from November 1993 (Buchan 1993) reports that according to the PFR 
operations manager, Derek Shipley, “[f]or an experimental reactor, Dounreay has worked… pretty 
well”. The newspaper continues explaining the argument of Shipley, according to which the problems 
at the site would have “little to do with the physics of the small machine sunk in the Caithness granite, 
but in the transfer of its generating force to the light-bulbs and washing-machines of the Highlands. 
Operators have had continuous difficulty actually making electricity.”  
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in 1996, has specific duties with respect to radioactive substances and will assume a 
regulatory role for the more severely contaminated land sites, including Dounreay (ibid.). 
  
Hirsch and Farmer (1986, 297-300) argue that “the inherent safety characteristics of 
sodium-cooled reactors” have been proven both in the UK and in the USA. Hirsch and 
Farmer likewise evoke the capacity of FBRs to prevent over-heating by natural 
convection alone, in what they consider an extremely unlikely case of all coolant 
pumps failing simultaneously. They also refute as “unfounded” the “theoretical fears 
about very large energy releases from interactions between severely overheated fuel 
and the sodium coolant”, underline that FBRs produce very low radiation exposure to 
staff, and argue that these favourable safety features provide protection against 
escalating costs in case radiation standards were tightened up in the future. Finally, 
Hirsch and Farmer note that the activity levels in effluents have been consistently very 
low, throughout the operation of the PFR lower than those authorised originally for 
the reactor, even though the activity handled had increased by tenfold and plutonium 
by thousand-fold. 
 
IV. THE LONG DECLINE 
 
The early 1970s marked the beginning of the decline of support for fast breeders in 
the UK, resulting from a combination of factors such as the split-up of the AEA, an 
increasing scrutiny of the economic and financial performance of fast breeders, 
mounting technical problems in the prototype reactor, declining uranium prices, and 
rising public opposition largely fuelled by nuclear accidents such as those in the Three 
Mile Island (1979) and later in Chernobyl (1986). 
 
4.1 AEA split-up and the erosion of institutional support for fast breeders? 
(1970s) 
 
A crucial change in the UK nuclear establishment took place in 1971, when the 
hitherto uncontested leader of the country’s nuclear policy, the AEA, was split up into 
three separate organisations. While the AEA had until the beginning of the 1970s 
virtually a free reign to develop its own R&D in the directions of its own choice, the 
splitting up of the organisation began a new era of increasing government oversight 
and accountability. After the reorganisation, the AEA only retained research activities, 
while the Radiochemical Centre Ltd (later Amersham plc) took over production of 
medical and industrial radioisotopes, and the British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) was 
given the responsibility for nuclear fuel and weapons material producing activities. 
The BNFL therefore became the manager of the manufacturing plant at Springfields, 
the enrichment plant at Capenhurst, the spent-fuel facility at Windscale, and the dual-
purpose Calder Hall and Chapelcross military plutonium producing reactors.29 
Patterson (1985, 17) casts doubt on "the ostensibly commercial nature of BNFL", on 
the grounds that the AEA held 100% of the shares in BNFL, and that AEA chairman 
Sir John Hill was also installed as chairman of BNFL. Furthermore, he refers to the 
essentially non-commercial nature of the production of fissile material for British 
                                                
29 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf84a_nuclear_development_UK.html 
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nuclear weapons - an activity whose financial basis was kept out of the 'commercial' 
books (Patterson 1985, 69). 
 
As a result of the changes, while still owning and operating the PFR (as well as the 
associated fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants and the supporting development 
facilities), the AEA no longer had the complete responsibility for the project. The PFR 
was designed by the Nuclear Power Group (TNPG), which was subsequently 
transformed and renamed the National Nuclear Corporation (NNC). The project was 
government-funded, but the BNFL and the main nationalised nuclear utilities, the 
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) and the South of Scotland Electricity 
Board (SSEB), were represented in the management of the project and contributed to 
the R&D work (Judd and Ainsworth 1998, 614). 
 
4.2 Towards a commercial fast breeder reactor (CFR) and international 
collaboration (1970s) 
 
In the early 1970s the AEA was pushing the government to approve the construction 
of a Commercial Fast Reactor (CFR), which was to be a scaled-up version of the PFR 
– a 3300 MWth, 1320 MWe oxide-fuelled pool reactor, designed by the NNC (Judd 
and Ainsworth 1998, 614). The first British design study for a 1000 MWe commercial 
fast reactor was produced during the first half of the 1960s (Valéry 1974, 424) and the 
design of a commercial reactor started at earnest in the early 1970s, during the time 
when the PFR was still under construction. The reference design of a 1300 MWe 
reactor, CFR-1, produced by TNPG, emerged in 1973. At this time, about 39% of UK 
public funding of energy R&D went to fast breeders, while the corresponding figure 
in France was about 30% (Surrey and Walker 1975, 93). By 1976 the AEA was 
spending on FBR R&D only – excluding investments – close to £100 million per year 
(Patterson 1985). 
 
However, the launching date for a commercial reactor was repeatedly pushed forward. 
In 1970, the AEA Chairman John Hill expected the construction of a prototype to start 
in 1974, a view reiterated in the AEA annual report 1971 (Patterson 1985, 103-104). 
In its monthly magazine, the Atom, the AEA in February 1973 estimated that, on the 
basis of the experience and know-how acquired through the PFR, a commercial FBR 
programme would be viable, with a lead station coming on line in 1981 and further 
stations in the mid-1980s. The AEA expected the first order to be placed in around 
1976. Patterson (1985, 104) points out the high, if not excessive, ambition of this 
schedule: the CFR would be constructed and running in five years whereas the AGR 
required over eight years to complete. In a presentation delivered in the US in 1973, 
the deputy managing director of the AEA's Reactor Group, Tom Marsham, stated that 
there was “nothing adventurous or foolhardy about” the AEA’s plan, given the 
”[s]atisfactory experience with the experimental reactor DFR in the early 1960s”, and 
the subsequent construction of the PFR (Patterson 1985, 104).  
 
Patterson (1985, 104) suggests that the optimism of the AEA reflected the degree to 
which the organisation was out of touch with the political and economic realities of 
the time. In particular, he argues that the AEA refused to see the trouble in which the 
country's nuclear policy as a whole found itself at the time. Patterson (1985, 104) 
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hence enumerates the numerous reasons that would have, in his view, warranted a 
more cautious approach to FBRs: 
 
"the Dungeness B was in chaos; the later AGR stations were already 
falling behind schedule. The consortia had dwindled to two; the choice of 
reactor for forthcoming nuclear stations was under examination in the 
secret and eventually fruitless deliberations of the Vinter committee."30 
 
In parallel with the Vinter committee examination of thermal reactor policy, another 
committee was examining UK's fast reactor policy. Again, the findings were kept 
secret, but they arguably underpinned a policy statement made on 8 August 1972 in 
front of the House of Commons, in which the then Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, John Davies, announced that the government wanted 'to push ahead as 
rapidly as possible with development of the fast reactor' (cited in Patterson 1985, 103-
104).  
 
However, while the AEA continued, at least until 1977, to press for quick 
development of commercial fast breeder reactors, there were sceptical voices for 
instance in Parliament. For instance, the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities,31 when gathering evidence on the 'EEC Energy Policy 
Strategy' R/3333/74 in the spring of 1975, considered that the EC Commission's 
proposals on nuclear energy were "not realistic" (Patterson 1985, 115). 
 
In the mid-1970s the ranks among the fast breeder advocates slowly began to loosen, 
as the subtle changes in the views of Walter Marshall, at that time the Department of 
Energy’s chief scientist and Harwell’s director, demonstrated. On the one hand, 
Marshall was hesitant about whether the UK should continue developing its own fast 
breeder programme or instead join efforts with other European countries in fast 
breeder development – as suggested by the above-mentioned Commission reports. 
Even more crucially, Marshall expressed doubts about the rate of development of a 
commercial FBR, predicting that, in contrast with the optimistic forecasts from the 
1950s, the UK would "have only two fast reactors operating at the turn of the century 
at the present rate of progress" (Patterson 1985, 115). Marshall’s scepticism reflects a 
more general cleavage between the AEA and the CEGB, with the latter far more 
interested in quickly launching a thermal reactor programme than in pursuing the 
much longer-term R&D effort into fast breeders. Marshall was indeed one of the main 
proponents behind the introduction of PWRs in Britain (Patterson 1985). 
 
                                                
30 Faced with the apparently intractable problem of reactor choice between the AGR and PWR, the 
Conservative government of Edward Heath set up, in 1971, a committee chaired by Peter Vinter, a 
deputy secretary in the Department of Trade and Industry. The committee's report was kept secret even 
to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Science and Technology. According to Patterson (1985, 
104), the secrecy was dictated by the desire to avoid embarrassment caused by the inability of the 
committee to decide on the reactor choice. Instead, the committee apparently took up another similarly 
problematic issue - "the need to streamline Britain's reactor-building industry, and slim it down to 
match the economically plausible demand on it.” [Nuclear Power: Vinter Report: Select Committee 
Acts. Nature  241(5389): 357].  See also an article (Kenward 1973) in the New Scientist, which argued 
the Vinter report should have been made public.  
31 A UK House of Lords committee charged with the task of examining providing advice to the 
government on issues related to EC. 
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4.3 RCEP’s 6th report – the “Flowers Report” (1970s) 
 
The sixth report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) – “an 
independent standing body established in 1970 to advise the Queen, government, 
Parliament and the public on environmental issues” 32 – was to mark a milestone in 
British, and to a certain extent international, fast reactor development. The report, 
published in 1976 and entitled Nuclear Power and the Environment, was allegedly the 
first official statement critical towards fast breeders, and was to be used by opponents 
of fast breeder reactors also in France (see e.g. Martin 1976) to support their 
arguments. Patterson (1985, 42) notes that the report laid out its view "in lucid but 
magisterial terms…with supporting arguments of impeccable authority." The report 
generated considerable attention in the media and the nuclear establishment, notably 
because the chairman of the RCEP heading the commission, Sir Brian Flowers, was 
himself an 'insider' of the nuclear establishment. As a distinguished nuclear physicist, 
rector of the Imperial College, and a part-time board member of the AEA, Flowers’ 
views could not be simply dismissed by reference to any "subversive motives" that the 
nuclear advocates habitually imputed to the "less eminent among their critics" 
(Patterson 1985, 79). According to Patterson (1985, 42), the report’s "most 
controversial findings challenged official British policy about plutonium, reprocessing 
and the fast breeder." 
 
 
The Flowers report could be described as one that cautiously endorsed nuclear energy 
in general, but raised concerns about numerous fundamental issues concerning the 
way in which nuclear power was being developed in the UK. Already in 1975, 
Flowers wrote to Prime Minister James Callaghan asking him to delay decisions “on 
whether to proceed with such a [fast breeder] plant in collaboration with other 
European countries” until the Royal Commission had published its report. Kenward 
(1976a) summarises the main highlights of the report, noting that it  
 raised concerns about the ‘plutonium economy’, notably the possibilities of 
“threat and blackmail against society” that plutonium seemed to offer; 
highlighted the risks of the “construction of a crude nuclear weapon by an 
illicit group”, as well as the problems associated with producing plutonium in 
large quantities “in conditions of increasing world unrest”;  
 called into question – on environmental grounds – the scale of the proposed 
nuclear programme, and argued that while commitment to fission power 
should not be abandoned, “we should postpone commitment to fission and 
plutonium economy as long as possible”;33  
 was apparently the first official statement in the UK highlighting the 
unresolved nuclear waste problem: as it argued that commitment to any 
significant nuclear fission programme should be contingent on the 
demonstration “beyond reasonable doubt” that the waste problem can be 
solved;  
                                                
32 Within this remit the Commission has freedom to consider and advise on any matter it chooses; the 
government may also request consideration of particular topics 
(http://web.archive.org/web/20000306220337/www.rcep.org.uk/about.html). 
33 By contrast, the report was favourable to nuclear fusion, calling for increasing support for the 
development of “other energy sources”, such as energy conservation, combined heat and power, and 
fusion (e.g. Kenward 1976a). 
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 called for support to alternatives sources of energy, including energy 
conservation, combined heat and power and nuclear fusion; and  
 postulated that any major commitment to a nuclear programme, including the 
construction of fast breeder reactors, should be preceded by a process of public 
consultation. 
 
The Commission’s recommendations on the fast breeders left room for some 
speculation. On the one hand, it stated that “purely on environmental grounds”, the 
plans to build a commercial fast breeder reactor should be delayed (paragraphs 517-
18). On the other hand, it stated that “[w]e don’t oppose the construction of CFR1 on 
environmental grounds”, but demanded that the Commission’s views be taken into 
account when government makes decisions on the future of the fast breeder 
programme (recommendation 49). The ambiguity is perhaps explained by the fact that 
the Commission was critical about a large-scale fast breeder programme, which it saw 
as a logical likely outcome of the construction of a CFR1. Hence, the report feared 
that “the cost and the momentum” of the construction of a CFR would inevitably lead 
to a large FBR programme in the future, and stressed that there were substantial 
environmental arguments against a nuclear programme of the scale envisaged in 
official projections (Nuclear power and the environment 1976; Kenward 1976a). 
Unsurprisingly, the anti-nuclear NGOs, both in the UK and in France, eagerly seized 
upon the Flowers report to support their claims about the inherent risks involved in 
fast breeder technology (e.g. Martin 1976).  
 
In view of this ambiguity, it was by no means surprising that the report would 
generate heated debate and conflicting interpretations also among the insiders within 
the nuclear establishment. Walter Marshall, at this time deputy chairman of the AEA 
and chief scientists for the Department of Energy, criticised the report for ambiguity, 
underlining that while especially its recommendation no. 49 (stating that there were 
“no environmental reasons against FBR”), could be read as an endorsement of the 
FBR programme, the comments by RCEP members after the release of the report 
highlighted that on purely environmental grounds, CFPR should be postponed. 
 
John Hill, then in charge of the AEA, flatly opposed Flowers’ recommendations, 
referring to the “very clean bill of health to the British nuclear industry”, arguing 
further that Flower report’s predictions about the future risks were based on a shaky 
ground: in the next 25 years the technology would advance greatly, making it simply 
“wrong” to worry about a large-scale nuclear programme based on technology of the 
mid-1970s, because this was simply “not going to happen” (Kenward 1976a). 
 
Kenward (1976a) further describes the varying reactions to the Flowers report. Ned 
Franklin, chairman of the Nuclear Power Company, described the report as 
reasonable, even though he did not agree on every detail. Con Allday, the chairman of 
the BNFL, was critical, while some of the senior research staff at his organisation 
were far less unhappy with the report. 
 
One of the most crucial bases upon which the Flowers commission built its scepticism 
concerned what it considered as highly unrealistic electricity demand forecasts. The 
economic stagnation caused by the first oil crisis had brought an abrupt end to the 
development of the UK electricity supply system, and the rate of growth in electricity 
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demand fell sharply – in the UK from an average of 7% per year in 1955–1970 to 
around 1–2% by the mid-1980s (Chesshire 1996, 27). In fact, the use of electricity in 
Britain fell in the couple of years immediately following the first oil crisis of 1973 
(Patterson 1985, 42). 
 
The main changes in government policy triggered by the Flowers report were the 
transfer of nuclear waste management from the remit of the Department of Energy to 
the Department of the Environment, the setting up of an advisory committee on the 
interaction between energy and environmental policy, and the promise, by the 
environment secretary, Peter Short, that “some sort of public debate” would probably 
be organised, possibly a planning inquiry commission, before the government decides 
on the proposed commercial fast breeder reactor (CFR1).34 
 
Even though the Flowers Report put a damper over the possibility of building a large 
commercial FBR, the AEA continued to develop the design for a 1300 MWe 
demonstration FBR (Parker and Surrey 1995, 835). 
 
4.4 Reprocessing, proliferation concerns and the Windscale Inquiry (late 1970s) 
 
From the beginning of fast breeder development, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel 
had constituted an essential element in the vision of a nuclear future based on large-
scale exploitation of the technology. Reprocessing was first introduced in the 1940s to 
provide plutonium for nuclear weapons. In the UK, an integrated plutonium 
production site, involving both reactors and reprocessing, was established in 
Windscale, and later run by British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL). The spent fuels from the 
British Magnox reactors required reprocessing, as a means of preventing the fuel from 
becoming a hazard35 (Walker 2000, 835). Even though this necessity disappeared with 
the adoption of AGR and PWR technologies, reprocessing went on, in anticipation of 
the emerging “plutonium economy”, in which fast breeder reactors would require a 
steady supply of plutonium from reprocessing.  
 
In early 1977, all eyes of the nuclear community were at the planned, highly 
controversial, inquiry into the construction of a reprocessing plant, THORP (Thermal 
Oxide Reprocessing Plant), at Windscale. Walker (1999, 9-13) describes the main 
reasons for the BNFL’s eagerness to construct a dedicated reprocessing plant: UK’s 
desire to become a major player in international reprocessing business, with contracts 
already signed with European and Japanese utilities in the expectation that a new plant 
would be built; the BNFL’s favourable bargaining position vis-à-vis the UK utilities 
(notably CEGB) as a provider of reprocessing services36; and need to comply with the 
Euratom safeguards (the UK had accessed to the Euratom Treaty in 1972). Walker 
                                                
34 Government responds to Flowers report. New Scientist, 2 June 1977, p. 515. 
35 The reason for this procedure was that spent fuel was temporarily stored in water-filled ‘ponds’, but 
Magnox fuel’s metallic casing corroded in water. This would no longer be the case for AGR and PWR 
technologies, because fuel from these plants did not erode in water, and therefore opened the possibility 
of long-term storage. (Walker 2000) 
36 The UK electricity suppliers could have resorted to long-term storage of spent AGR fuel as an 
alternative to reprocessing, but they had failed to build enough on-site storage capacity and were 
therefore highly dependent on BNFL for reprocessing (Walker 1999, 10-11). 
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(2000) notes that for the BNFL, reprocessing promised to be a highly lucrative 
activity. Since Germany and Japan had no involvement with nuclear weaponry, they 
also lacked experience of large-scale reprocessing. Britain and France hence saw their 
opportunity in providing reprocessing services to these countries. Presumably a key 
reason for the German and Japanese interest in reprocessing was these countries’ 
desire to avoid the difficult decisions on what to do with their spent nuclear fuel. For 
the BNFL, reprocessing German and Japanese spent nuclear fuel was all the more 
attractive, since the customers paid for the service upfront. 
 
A central reason for the calling of a public inquiry on THORP was the series of 
incidents and radiation leaks between 1973 and 1976, starting with problems with a 
fuel pond and culminating with the leaks of radioactivity to the Irish Sea (Walker 
1999, 13). The decision was precipitated by factors concerning the general contexts, 
including the forecasts of an increasing role to be attributed to nuclear power and 
plutonium in energy supply in wake of the first oil crisis, the greater weight that the 
process of public inquiry was acquiring in numerous areas of governmental decision-
making, the rising professionalism of environmental NGOs (e.g. the Friends of the 
Earth), and the scepticism of the Minister for Technology Tony Benn (formally 
responsible for nuclear policy) towards the construction of THORP (Walker 1999, 
14). 
 
Recognising the high political sensitivities, both nationally and abroad, associated 
with the possibility of constructing a reprocessing plant designed to treat both 
domestic and imported spent nuclear fuel, the government held the Windscale Inquiry 
on the planned reprocessing plant (THORP) and promised to give Parliament a greater 
say on the decisions.  
 
4.4.1 The institution of public inquiry and the run-up to Windscale Inquiry 
 
In the UK, a public inquiry is an official review of events or actions ordered by a 
government body. Unlike a Royal Commission, a public inquiry accepts evidence and 
conducts its hearings in a more public forum and focuses on a more specific 
occurrence. In this way, the process enables interested parties to come together, 
present their arguments and evidence, and examine a specific development proposal 
in detail (Rough 2011, 24). Each inquiry is a temporary structure, and can last 
anywhere between one day and several years. Inquiries have been a habitual feature of 
the regulatory framework governing the siting of power stations for more than a 
century. An inquiry was mandatory in case the local planning authority objected to the 
granting of an approval for the project in question. Otherwise, inquiries are held at the 
minister’s discretion. Subsequent to the decision to hold an inquiry, the minister 
appoints an inspector to oversee the proceedings. At the completion of the process, the 
inspector submits a report summarizing the cases for and against the proposal, and 
provides specific recommendations concerning the granting or withholding of 
consent. While the minister usually takes the final decision, based on considerations 
of ‘national interest’, the inspector has considerable discretion over the format of the 
inquiry. For instance, Rough (2011, 30) notes that the nuclear inquiries in the period 
1955-1961 allowed discussion not only on the local-level project in question, but also 
on the broader aspects of the country’s nuclear policy. 
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Walker (1999) cites three functions provided by public inquiry: a means for openly 
venting conflicts and disagreements in a quasi-judicial arena; a means of arriving at 
definite decisions through a rational procedure examining the virtues and the 
downsides of a given proposal; and an opportunity for politicians and authorities to 
legitimise their decisions. Public inquiries are non-judicial ‘advisory mechanisms’ 
that form a part of “the fabric of administrative jurisdiction” in Britain (Wraith and 
Lamb 1971, 31). In theory, they are intended to provide information to assist the 
minister in the implementation of a pre-existing policy, but in practice they serve a 
more strategic, political function (Rough 2011, 24). Such functions include that of a 
“safety valve” allowing opponents of a contentious development to “blow off steam” 
(Drapkin 1974, 243), and the legitimisation of controversial decisions and policies 
(Kemp 1985). Public inquiries have served a crucial function also in decisions 
concerning nuclear power in the UK, representing for instance in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s “the only formal opportunity open to the public to question the siting of a 
nuclear facility”. Wynne (1982, in Rough 2011, 24) notes that the seven public 
inquiries held on nuclear reactors between 1956 and 1961 “were a rare point of 
contact between the public, national groups, such as the Council for the Protection of 
Rural England, policy makers, and industry”. 
 
While the British planning law required only that the local Cumbria County Council 
approve the BNFL planning application for a reprocessing plant at Windscale, by 
mid-1976 the plan had aroused wide-ranging debate and opposition. The Energy 
minister had deemed the outcome of the two public debates, held in 1975 and 1976,37 
sufficiently positive to warrant a continuation of “overseas business” by BNFL. On 25 
June, 1976, BNFL then submitted a formal application to the Cumbria County 
Council for an outline planning application. The Council was indeed minded to accept 
BNFL’s application, but decided nevertheless to refer the issue to the Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Peter Shore (Greenhalgh 1978). Despite the government’s 
initial reluctance (for details, see Walker 1999, 13-14), the Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Peter Shore, announced in the end of 1976 that the Windscale proposal 
would be made the subject of a planning inquiry. The final trigger for the inquiry was 
the “sensational publicity” (Greenhalgh 1978) following the revelation, in December 
1976, that the BNFL had failed to inform the government about a leakage of low level 
radioactive water from a storage silo containing spent fuel hulls (Greenhalgh 1978; 
Walker 1999, 14). Unlike the previous public inquiries concerning nuclear 
installations, which had been rather routine procedures focusing on local issues 
(Walker 1999, 13), the Windscale Inquiry would consider also national and 
international aspects of the proposal. The Inspector in charge of the Inquiry would 
report to the Secretary of State for the Environment, who with his Cabinet colleagues 
would then take responsibility for approval or rejection of the BNFL application. 
Exceptionally, Parliament was entrusted with the decision on THORP through the 
device of a Special Development Order upon which the House of Commons would 
vote (Walker 2000, 837).  
                                                
37 A public debate was first held on 11 December 1975 at local level at Barrow in Furness and then on 
15 January 1976 at the national level at Church House, Westminster, on the proposals to refurbish the 
existing Magnox reprocessing plant, and to build the THORP plant. The debates were held under 
presumably independent chairmen, with participants including environmentalist groups and a wide 
range of representatives of local and national organisations. (Greenhalgh 1978). 
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The inquiry was led by Justice Parker, assisted by two technical assessors – Sir 
Frederick Warner, a chemical engineer of international repute, and Sir Edward 
Pochin, a radiologist of similar eminence (Patterson 1978), and the various witnesses 
gave their evidence under oath (Greenhalgh 1978). According to Walker (1999, 36), 
the quality of the inquiry suffered from the fact that especially Warner was known as 
a staunch advocate of fast breeder technology, and had presumably a strong influence 
on judgements made by Parker. Indeed, a number of environmental NGOs, together 
with the government of the Isle of Man, immediately protested against the 
composition of the commission (Patterson 1978). The designation of a judge of the 
High Court38 rather than just a Department of the Environment official to lead the 
inquiry testified to the exceptional nature of the Windscale Inquiry (Patterson 1978), 
and to the desire to ensure the independence of the procedure.  
 
4.4.2 Reprocessing, FBRs and proliferation fears 
 
For the development of FBRs, the question of reprocessing was crucial, as the key 
underlying rationale for reprocessing was the utilisation of reprocessed fuel in fast 
breeder reactors. Furthermore, Collingridge (1984b, 62) argued that the choice of the 
AGR technology and reprocessing its waste in the THORP reprocessing plant played 
in favour of fast breeders. The construction of THORP would increase the 
attractiveness of an FBR as an investment, since learning how to reprocess thermal 
oxide fuel, such as that from AGRs, was seen as an essential step towards a breeder 
economy. In financial and economic terms, the choice of AGR had provoked equally 
significant: without the AGR, there would be no immediate need to invest in THORP, 
and the costs of THORP would appear on the balance sheet of the breeder, whereas 
with AGR, the cost of THORP would appear on that reactor’s account. 
 
The lead-up to the Windscale Inquiry risked being difficult for the fast breeder 
advocates, since only a month before the opening of the inquiry, in May 1977, an 
explosion took place at the PFR at Dounreay, in the access shaft leading into a waste-
disposal tunnel under the seabed offshore. However, Patterson (2010, 81-82) holds it 
as hardly a surprise that almost no mention was made in the media about the 
explosion. Just a month earlier, on 7 April 1977, the Carter administration in the US 
had added to the difficulties, by its decision that the country would give up the 
development of reprocessing and fast breeders, mainly because it deemed the 
associated proliferation risks as excessive. 
 
European and Japanese governments were not discouraged by the US government’s 
decision to give up reprocessing, but sought instead to set up infrastructure needed to 
make the ‘plutonium economy’ a reality. The American non-proliferation policy did 
not seem to have a great impact on UK decisions; indeed, a former AEA scientist 
described the Americans’ concern for proliferation as somewhat excessive ‘hysteria’.  
However, as mentioned by our interviewees, proliferation was very much on the 
                                                
38 The High Court deals at first instance with all high value civil disputes, and includes also the 
administrative court, with a broad range of cases under its responsibility 
(http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/rcj/index.htm). 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
agenda of public discussion and NGO opposition against the ‘nuclear complex’. Even 
industry insiders voiced concerns in the late 1970s, with the Flowers report as a 
prominent example. The Independent newspaper (Buchan 1993) quotes a presumably 
famous lecture given by Lord Marshall, the head of the CEGB in the 1980s, at Salford 
University in 1979: ”There is . . . a risk that if plutonium-bearing thermal reactor fuel 
is developed and used in any thermal reactors, it will ultimately be used the world 
over. This may give rise to a significant increase in the technical opportunities for 
proliferation (of nuclear weapons) with only a marginal economic and resource gain 
to set against the risk.” Proliferation risks were likewise evoked by Papadopoulos 
(1981), who reminded of the dangers involved in plutonium transport that a plutonium 
economy based on fast breeders and reprocessing would require. The technical and 
administrative measures proposed by the nuclear industry to prevent such threats 
would, according to Papadopoulos, not only impose significant costs, but would also 
potentially threaten civil liberties.  
 
4.4.3 The outcome of the Inquiry: landmark of participatory decision-making or 
a symbol of opposition against the ‘nuclear complex’? 
 
The Windscale Inquiry began its hearing on 14 June 1977 and ended on 4 November 
1977 (Greenhalgh 1978). The main participants in the inquiry were represented by a 
legal counsel. The 100 days of inquiry involved oral evidence and cross-examination 
from several dozen witnesses, and all the sessions were open to the press and the 
public (Patterson 1978). The Inquiry transcript totalled over 4 million words, backed 
by some 1,500 documents (ibid.). As evidence for the neutrality and balanced 
approach of the inquiry, Greenhalgh (1978) evokes the numbers of days spent on 
hearing different parties to the debate: “BNFL occupied 30 of the 100 days, BNFL 
supporters another 10 days, Government departments 10 days, the objectors 40 days, 
with 10 days given to opening and closing statements.” According to Greenhalgh, 
BNFL produced 17 witnesses and received support from another 19 organisations and 
individuals, while the objectors produced as many as 84 witnesses including a number 
from the United States. The cost of the Inquiry was well over £1 million (Patterson). 
To the surprise and dismay of the project’s opponents, the final report of the inquiry, 
published in January 1978, declared unequivocal support to the immediate 
construction of THORP, as the BNFL had requested. Exceptionally, Parliament was 
entrusted with the final decision on THORP through the device of a Special 
Development Order upon which the House of Commons would vote (Walker 2000, 
837). 
 
The inquiry has been hailed as a ‘landmark in British nuclear policy making’ (Hall 
1986, 161), thanks to its broad scope and participatory approach (Shore 1977, cited in 
McAuslan 1979, 15). Greenhalgh (1978) evokes the suggestion by the Secretary of 
State for the Environment that no other country in the western world had ever had a 
more open, thorough and impartial examination of a major nuclear proposal, as well 
as the final submission by Mr. Kidwell, the Counsel for the Friends of the Earth, 
recognising the impartiality of the Tribunal.  
 
However, a substantial number of observers have argued to the contrary, criticising 
the final report and the inquiry process on a several counts. Patterson (1985, 126) 
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argued that the report had failed to justify why the arguments of the opposition had 
been rejected. In an interview for support of this report, Patterson explained his 
disappointment as the lead witness of the Friends of the Earth: “along with another 
colleague and a very experienced lawyer we came away from the inquiry absolutely 
convinced we had made an unanswerable case against them acquiring permission for 
building the plant. But the inspector of inquiry ignored our case and gave the full go 
ahead to BNFL to build the plant.” Patterson (1978) further evoked “the Inspector's 
persistent misrepresentation of witnesses, by selective quotation out of context.” The 
opponents were dissatisfied with the way in which the report makes many witnesses 
to appear as if they were “advancing arguments diametrically opposite to their actual 
presentation before the Inquiry” (ibid.). Greenhalgh (1978) refutes this charge by 
arguing that it was based on a misunderstanding of the nature and the function of an 
inquiry, which was not to provide “a summary or precis of the differing views put 
forward at the Inquiry” but instead to present “the basis on which the Inspector's view 
was formed”, including the arguments and evidence underpinning the judgment. 
Walker (1999, 15-22) highlights what he saw as the three main shortcomings in the 
inquiry: the Inspector’s predisposition to approve BNFL’s proposal, which lead to an 
inadequate framing of the question; misrepresentation of uncertainty as if the only 
uncertainty concerned future demand of energy, and giving greater credence to high 
rather than low forecasts of energy demand; and the failure to consider the ‘exit 
options’, i.e. the ease or difficulty with which the UK could escape – or at least 
modify – the plan to construct the plant in case the future was to turn out different 
than predicted.  
 
Wynne (1982), in his seminal work on the Windscale Inquiry, takes a broader view 
and condemns the inquiry process as erroneous; he contends that the entire inquiry 
process was built on methods of analysis and interpretation, which reflect symbolic 
universes that contain their own implicit morality and social meaning. According to 
Wynne, big inquiries such as that on Windscale are not intended to dig below the 
surface of a particular rationality and ritual. Patterson (1978) notes that the “objectors 
were by no means the only ones unimpressed by the Report”, evoking critical 
editorials in The New Scientist, Nature, and the London Observer that questioned the 
Report's conclusions and counselled caution, and other newspapers and magazines 
including the Times and the Economist that “found the Report's discussion of the 
proliferation case unconvincing”. Finally, it is notable that the criticism against the 
Windscale Inquiry seems to have persisted for a long time. For example, Buchan 
(1993) reports about a senior government official of the Conservative government of 
John Major, sceptical about THORP, who clearly did not hold the Windscale Inquiry 
and the recommendations by Mr Justice Parker from fifteen years earlier in much 
esteem: “You don't want to build anything on Parker”. 
 
Indeed, reprocessing has been a significantly more contentious issue in the UK 
nuclear policy than that of FBRs, largely because of the alleged very high economic 
cost of running THORP, the widespread view according to which the Windscale 
Inquiry (on the construction of THORP) was highly defective and one-sided, and the 
intimate link of reprocessing with the problems of finding a solution to the nuclear 
waste problem (e.g. Buchan 1993). One of our interviewees, who was among the 
leading figures at the Friends of the Earth at the time, argued that THORP had “left a 
huge radioactive elephant at stupefying cost to UK taxpayers”. Moreover, the 
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Windscale Inquiry represented a landmark case in the UK nuclear policy, and in UK 
planning and decision-making more generally (e.g. Walker 1999). Furthermore, the 
Inquiry became an important symbol for the anti-nuclear movement, despite its failure 
to prevent the construction of THORP (Walker 1999, 28). 
 
Unsurprisingly, in view of the intense political confrontation that Carter 
administration's decision had triggered between the US and the rest of the world - or 
at least between the nuclear establishments in these countries – the Windscale Inquiry 
and the parliamentary debates following it were strongly marked by proliferation 
concerns (e.g. Walker 1999, 22-27; Walker 2000). As a result of the high-level 
diplomatic exchange that had followed Carter administration's declaration, a study 
called the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) was launched in 
October 1977, with participation from 66 countries and five international agencies. 
Patterson (1985, 116) argues that while the INFCE was supposedly only technical in 
nature, with the task of comparing different nuclear fuel cycles and their possible use 
for acquisition of weapons, in reality its outcome was to a large extent the result of 
intense lobbying from the "plutonium lobbies" of countries such as the UK (with the 
AEA at the forefront) in favour of reprocessing and the fast breeder. The report 
therefore declared that proliferation was a political problem, which should be left to 
the politicians to solve (Skjöldebrand 1980).  
 
4.5 CFR – an experimental or commercial reactor? (late 1970s) 
 
With the Windscale Inquiry still underway, in September 1977, the Select Committee 
on Science and Technology published the report 'Alternative Sources of Energy' 
recommending the construction of a commercial fast breeder reactor (CFR). However, 
by this time, the government had become increasingly hesitant to proceed with the 
CFR as its main concern was to ensure the nuclear manufacturing sector in the UK 
would stay afloat, by placing an order on thermal reactors that could be brought on 
line with a minimum delay. In a similar way as in France, the 'fast breeder dream' was 
giving way to the need to ensure the quick construction of thermal reactors, which in 
the UK also meant choosing between alternative designs - between the AGR and the 
PWR.  
 
Not only the gradual shift in the status of the fast breeder from the flagship project of 
nuclear industry to a long-term R&D project, but also the confusion and disagreement 
around the late 1970s about the name of the planned new reactor were reminiscent of 
the French fast breeder development. The question was obviously not only semantic, 
but would have profound implications on who was to pay for the new reactor. 
 
In 1977, John Hill (AEA) declared that the proposed new reactor would not be 
experimental, but just another nuclear power station, of a new design. However, as 
pointed out by Patterson (1985, 84), if this were the case, the ‘commercial’ reactor 
would not be paid by the AEA, but by the CEGB, the electricity supplier. However, 
according to Patterson (2010, 84), the CEGB was prepared to provide a site for the 
new fast breeder, but did not want to invest in the plant, not least because it was 
already struggling with excess generating capacity and did not want to get involved in 
the construction of yet another potentially problematic plant. The AEA therefore 
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quickly proceeded to changing the denomination of the new reactor, with Sir Hill this 
time declaring that "the plant would not be in any conventional sense 'commercial'. It 
would 'demonstrate' the design for a commercial plant; but its electricity output would 
not be competitive in cost with that from conventional generating plants" (Patterson 
1985, 113). Observers were quick to point out the inherent contradiction in the new 
name of the reactor - the Commercial Demonstration Fast Reactor (CDFR): surely, a 
reactor would have to be either commercial or for demonstration – not the two at the 
same time (Sweet 1982, 26; Patterson 2010, 84).  
 
In addition to the question of the sharing of the financing burden, the name of the 
reactor would affect the criteria against which the performance of the reactor would 
be assessed. A commercial reactor could only be judged as a success if it was 
economically viable, whereas an experimental reactor would be judged largely on its 
technical performance, notably its ability to provide a solid basis for the subsequent 
deployment of commercial reactors. Sweet (1982, 26) argued that as a de facto 
experimental reactor, the new CDFR should be evaluated in light of the opportunity 
costs of public R&D: “CDFR “should more properly be regarded as another stage in 
fast reactor R&D”, and the opportunity costs involved therefore ought to be 
quantified. 
 
These semantic battles were symptomatic of an atmosphere that had become 
increasingly hostile to the rapid introduction of a commercial-scale fast breeder 
reactor. Therefore, the approval given by the Energy Secretary Tony Benn in January 
1978 for the construction of a new PWR pushed the introduction of a commercial fast 
breeder further into the future, in the context of a stagnant electricity demand and the 
existence of excess generating capacity. In the same year, the government decided to 
hold off constructing a commercial FBR until a full public inquiry, similar to the one 
just organised on the construction of THORP, would be conducted. Concerns about 
the need to ensure adequate public participation in decision-making gained more 
importance during this period, with the AEA producing its first publicly available cost 
estimates on the construction of a commercial fast breeder reactor (e.g. Pearson 1978), 
The on-going debate on “coal vs. nuclear” was to large extent framed in terms of costs 
– an approach criticised for instance by Pearson (1978, 78), who remarked that 
“[m]ore relevant than coal versus nuclear economics is the effect of fast breeder 
development on the UK economy and employment prospects.” 
 
4.6 "Thatcher the scientist" takes office: an interlude of optimism in the fast 
reactor community (late 1970s) 
The election of Margaret Thatcher as the Prime minister in May 1979 briefly revived 
the hopes of the fast breeder advocates. Thanks to her scientific training, Thatcher had 
a capacity exceptional for a politician to understand the technical intricacies involved 
in nuclear power. Moreover, soon after taking office, on 6 September 1979, she 
visited Dounreay, and openly declared the government's support for the fast breeder 
project, pending on an inquiry:  
 
"My own personal view is that we should continue with fast reactors, but 
the government has agreed and is therefore obliged to have an inquiry, 
and it is not up to me to prejudge the outcome." (Patterson 1985, 116) 
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The revival of the support to fast breeders turned out to be short-lived, as the attention 
soon shifted again to the thermal reactor programme. For example, in 1981-82, the 
main focus of nuclear controversy was about the PWR Sizewell B, while “the fast 
breeder people kept their heads down” (Patterson 2010, 85). 
 
4.7 International collaboration - preparations for the 'fallback option' begin (late 
1970s to 1980s) 
 
Despite the initial optimism that Thatcher's open endorsement of nuclear power and 
fast breeders had generated, fast breeder people were already in the late 1970s 
preparing for international collaboration as a fallback option if and when the national 
FBR programme would not advance as expected.39 As Judd and Ainsworth (1998, 
615) note, as the prospects for commercial exploitation of fast breeder technology was 
pushed further into the future and the emphasis progressively shifted to R&D, 
separate national programmes appeared increasingly wasteful and expensive. As 
argued by Patterson (1985, 117), this was not to be simple and easy either. By this 
time, the British government had to concede that the French were now leading the 
Western world in fast breeder development. While the French Phenix plant at 
Marcoule had had its troubles, it was nevertheless operating and generating electricity 
much more reliably than the Dounreay PFR. Likewise, the full-scale Superphénix at 
Creys-Malville was behind schedule and over budget, but expected to be on stream by 
1984. Concretely, the French dominance meant that they were able to impose on the 
British an 'admission fee' of £50 million if they wished to participate in European fast-
breeder collaboration (Patterson 1985, 117). 
 
Patterson (1985, 114) describes the dilemmas faced by CEGB concerning European 
collaboration. The plans for European collaboration involved the construction of three 
separate full-scale demonstration plants in France, Germany and Britain. The CEGB 
had already in the 1970s agreed to take a 3 % interest in the international group, SBK 
(Schnell-Bruter-Kernkraftwerk), which owned 16 % of the French Superphénix 1200 
MW plant which was under construction, and was planning a sister station, SNR-2, in 
Germany. The minuscule holding hardly allowed the CEGB to actively participate in 
the development, but enabled it to keep an eye on the continental fast breeder 
activities. 
 
Furthermore, despite the proliferation anxieties in the US, the Americans and the 
British set up a joint research group, using Dounreay and the nuclear power facilities 
in Idaho Falls as examples. The UK was also working on establishing a research 
group, Fastec (fast reactor technology) to exchange experience and data with Serena, 
a company comprising its European counterparts including France, Germany, 
Belgian, Italy and the Netherlands. 
 
                                                
39 For example, one of our academic interviewees (economist), noted that European collaboration 
provided an ‘exit strategy’ for national fast breeder programmes, but questioned whether a project that 
was not economically viable at the national level could be rendered viable simply by pooling resources 
at international level. See also Patterson (1986). 
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Collaboration started in 1982 between France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Italy, and in January 1984 Peter Walker, Secretary of State for Energy, and Sir 
Peter Hirsch, the chairman of the AEA, signed an inter-governmental memorandum of 
understanding which opened the way for wide-ranging cooperation and eventually to 
the merging of the UK fast reactor development programme with those of its 
continental neighbours (Judd and Ainsworth 1998, 615). The cooperation involved 
electricity suppliers, as well as nuclear and fuel cycle organisations in each country – 
from the UK, the CEGB, the AEA, British Nuclear Fuels and the National Nuclear 
Corporation. 
 
V. THE FINAL COUP DE GRACE: CHANGING EXTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT, THATCHER’S POLITICAL AMBITIONS AND 
ECONOMIC LIBERALISM (1980S) 
 
The rhetoric in favour of fast breeders remained strong in the late 1970s and even 
early onto the 1980s. Patterson (1985, 114) argues that the nuclear energy proponents 
continued to support the FBR with ‘evangelical fervour’. Some AEA staff continued 
until at least 1977 talking about a vast and immediate programme of fast breeders. 
The technology was still portrayed as a means to meet the world’s increasing future 
energy needs. The government also kept to its rhetoric in favour of the fast breeder 
programme. Following the government’s review of the fast breeder programme in 
November 1982, during the Sizewell inquiry, the Secretary of State for Energy, Nigel 
Lawson, addressed his view to the House of Commons (Patterson 1985, 117-118): 
 
"The Fast Reactor is of major strategic significance for the UK's and the 
world's future energy supplies. It is 50 times as efficient a user of uranium 
as thermal reactors such as the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor and 
Pressurized Water Reactor, and can create out of the spent fuel and 
depleted uranium which has so far arisen from our thermal programme 
fuel equivalent to our economically recoverable coal-reserves. 
 
The UK is among the world's leaders in the development of this 
technology. Through the successful programme of research and 
development undertaken by the Atomic Energy Authority, which centres 
on the operation of the Prototype Fast Reactor and associated fuel cycle 
at Dounreay, we have demonstrated the feasibility and potential of this 
technology. We have also collaborated with other major countries who 
have programmes in this field. We are in an excellent position to carry the 
programme forward and to prepare for the introduction of commercial 
fast reactors when these are needed to augment our thermal reactor 
programme.  
 
The Government has therefore decided to continue with a substantial 
development programme for the fast reactor based on Dounreay and I 
have asked the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority, Sir Peter 
Hirsch, in consultation with the generating boards, British Nuclear Fuels 
Ltd and the National Nuclear Corporation to draw up a future 
development programme which makes the best use of our resources and 
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experience. 
 
However, Lawson’s on the surface positive statement about fast breeders as a 
technology of key strategic importance tended to conceal a subtle message about fast 
breeders as a technology for the future, which will eventually be needed as a 
supplement to the thermal reactor programme. Lawson further noted that “the series 
ordering phase will begin in the earlier part of the next century” and that the 
development programme would “be geared to this timescale” (Patterson 2010, 85). 
 
In essence, this declaration meant that the government was slowing down the 
programme, and the AEA cut its R&D expenditure on fast breeders by a third, to 
about £70 million a year (Campbell 1984). The shift in emphasis away from fast 
breeder R&D to the construction of thermal reactors also further marginalised the 
AEA in the UK nuclear community, and the concomitant rise in the status of the 
CEGB. According to one of our AEA interviewees, such a shift, in turn, contributed 
to a ‘brain drain’ as capable AEA scientists and engineers – especially those who 
wished to ‘make a difference’ – sought work opportunities at the CEGB. 
 
Kreczko et al. (1987, 303-304) report on a lecture delivered to the British Nuclear 
Energy Society on 15 September 198340 by Sir Peter Hirsch, the former Chairman of 
the AEA. Hirsch expressed the official view that a demonstration fast reactor (CDFR) 
should be in operation by the year 2000, based on the assumption that the Generating 
Boards should decide on the first series-orders at around 2005, with the entry in 
operation of these reactors in 2015. 
 
At this point in time, the timetable for the introduction of commercial fast breeder 
reactors had slipped far to the 21st century, in stark contrast with the optimism that had 
prevailed until the early 1970s. This postponement was brought about largely by the 
changes that had made the external environment much more hostile to nuclear energy 
in general and to fast breeders in particular. The changes were summarised by Piran 
(1984, 180-181) through the following sequence of events:  
 
 economic stagnation in the Western economies and the Three Mile Island 
accident, which led to… 
 a sharp drop in the number of orders for new nuclear stations, which in turn… 
 undermined earlier estimations of growth in nuclear industry and the evolution 
of uranium prices, which again were accompanied by… 
 the escalation of the cost of reprocessing and… 
 difficulties in gaining public acceptance. 
 
Piran (1984, 181) concluded that the large-scale deployment of fast breeders would 
therefore almost certainly be delayed. 
 
Apart from the Three Mile Island accident, public opposition against nuclear energy 
was further fuelled by growing concern about radiation safety and probably by the 
massive demonstrations in France against the Superphénix project in Creys-Malville 
in 1977 (despite the fact that the opposition in France waned after this traumatic 
                                                
40 Published in Atom, No 325, November 1983, pp 242-251. 
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demonstration, in which one demonstrator died). The potential negative health effects 
of the Dounreay site gained increasing attention as a particle of irradiated Material 
Testing Reactor (MTR) fuel was found in 1983, in a routine radiological survey at 
predetermined locations on the Dounreay beach (Toole 2005). The particle was 
primarily composed of aluminium and contained a small amount of uranium as well 
as fission products (ibid.). The discovery resulted in the closure of beaches along a 
10-mile coastal stretch, and warnings against swimming in the sea41, and the BNFL 
was fined £10,000 for the discharge.42 The ‘beach incident’ was closely followed by a 
Yorkshire TV documentary “Sellafield – the nuclear laundry”, which alleged there 
was a cluster of leukaemia cases linked to the site (Osborne and Huston 2009). Even 
though no causal link between Sellafield and leukaemia clusters could be established, 
the wide media coverage was to tarnish Sellafield’s reputation for years. The beach 
incident contributed to the launching of regular monitoring of radioactivity on 
Dounreay beaches (Toole 2005). It also prompted the BNFL to revise its PR strategy. 
The company sought to remedy the reputation of dishonesty and secrecy that 
prevailed among citizens, by demystifying Sellafield through an ‘open door’ policy, 
newspaper advertisement campaign, organised media visits to Sellafield, and the 
construction of a Visitors Centre (Osborne and Huston 2009). Moreover, the leaks in 
Windscale, which had ultimately triggered the public inquiry on THORP, had further 
eroded public confidence in the technology. 
 
While Judd and Ainsworth (1998, 615) recognise the importance of the technical 
problems and the high cost of the PFR as contributory factors to the postponement 
and eventual cancellation of the CFR project, they attribute the main cause to the 
revisions in the electricity demand and uranium price forecasts, i.e. what the 
developers and advocates of fast breeders often conceive of as ‘external factors’. Judd 
and Ainsworth likewise note that the utilities were fully occupied in getting thermal 
reactors up and running.  
 
The above factors were valid across the entire Western world, yet a decisive factor in 
the UK was the increasing importance of economic assessment in decisions on energy 
policy. The change was felt particularly hard at the AEA, which had until 1971 
enjoyed a nearly full freedom to develop its ‘curiosity-oriented’ (Gowing, 1974a, 207) 
research activities unhindered by economic constraints. The organisational changes in 
1971 triggered a process whereby economic considerations gained importance, and 
increasingly limited the scope of the kind of ‘blue skies’ research practiced in the 
AEA. The entry in power of Thatcher government was a landmark in this 
development, yet as many of our interviewees underlined, the roots of the ‘economic 
dogmatism’ that came to characterise British energy policy for the subsequent three 
decades lie deeper in the evolution of the British society: a long-term adherence to a 
more economy and efficiency-oriented approach, and the near-abandonment of the 
objective to create ‘national champions’ through active industrial policy. Spence 
(1987, 37) follows the same line of argumentation, in noting the profound ideological 
and historical differences between the UK and France. Formally, the structure of the 
UK’s nuclear sector was similar to that of France: there was a single reactor 
                                                
41 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sellafield 
42 Hansard, "Written answers for Friday 5th May 2000". Retrieved 16 August 2011. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo000505/text/00505w05.htm 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
 
corporation (the National Nuclear Corporation, NNC), two state-owned utilities 
(CEGB and South of Scotland Electricity Board, SSEB) dominating power-station 
ordering, and one state-owned research body (AEA). However, Spence argued that 
the “state-monopolist tendency does not have deep roots in the UK”, which he 
portrayed as “the homeland of classic liberal internationalism” (ibid.). Spence 
considered that the especially the complicated decisions over reactor design in the 
1970s were an illustration of the way in which, within the framework of national 
institutions, battles were being fought, which had been resolved elsewhere 20 years 
earlier (ibid.). 
 
It is notable that while the changes in the external environment contributed to the 
termination of the fast breeder programme, they did not halt reprocessing, whose 
rationale nevertheless greatly depended on the fast breeder programme. Walker 
(2000) explains such an inertia through the various types of ‘commitments’,43 which 
allowed reprocessing to continue even after its underlying rationale – notably the 
justification for fast breeder reactors – had disappeared – for much the same reasons 
as those evoked above. By the time that the construction of THORP began in 1984, 
world energy prices had fallen substantially and few countries ordered new nuclear 
power stations. The expected rise in uranium prices did not materialise, and the need 
for plutonium to fuel a continuing expansion of nuclear investment quickly 
evaporated.  
 
5.1 The	  (poor)	  economics	  of	  nuclear	  power	  'revealed':	  calls	  for	  greater	  financial	  
accountability	  (late	  1970s	  to	  1980s)	  
 
Many observers have explained the decline of nuclear power in the UK by the 
increasing scrutiny under which the economic costs of the industry were brought over 
the course of the 1970s and 1980s. Henney (1994, 7) goes as far as arguing that “[f]or 
a quarter of a century the CEGB, the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) and 
the government consistently misled Parliament and the public about the cost of 
nuclear power”, and talks about the “CEGB's obsession with building expensive 
nuclear power stations and ever larger coal plants” (Henney 1994, 9). While such an 
interpretation may be extreme and partly unjustified, it is clear that the atmosphere 
and the criteria against which the fast breeder was examined had undergone a 
fundamental revision by the late 1970s. Hence, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw a 
multiplication of economic analysis of the British nuclear policies both in the 
academic literature, and by the official institutions. Even more than the question of the 
‘real’ costs of fast breeders, this economic debate concerned topics such as the choice 
between coal and nuclear (e.g. Pearson 1978; Parker and Surrey 1995) and the costs 
of reprocessing (Piran 1984). As one of the most illustrative portrayals of the 
government’s new approach to decision-making on energy Parker and Surrey (1995, 
821-822) evoke a speech given in 1982 by the then Secretary of State for Energy, 
Nigel Lawson. In his speech, Lawson argued against the attempts at 'guessing the 
unguessable' and against detailed central planning from Whitehall. By contrast, 
                                                
43 Walker (2000, 833) describes such commitments as essentially social in nature, “usually including 
legal (especially in the form of contracts), organisational (involving producers, users and financiers), 
and political (involving various actors associated with the state) commitments.” 
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energy prices would be the best instrument that would send appropriate signals to 
consumers and producers to encourage efficiency. Competition, private enterprise, 
and the free play of market forces would be needed to curb the power of state 
monopolies, while investment decisions would be based on strictly commercial 
criteria as opposed to security of supply considerations. And yet, this did not prevent 
Lawson from praising the large French nuclear programme or expressing confidence 
in the proposed British PWR programme – products of central planning rather than 
market forces.  
 
One of the most crucial of the economic analyses was conducted by the Comptroller 
and Auditor General in February 1984. The report “Development of Nuclear Power” 
examined  the economic and financial viability of the fast breeder programme and the 
AEA’s financial standing, and subsequently  led to further investigation by the House 
of Commons Committee of Public Accounts. Patterson (2010, 87) explains the 
reasoning that the Parliament Select Committee on Energy expressed in its 
conclusions on 19 July 1984 concerning the costs of the fast breeder programme. The 
committee concluded that the total expenditure accorded to fast breeder R&D from 
1955 to 1983 amounted to some £2400 million (in 1982-83 money values), and that 
the annual R&D expenditure had remained remarkably steady at between £85m and 
£120m in the twenty years since 1962-1963. Assuming the estimates provided by the 
AEA Chairman (Sir Peter Hirsch) in his evidence to the committee – further 25-30 
years and additional R&D expenditure of £1300 million – together with £2 billion 
construction costs for a commercial demonstration reactor and £300 million for 
reprocessing facilities, the Committee concluded that the total estimated further 
expenditure would lie at £3.3 billion and a cumulative figure at £5.7 billion. Hence, 
the fast reactor would be “roughly halfway through a perceived 60-year research, 
development and demonstration programme” (Patterson 2010, 87). 
 
Campbell (1984) reported on further criticism brought forth by the Committee: the 
lack of major specific targets in the UK’s fast breeder development programme, 
which had presumably weakened financial control; since there was no government 
commitment to the construction of a commercial fast breeder reactor, and the AEA 
had specified intermediate milestones neither for the costs nor the achievement of the 
programme, it was difficult to judge whether the annual spending allocated to the 
programme by the AEA was justified. Parker and Surrey (1985, 842) note the 
Committee’s conclusion according to which 82% of the Department of Energy's R&D 
expenditure went to nuclear power – disproportionate to the relatively small potential 
contribution of nuclear power in meeting UK’s primary energy demand – and that 
nuclear R&D was nevertheless scrutinised far less than the much smaller amount of 
non-nuclear R&D funded by the Department. Apparently the committee report did not 
go without provoking changes in the AEA, as demonstrated by comments by one of 
our interviewees – a former AEA employee – concerning the pervasive changes 
towards project-based and performance-based management within the AEA, 
especially since the entry in power of the Thatcher government.  
 
The committee was sceptical, to say the least, about the future of fusion power, 
arguing that fusion power would not be needed if the fast breeders were developed. If, 
on the other hand, the FBR were rejected due to the associated radioactive waste 
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problems, then, logically, fusion would have to be abandoned on the same grounds 
(HC 585, 1984, paras 28 and 29, in Parker and Surrey 1995).  
 
The Committee was equally critical towards the existing plans for Franco-German-
British collaboration on fast breeders, in which each country would develop and build 
their own demonstration FBRs. This, the committee noted, “would be far more costly 
than joining efforts to develop and build a single demonstration plant licensable in 
each of the participating countries (HC 585, 1984, paras 22-24)” (Parker and Surrey 
1995, 842). The committee hence found “the proposal difficult to understand, except 
on political grounds”, wondering what would be the added value of collaboration that 
would involve each country pursuing roughly the path they had been following 
independently (Patterson 1985, 121).  
 
In late 1985, while the AEA continued to pursue its FBR programme and was pushing 
for approval for a European Demonstration Reprocessing Plant for fast breeder fuel at 
Dounreay, the Thatcher government announced further cuts in the annual funding for 
fast reactor development (Patterson 2010, 87).  
 
 
5.2 European	  fast	  breeder	  project	  –	  the	  last	  glimmer	  of	  hope	  (mid-­‐1980s	  to	  
1990s)	  
 
Despite the doubts expressed in 1984 by the Energy Committee, international 
collaboration gained an increasingly important position in UK’s fast breeder activity. 
Therefore, the European Fast Reactor (EFR) programme was initiated in 1985 
between the UK, France, Belgium, Italy and Germany, with the UK contributing 20% 
of the project cost. According to Patterson (1986), the European project was merely a 
face-saving measure undertaken by national authorities, which had until then invested 
considerable amounts of money and prestige in fast breeder programmes.44 The 
official aim was to design a 1500 MW prototype reactor by 1993 and to generate 
electricity at a cost around three times less than light water reactors. In early 1986 a 
public inquiry opened into the proposal to build a fast reactor fuel reprocessing plant 
at Dounreay as part of the programme (Kreczko et al. 1987, 303). Still in August 
1985, Sir Peter Hirsch expected that at least four commercial-size reactors would be 
in operation in Europe just after the turn of the century: Superphénix 1 and 2 in 
France, SNR 2 in Germany and CDFR (or UK 1) in the UK (Hirsch and Farmer 1986, 
301). Then, on 26 April 1986, came Chernobyl. The accident cast doubts over every 
form of nuclear activity, triggering public opposition even at Dounreay. Then yet 
another steam-generator failure forced a six-month shutdown of the PFR (Patterson 
2010, 87). 
 
                                                
44 
http://books.google.fi/books?id=wAYAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA38&lpg=PA38&dq=caithness+fast+bree
der&source=bl&ots=Wgyuie1CbN&sig=V-
l1CwqR_aP0VYUxlF6Gd8x5xB8&hl=fi&ei=BiRFTsOKNoOhOsmm0OcD&sa=X&oi=book_result&
ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDsQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=caithness%20fast%20breeder&f=false 
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Even at the end of the 1980s, many fast breeder advocates still retained their belief in 
the technology, despite the recurrent drawbacks and delays in the development of the 
fast breeders since the 1970s. For instance, in his comprehensive review of policy and 
prospects, Professor P.M.S. Jones (1987) maintained that this sort of reactor had 
“been demonstrated technically” and portrayed “many attractive safety features” 
(Conway 1989, 64).  
 
In 1988, the main design activities of France, Germany and the UK were merged. A 
combined organisation called EFR Associates (EFR-A) was set up by Siemens, 
Novatome and NNC to design a new European Fast Reactor (EFR), incorporating 
features from the three national projects. The national R&D programmes were merged 
in support of it. At the same time the main West European utilities in Belgium, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy formed the European Fast Reactor Utilities’ 
Group (EFRUG) which acts as the potential customer for an EFR, which was 
expected to be built in one or several of the participating countries after 1996-1997, 
with a view to preparing a series of plants by about 2010 (Crette 1998, 585). Judd and 
Ainsworth (1998, 615) deemed that the EFR design had by 1994 reached a point 
where further work would depend on the selection of a site, and estimate that the costs 
of an EFR would “fall within the range of projected costs of advanced PWR reactors.” 
 
In February 1988, following the government’s White Paper on electricity sector 
privatisation, the CEGB withdrew its modest share in fast breeder R&D (Patterson 
1990, 11). A few months later, in July 1988, the Energy Secretary Cecil Parkinson 
declared that the government would stop paying the £50 million a year net running 
costs of the PFR and that the associated annual R&D expenditure would be cut from 
£51 million in 1988-89 to £10 million a year from 1990-91 – a level which would 
enable continuing UK participation in the collaborative work with France and 
Germany on the EFR (HC 119, 1990, paras 2 and 3). The total annual government 
spending on FBRs was therefore cut to a tenth. Funding for the PFR would cease after 
1994, and for Dounreay reprocessing after 1997, hence bringing the FBR programme 
to an end. (Patterson 2010, 87) According to our AEA interviewee, the BNFL was 
desperate not to completely quit international cooperation and therefore put on the 
table £5 million per year for this purpose – this funding was subsequently reduced to 
£1 million and finally discontinued completely in 2006.  
 
Judd and Ainsworth (1998, 615) interpret the Thatcher government’s policy towards 
FBRs by stating that while still recognising “the long-term need for fast reactors, it 
believed that the technology had been proved”, and that rather than being funded by 
the taxpayer, the further development should henceforth be the responsibility of 
private industry on a strictly commercial basis. Parker and Surrey (1995, 842), in turn, 
summarise the rationale behind the government’s decision to cease funding to FBRs, 
relying largely on material from subsequent reports from House of Commons Energy 
Committee providing advice to the government: the world uranium resources would 
last for at least 75 years and the UK would not need an FBR for at least 30-40 years; 
participation in the European collaboration was costly; the political support for the 
FBR was waning; for FBRs to become economic, thermal reactors in the UK would 
first need to become competitive with alternative energy sources – unless world 
thermal reactor capacity was expanding sufficiently to force the extremely large rise 
in the price of uranium needed to make FBRs economic compared to thermal reactors 
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and unless the public accepted the widespread installation of plutonium-fuelled FBRs; 
and FBRs were not needed to guarantee energy security in the UK.  
 
Parker and Surrey (1995, 842) described the last phases of decision-making on FBRs: 
While continuing its support to the EFR collaboration, the government nevertheless 
said that it would review its position in 1993, when the Concept Validation Phase of 
the EFR was expected to end. The government also would expect the utilities and/or 
the industry to carry the major responsibility for the possible preconstruction phase of 
the EFR. Soon afterwards, the British electricity supply industry was privatised, its 
R&D was cut to a fraction of its former level, and the commercial interest for the EFR 
in the UK, Germany and France was vanishing.  
 
5.3 Explaining	  Thatcher	  government’s	  decisions	  on	  fast	  breeders	  –	  economics,	  
ideology,	  and	  politics	  
 
In their analysis of UK nuclear policies during the Thatcher era, Parker and Surrey 
(1995, 835) conclude that “[n]uclear power policy was dominated from 1979 to 1987 
by the intention to build PWRs, but from 1988 onwards it was dominated by the 
financial liabilities resulting from decisions made long before 1979.” Contrary to the 
situation that had prevailed until the early 1970s, and to a certain extent up until the 
entry in power of the Thatcher government in 1979, fast breeders were no longer at 
the centre of UK’s nuclear policy. While the economic viability of nuclear power in 
general, and fast breeders in particular, had come under increasing criticism already 
since the latter part of the 1970s, the failed privatisation of the nuclear industry in 
1989 brought about a more fundamental change. It was then that nuclear energy 
proved to be uneconomical in light of new cost calculation criteria, triggering a shift 
in argumentation by the government from the claim that nuclear was economical in 
the short and medium term, to the claim that it brought significant environmental and 
long-term security of supply benefits, and would indeed be economical when the price 
of fossil fuels would increase and the environmental externalities of fossil fuels would 
be integrated in cost estimates  (Parker and Surrey 1995, 843).45 
 
Clearly, economic concerns and cost calculations took the centre stage in debates on 
British energy policy from the late 1970s onwards, with the election of Margaret 
Thatcher in 1979 marking a key turning point. While by no means an unconditional 
supporter of government energy policy, Henney (1994, 12)46 nevertheless 
encapsulated the ethos that prevailed in the 1980s and early 1990s in the UK energy 
policy, arguing that the major reason for the demise of the coal and nuclear policies 
was the revelation of the “economic reality” of the policies practiced thus far. Henney 
made a parallel to Churchill’s well-know statement about democracy as the “least-
worst” option, arguing that while markets “are not perfect and they are generally 
uncertain and messy, and sometimes chaotic and painful”, they are nevertheless 
“preferable to politicians, civil servants and supplicants for public patronage at 
                                                
45 In particular, Prime Minister Thatcher had spoken on the world stage about the dangers of 
greenhouse effect, and evoked nuclear power as a means of addressing the problem. 
46 Indeed, while keen to retain his independence and freedom of opinion, a few years earlier Henney 
had produced a report for the Greenpeace (Henney 1989), in which he heavily criticised the 
government’s policy on nuclear energy. 
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public expense. The wise energy policy is to liberalize markets and then correct for 
defects - but the experience of past failures shows that public policy should be 
discussed in an open manner with the numbers on the table.” 
 
Hence, Henney's statement captures two key demands prevailing in the UK energy 
policy and society at the period: greater openness and closer economic scrutiny. What 
was probably characteristic to the UK, was the combination of the two; the primary 
function of openness was seen to be that of revealing the economic ‘truth’ about 
nuclear, not the safety failings of nuclear industry, for example. 
 
5.4 ‘Pure’	  economics	  or	  political	  interests	  and	  strong	  personalities?	  Coal	  
industry,	  miners'	  strikes	  and	  leaders	  of	  the	  UK	  nuclear	  establishment	  
 
While it would be tempting to interpret the evolution of UK policy on nuclear in 
general and fast breeders in particular under the Thatcher government from the angle 
of mere economic rationality – that the government's main mission was to introduce 
economic and financial accountability into the nuclear policy – this would be to 
overlook at least two other crucial factors. First, while fundamentally driven by an 
ideology of free market liberalism and economic efficiency, Thatcher was certainly 
motivated just as much by the political objective of crushing the power of the coal 
miners' unions. According to Parker and Surrey (1995, 846), the policy of the 
Thatcher government “was to expand nuclear power in part if not wholly as a means 
of achieving the political agenda on coal.”47 In other words, for Thatcher, nuclear 
power was a crucial alternative to coal: reduction of the importance of coal in the 
national energy mix would also reduce the power of the coal miners unions. Hence, 
Parker and Surrey refer to the disparity of treatment between coal and nuclear: while 
coal was judged on conventional economics basis – equated with all other 
commodities – nuclear was considered as an asset of strategic security and therefore 
continued to enjoy special treatment.  
 
Importantly, strategic security was not defined in terms of import dependency, but as 
an attempt to minimise possibilities for electricity supply disruption that the recurrent 
coal miners’ strikes had brought about. Furthermore, Henney (1994, 11) asserts that 
“British Coal's unreliability was a major cause of the CEGB's wish to build PWRs – 
Arthur Scargill48 – was nuclear power's best advocate.” He further claims that the 
“CEGB wanted to reduce its dependence on British Coal and many of the engineers 
were obsessed with building PWRs” (Henney 1994, 7). The desire to crush the miners 
was certainly an important motivation for the haste at which the government pushed 
the construction of thermal nuclear plants, and thereby probably at least precipitated 
the fall of the fast breeders. As political priorities had shifted to the need to tackle the 
trade unions, fast breeders no longer served a useful purpose. 
 
                                                
47 Winskel (2002, 462) notes the Energy Secretary Nigel Lawson’s remark that ‘the need for 
“diversification” of energy sources . . . was code for freedom from NUM blackmail’: Nigel Lawson, 
The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (London: Bantam, 1992), 168. 
48 A vocal opponent of Thatcher’s policies, Scargill was the President of the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) from 1982 to 2002, and led the union through the 1984–85 miners' strike. 
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The second non-economic consideration relates to the role of strong personalities in 
directing the policies. It has not been possible, within the framework of this research, 
to conduct careful analysis of the role that key personalities – notably the leading 
figures at the AEA and the CEGB – played in shaping the policies. However, the 
somewhat patchy evidence available suggests that action by leaders such as 
Christopher Hinton, John Hill and Walter Marshall indeed was pivotal in shaping the 
evolution of British fast breeder policy. The UK fast breeder history provides 
examples of more or less failed attempts by the government to promote its own policy 
agenda by nominating their favoured powerful individuals in key positions. An early 
illustration was the nomination of Christopher Hinton as the first chairman of the 
CEGB. Patterson (1985, 6) argues that unlike the government thought when 
appointing Hinton, “the brilliant engineer who had overseen the creation of Britain's 
nuclear-weapons facilities” (Patterson 1985, 6), Hinton became one of the early 
‘doubters’ of the extent of UK’s nuclear programme, and later of the FBR 
programme. According to Patterson (1985, 6), this was because Hinton was 
committed to “sound engineering – including economic engineering”. Hence, in 
March 1977, Hinton noted: “Most of the mistakes (and fortunately they have been 
rectifiable) on PFR have been made because engineers have thought they were just 
that little bit more clever than any of us really are” (Patterson 2010, 81). Similarly, the 
nomination of Sir Brian Flowers to chair a RCEP committee to examine Britain’s 
nuclear policy in 1975 was thought to give fast breeders a boost. In reality, the 
Flowers report became an ‘instant bestseller’ as the first official high-level report 
casting serious doubts about the reasonableness of the fast breeder programme and 
highlighting the problems of nuclear waste and proliferation.  
 
Thatcher government's decision to nominate Walter Marshall, first as the head of the 
AEA in February 1981, and then of the CEGB from July 1982 (Patterson 1985, 57, 
61) was probably crucial in helping the government push through its liberalisation 
policies while at the same time supporting nuclear power. However, even so, the 
forces unleashed by these decisions seemed to escape the control of the government. 
Marshall was known as a key figure within the British nuclear lobby, having been 
sacked in 1977 from his position as a Chief Scientist of the Labour government, 
presumably at least in part as a reaction to his excessively eager support of the PWR 
technology (Patterson 1985, 45). However, Thatcher and the Energy Secretary Nigel 
Lawson saw in Marshall a useful ally in promoting their nuclear policy.  
 
According to Patterson (1985, 57), Thatcher – as well as the "fast breeder enthusiasts" 
– particularly appreciated Marshall's "aggressive and outspoken style of leadership", 
but this very same approach also aggravated the existing controversies within the 
nuclear establishment. Perhaps even more crucially, as Winskel (2002, 457) argues, 
"the deeply held pro-nuclear convictions of both Marshall and Thatcher… 
undoubtedly obscured appreciation of the wider institutional and economic forces 
released by the liberalization proposals.” Hence, it was only when “the escalating 
cost estimates threatened the entire ESI sale that the Government abandoned its 
allegiance to the technology.” (ibid.) 
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5.5 Withdrawal	  of	  the	  UK	  from	  international	  fast	  breeder	  collaboration	  (early	  
1990s)	  
 
Two years after taking office, in November 1992, the Prime Minister John Major’s 
conservative government declared that the UK would withdraw from the European 
fast breeder collaboration. The cutback in government support for the FBR 
programme was expected to lead to 400 to 600 job losses at AEA Technology centres 
at Risley, Winfrith, and Harwell (Nuclear News, 4 December 1992). The Energy 
Minister at the DTI, Tim Eggar, justified the decision in his address to the House of 
Commons stating the project "was not a priority" for the government, and that it had 
consulted the British nuclear industry prior to making the decision. By contrast, the 
UK's decision took by surprise its French and German partners, who complained 
about not having been consulted in advance (Europe Energy, 4 December 1992). 
 
In the UK, there was some opposition to the backing out. The trade unions and the 
opposition Labour Party urged the government to proceed with FBR research in order 
to secure the UK’s future in the energy sector. However, the government claimed that 
the decision would save British taxpayers almost £13 million per year (Europe Energy 
1992). Over forty years, British taxpayers had spent an estimated £4 billion on FBR 
research (Europe Energy, 4 December 1992). 
 
5.6 Shut-­‐down	  and	  decommissioning	  at	  Dounreay	  (mid-­‐1990s)	  
 
Judd and Ainsworth (1998, 616) note, with some bitter irony, that at the end of March 
1994, “PFR was finally shut down, after one of its most successful years with a load 
factor over 80%”. With equal sarcasm, the Independent newspaper (Buchan 1993), 
sceptical towards nuclear energy in general, reported just a few days after the closure 
of the PFR in 1993 that the closed reactor “generated from its only functioning fast 
reactor enough electricity to light up the city of Aberdeen”, and continued that in 2001 
“there will not be 10 000 MW of plutonium electricity in the British grid” [as the 
Windscale Inquiry report fifteen years earlier had predicted], “but none”. The same 
newspaper article quoted Dr Christine Brown of AEA Technology saying that she was 
“absolutely convinced that a commercial fast reactor will be in operation within 25 
years” (Buchan 1993). 
 
Reprocessing of irradiated fuel came to a halt in 1996, following a plant breakdown 
which the government in 2001 decided not to repair. By 1995 all the fuel had been 
removed from the PFR. Judd and Ainsworth (1998, 616) expected the “[f]irst stage 
decommissioning, with the sodium and NaK removed and disposed of, the reactor 
prepared for long-term storage, and all the fuel reprocessed”, to be completed by 
2001. The original timescale for decommissioning of 100 years has been reduced 
steadily. In 2008, Dounreay Site Restoration Ltd, the company managing the clean-up 
on behalf of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), estimated the total cost 
of the project at £2.5 billion (undiscounted), with the expected end-date for the clean-
up 2025 (NDA 2008). The project is funded and regulated by the UK Government 
through statutory bodies such as the NDA, the Scottish Environment Protection 
Agency, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the Health and Safety Executive and 
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the Office of Civil Nuclear Security. The project continues to be a significant 
employer in the region, employing in 2008 some 2000 people, i.e. about 20% of the 
local workforce.(ibid.). After 2025, hazardous intermediate-level waste is to be stored 
above-ground pending a national policy for its long-term management. Access to 
areas contaminated with radioactivity is likely to be restricted until 2300.49 
 
 
VI. EXPLAINING THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FAST 
BREEDER PROGRAMME 
 
After the chronological description of the UK fast breeder development from the early 
days of the nuclear programme, when the fast breeder was seen as the flagship project 
of the nuclear industry, to the eventual termination of the programme in the 1990s, we 
shall in this section seek to explain the reasons for the trajectory of advancement of 
the FBR projects in the UK. A number of key elements and explanations put forward 
by our informants and found in the literature will be examined in more detail. One of 
the most fundamental among these are the forecasts and predictions about the 
electricity demand and the potential of fast breeder reactors, both of which were 
repeatedly revised downwards during the course of the years. Another key topic of 
debate was the nature of the problems encountered in FBR development: to what 
extent were the difficulties inherent to the technology itself as opposed to being 
provoked by ‘external’ factors and events. As we shall seek to demonstrate, the 
external-internal distinction is largely a false debate: the viability of a technology 
cannot be meaningfully judged in isolation of the broader environment within which it 
is developed and applied. Nevertheless, the demise of the fast breeders was frequently 
blamed on what were perceived as ‘external’ factors – be they technical problems 
presumably unrelated to the ‘core’ of fast breeder technology or factors external to the 
broader system of fast breeders such as the declining uranium and energy prices, the 
oil crises, nuclear accidents and incidents unrelated to fast breeders, or presumably 
excessive concerns about proliferation risks associated with the planned ‘plutonium 
economy’. Obviously the role of and the relations between key actors in the area were 
crucial in shaping the development of the FBRs, the gradual loss of power and 
autonomy of the AEA being a key explanatory factor. More generally, the problems 
encountered by the UK nuclear sector especially in the 1970s were often attributed to 
institutional failings, the fast breeder advocates frequently criticising what they 
perceived as the absence of a coherent industrial policy in the country. Among the 
most significant factors explaining FBR developments in the UK was the sharp shift 
in the political environment with the entry in power of Margaret Thatcher, and the 
subsequent doctrine of economic liberalism. On the one hand, the ‘free market 
fundamentalism’ profoundly changed the criteria against which the performance and 
potential of energy technologies in general and nuclear energy in particular were 
assessed, while on the other hand Thatcher saw no place for FBRs in her political 
ambitions of bringing down the power of the coal miners’ unions. Finally, the public 
opposition against fast breeders seemed surprisingly weak in the UK, especially 
against the background of a rising concern about nuclear energy in general and 
reprocessing in particular. However, this general opposition against the ‘nuclear 
complex’ clearly played an indirect role in weakening the nuclear industry and 
                                                
49 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom_Atomic_Energy_Authority 
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thereby making it more difficult for FBR advocates to push for their preferred 
technology. 
 
6.1 Forecasts, predictions and expectations 
 
The history of UK fast breeder programme has been marked by an evolution from the 
highly optimistic, even fantastic expectations concerning the cost, technical 
performance and rate of construction of fast breeder technology, towards gradually 
more realistic and increasingly pessimistic estimates as experience was gained on the 
actual operation of the fast breeders. For example, the select committee on science 
and technology simply declared in its first report in October 1967 that fast breeder 
reactors were “likely to provide a very cheap source of electricity” (Patterson 2010, 
76). The committee expected building costs (at 1967 prices) of fast reactor stations as 
low as £50 per kilowatt installed and generating costs falling to 0.3d [old pence] per 
kilowatt hour (ibid.) This conclusion was partly based on the assessment by the AEA, 
which in its 1965-66 annual report had concluded that the capital costs of a 
commercial fast breeder reactor would be “similar to that of the best thermal reactor 
available at the same time, with potential for further reductions” (AEA Annual Report 
1965-6, paragraph 157). A decade later, at a conference on energy policy and fast 
breeders held in London in November 1978, when the introduction of commercial fast 
breeder reactors was at the centre of nuclear policy agenda, the Deputy Chairman of 
the AEA, Walter Marshall, presented a first cost estimate, arguing that the AEA 
“figures were of the same order of magnitude as the French estimates for the cost of 
Superphénix, i.e. about 60% above the cost of French LWRs (Pearson 1979, 77). 
 
The predictions about the likely contribution of fast breeders to UK electricity supply 
were continuously corrected upwards in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Hence, in 
1968, the AEA estimated that FBRs would provide at least 15 GWe of electricity by 
1986, while Valéry (1974) reported, in the aftermath of the first oil shock, that it 
would not be unrealistic to expect that by the end of the century, 25% (up to 40 000 
MW) of UKs electricity might be generated by fast breeders. A year later, in its 
submission to the “Flowers committee”, the AEA expected at least 33 GWe of the 
total generation of nuclear electricity 104GWe in 2000 to come from fast breeders 
(RCEP 1976, 179). According to our interviewees, the AEA had in fact already cut its 
original estimates by half before submitting its views to the committee, simply to 
ensure that the forecasts appeared realistic. Patterson (1985, 38), in turn, reports that 
the chairman of the committee, Sir Brian Flowers, "apparently took issue with this 
surreal suggestion", leading the AEA to quickly pull back, claiming that these figures 
did not represent a forecast, but "merely an upper limit for analytic purposes". 
However, still a year after the release of the Flowers report, Cutts (1977, 245) 
predicted up to 80% participation of nuclear in the UK electricity supply in 2020, the 
majority of which would be derived from fast reactors. In particular, Cutts argued 
against postponing the fast breeder programme, because any delays would 
significantly reduce the potential savings in uranium resource. 
 
The timetables foreseen for the construction of fast breeder reactors were equally 
ambitious and later turned out to be unrealistic. In the early 1960s, a large-scale 
commercial fast breeder programme was expected to be in operation by the early 
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1980s (Herbert 1962). In the mid-1960s, the industry reported that fast breeder 
reactors would be on-line by 1971 (Sweet 1990, 408). Sweet (1990, 408) notes that 
two years after this had not happened, yet the industry projected the future of an 'All 
Electric Economy'.50 In October 1970, the AEA (John Hill) expected the construction 
of the first civil fast reactor, of possibly 1300 MW, to start by early 1974. In its annual 
report one year later, the AEA confirmed the plan to start the construction of a “lead 
station” in 1974, which would be followed by the construction of other stations at 
perhaps two years’ interval (Patterson 2010, 76-77). At the same time, the CEGB 
remained hesitant. Hawkes (1971, 682) hence underlined the optional nature of the 
plans, referring to a statement by a CEGB spokesman: "What we're saying is that we 
could order as early as 1974. That would mean we would be commissioning the first 
station round the turn of the decade." 
 
Notwithstanding the official position within the ‘nuclear establishment’ in these early 
years of British nuclear policy that fast breeders were the ultimate and logical 
culminating point of nuclear energy policy, there were dissenting views even among 
the ‘insiders’. The inflated expectations of the late 60s and early 70s were therefore 
partly in contrast with the relative cautiousness of many pioneers of nuclear power. 
Winskel (2002, 442) notes that these pioneers – such as Christopher Hinton – were 
often sceptical particularly about the economic competitiveness of nuclear electricity. 
For instance, as early as 1950, during a period when the need to develop fast breeders 
was allegedly nearly the only topic subject to consensus among the British nuclear 
energy community, the head of the research institute at Harwell, Lord John Cockcroft 
recognised the technical challenges and complex chemical engineering tasks involved, 
which could mean that the reactors “may take a considerable time to develop into 
reliable power units” (Cockroft 1950, 33019). Perhaps unsurprisingly, such scepticism 
was more widespread among the engineers involved in the practical construction of 
nuclear installations than among the nuclear scientists conducting basic research and 
developing new technologies such as the fast breeders. Hence, AEA engineers 
working at Risley expressed their doubts in 1953, noting that the “fantastic” yet 
“unrealistic” FBR scheme and that “[i]t might well be argued that it could never 
become a serious engineering proposition” (Patterson 2010, 74). On May 9 1962, Sir 
Christopher Hinton, at the time head of the CEGB, told the House of Commons Select 
Committee on the Nationalized Industries, 1962-63 that he thought progress at 
Dounreay had been “disappointingly slow”, and that he did not feel at all confident 
about predicting when the technology might be mature enough to deliver a solution 
(Patterson 1977, 24). Herbert (1962, 338) indirectly alludes to the early 
disillusionment in among the nuclear establishment in noting that the Dounreay 
experimental reactor may finally be on the verge of resolving the long-drawn 
problems, which could help to recover “the lost excitement and wonder of harnessing 
the energy of the atom”.  
 
However, the early scepticism seemed to soon give way to inflated expectations in the 
60s and early 70s – a period of great expansion of the AEA staff, when the AEA was 
virtually independent from any outside control, and therefore presented, according to 
one of our interviewees, “a wonderful environment” to do research on fast breeder 
technology. According to this informant, the great change came only with the entry in 
                                                
50 L. Brookes, 'Towards the all electric economy', Atom (UKAEA), 202 August 1973. 
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power of the Thatcher government, whereas others – including many of our 
interviewees – pointed at the gradual loss of credibility of the fast breeder programme 
during the 1970s, and notably the reorganisation of the AEA in 1971. 
 
The highly optimistic forecasts were, however, progressively being called into 
question and revised from around mid-1970s onwards. This rethinking and the 
relatively rapid and accelerating erosion of trust in FBRs during the 1970s were 
triggered by many reasons such as the stagnation of electricity demand following the 
oil crisis and the economic stagnation in the late 1970s, the technical problems with 
the fast breeder reactors, and the decline in oil and uranium prices in the 1980s. 
However, a key factor was the change in the “goalposts” of economic appraisal, 
initiated during the course of the 1970s and reinforced with the privatisation of the 
electricity industry. According to an AEA informant, the great change came only with 
the entry in power of the Thatcher government, whereas others – including many of 
our interviewees – pointed at the gradual loss of credibility of the fast breeder 
programme during the 1970s, and notably the reorganisation of the AEA in 1971. 
Sweet (1982) described the radical change concerning the assumptions underpinning 
the forecasts noting that the increasing uncertainty had brought economic arguments 
to the centre stage – implying that investment decisions should be underpinned by a 
careful analysis of the costs and risks involved. Sweet highlighted the drastic change 
in the methods of forecasting and modelling for the introduction of FBRs, which had 
until the late 1970s been dominated by the assumptions that high breeding gains and 
short doubling times (7-14 years were common to many models) were primordial, and 
that capital costs of FBRs would be at most marginally higher than those of thermal 
reactors. Sweet (1982, 18) mentions as a typical example of the new thinking the 
criticism by the House of Commons Select Committee in 198051 against the industry’s 
“preference for using historic costs rather than replacement costs, and for using such 
cost trends in extrapolating future requirements”, which had allegedly “led to a wide 
divergence between published costs and real costs.” By the early 1980s, it was 
broadly accepted in most countries considering fast breeders – France being a notable 
exception – that FBRs breed “only slowly, that doubling times have no great 
significance and that the early introduction of the fast reactor is either impossible or 
unwise” (Sweet 1982, 18).   
 
Finally, it is worth noting that still in the late 1990s, fast breeder advocates saw the 
technology as an inevitable culmination of nuclear energy, with Judd and Ainsworth 
(1998) concluding that around 2050 “the main emphasis will be on breeders”. Simnad 
(1998) summarises the enduring belief of fast breeder advocates in FBRs as a solution 
for the world’s energy problems, in the context of ever-increasing needs:  
“We are now at the threshold of large-scale commercial acceptance of FBRs 
within the next few decades in many countries, in order to meet the 
tremendous increase in energy demand anticipated for the next century. The 
combined forces of a doubling of the world’s population and increasing per 
capita energy consumption to achieve economic growth will require a solution 
to the problem of providing an acceptable and abundant long-term energy 
supply.” 
                                                
51 House of Commons Select Committee on Energy, Report on the Government Statement on the New 
Nuclear Programme, HC114-1, HMSO, London, 1980 
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6.2 Technological Arguments: problems inherent or external to the technology? 
 
Arguments evoking the inherent viability (or unviability) of the technology were 
central in the discussion on fast breeders in the UK, and were clearly manifest in our 
interviews. These positions and opinions range between the two extremes from the 
view that the fast breeder technology is fully tried and tested to those considering fast 
breeders as nothing but another unrealistic engineering dream, plagued with 
irresolvable technical and safety problems. 
 
Examples of the view that the fast breeder technology is inherently viable, tested, and 
safe came from the former AEA scientists and engineers. One of them admitted that 
FBRs were undoubtedly more difficult to operate than the thermal reactors, with the 
use of sodium as coolant as among the most crucial of such difficulties. However, as 
the fast breeder proponents repeated at numerous occasions throughout the years, 
these problems were by no means inherent to the FBR technology or the nuclear fuel, 
but would be ‘conventional’ problems related notably to the materials used in the 
reactors. According to one of our AEA interviewees, when it comes to basic reactor 
physics, “the FBR technology works”. And yet, it was precisely this argument of FBR 
technology as “proven” that was used as an argument by the government to 
discontinue funding the fast breeder development in the 1980s. If the technology was 
already proven, it should be up for the industry to decide whether or not to launch a 
commercial-scale FBR programme. By contrast, Patterson (2010, 80) counters the 
argument about the technical problems as merely ‘ancillary’ by noting: “If you could 
not then use the molten-sodium reliably to boil water, you had a basic design problem 
– one that could not be brushed aside by reference to the satisfactory operation of the 
reactor core itself.”  
 
The ‘internal vs. external’ discussion had another manifestation in the discussion on 
reactor safety, another topic on which even the advocates of nuclear energy were 
divided. One of our interviewees referred to the safety concerns among a ‘significant 
minority’ of members of the ‘nuclear community’, stemming largely from the 
difficulty of controlling the Dounreay reactor.52 A former AEA scientist, in turn, 
contested the view that fast breeders would suffer from particular safety problems, but 
argued instead that safety had been largely proven: both the pilot and demonstration 
plants have had a satisfactory safety record and performance – or at least, there have 
not been accidents comparable to Chernobyl or even the Three Mile Island.  
 
For the majority of the interviewees, there was an intimate link between technology 
and economics. Hence, the technological argument was rephrased in the following 
terms: the fast breeder technology entails inherent characteristics that make it virtually 
impossible to bring its cost below that of the thermal reactors. From this perspective, 
the technological argument alone would be irrelevant for practical decision-making, 
because in the face of the uncertainty about the evolution of different alternative 
energy technologies, it would be of little relevance whether the fast breeder 
technology could be made operational in the long term. 
                                                
52 For example concerns related to the issue of ‘void coefficient’. 
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6.3 External factors 
 
A common explanation for the failure of the fast breeder programme, used especially 
by the AEA scientist and engineers, made reference to “external” factors that 
hampered the development of the fast breeders. These explanations can be seen as an 
extension of the argument that the FBR technology itself was completely viable, but 
that the threats and problems came from various ‘external’ sources. At the centre of 
the debate were the varying interpretations of what exactly was external and ‘internal’ 
to the technology. 
 
6.3.1 Uranium prices 
 
The availability of uranium, and especially its price as an indicator of scarcity, 
featured prominently in all of the explanations to the evolution of the fast breeder 
programme. As explained by one of our interviewees, for the first, a feature common 
to the debates on nuclear power in general, the “uranium argument” has been used 
both by the advocates of fast breeders and the critics of nuclear energy. For the 
former, the unavoidable increase in uranium prices makes fast breeder technology an 
essential element of nuclear energy, while the latter use the argument of the limits of 
uranium resources as a proof of the unsustainability of nuclear energy. 
 
The decline in the world uranium prices was evoked by most of our interviewees as a 
major reason for the falling support for fast breeders. These discourses portrayed this 
evolution variously as a mere confirmation of the unviability of fast breeder 
technology, or as an “external” factor disturbing the long-term vision needed to 
develop a technology vital for the future of energy supply. In any case, by the late 
1970s, the situation concerning the availability and price of uranium had changed 
dramatically. The AEA predicted, in the mid-1970s, that uranium prices would 
increase to USD 100-200 per pound when all the high–grade uranium would have 
been committed to existing nuclear programmes in the 1990s and concluded that fast 
breeders should be built as quickly as possible (Merrick, 1976, 597). The CEGB, by 
contrast, argued that the main justification for fast breeders was not economic, but 
their ability to reduce the need for uranium in the long term – important because the 
resources might turn out to be limited (ibid.). Buckley et al. (1980) argued that reserve 
estimates were rising rapidly, demand growth was being cut back, and higher grades 
of ore and less expensive exploration techniques were expected to further reduce the 
price of uranium in the 1980s and lower the long-term price expectations of 
internationally traded uranium. 
 
While the anticipated rise in uranium price has always been a major rationale evoked 
by the supporters of FBRs, one of our interviewees sarcastically noted that the timing 
for such a price increase always seemed to be “ten years away”. In reality, already in 
the 1980s, uranium prices had declined low enough to render the price argument 
difficult to sustain (e.g. Walker 2000). One interviewee, a nuclear economist, 
provided recent evidence to support his view that the “uranium argument” continues 
to be untenable. Firstly, around 2000, a lot of Russian highly-enriched uranium from 
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its military installations came to the market and contributed to the decline in world 
uranium prices. Hence, today uranium accounts for only 2-3% of the life-cycle cost of 
nuclear energy. Another interviewee, an economist, argued that even a ten-fold 
increase in uranium price would not suffice to make fast reactors an economically 
viable option. Secondly, the “nuclear renaissance” – be it real or imaginary – has led a 
number of utilities to forward-contract uranium; since uranium is a compact source of 
energy and therefore very easy to store, most utilities keep a couple of years’ stock of 
uranium and thereby protect themselves from the widely fluctuating spot prices of 
uranium. Thirdly, the real price of uranium has remained essentially unchanged over 
the past 50 years. And fourthly, the volumes of uranium needed to run nuclear power 
stations are relatively small; for instance, one month’s production from a single mine 
in Australia could satisfy the entire world demand for uranium for a year. 
 
Finally, as Papadopoulos (1981, 320) reminded, the interaction between uranium price 
and fast breeder development goes both ways: especially in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
widespread development of fast breeders would have influenced uranium price 
expectations. 
 
Regardless of the ‘facts’ or the ‘reality’ concerning the availability and future 
evolution of uranium prices, the declining prices and the slowing down of thermal 
nuclear programmes certainly contributed to reducing the urgency to bring down 
uranium demand through the development of fast breeders. This explanation was 
indeed evoked by most of our interviewees.  
 
6.3.2  Oil crisis 
 
The first oil crisis (1973-74) had somewhat ambiguous consequences for the UK fast 
breeder programme. On the one hand, it reinforced the argument that nuclear power 
was needed as an alternative to fossil fuels. Given the central position of fast breeders 
as the logical end-point of the development of nuclear power, especially the first oil 
crisis therefore gave further impetus also to the development of fast breeders. 
However, the urgency to deploy readily available alternatives to oil led to a shift in 
priorities within the nuclear sector: long-term R&D on fast breeder technologies 
progressively gave way to the pressing need to build thermal reactors that would help 
to reduce oil dependency in the short to medium term. According to Patterson (2010, 
85), from 1978 onwards, PWRs became the chosen technology, hence replacing 
AGRs and “tacitly sidelining the fast breeder”. Despite the short revitalisation of the 
support to fast breeders in 1979, as a result of Thatcher’s entry in power, the attention 
soon shifted again to the thermal reactor programme. For example, in 1981-82, the 
main focus of nuclear controversy was on the PWR Sizewell B, not on fast breeders 
(Patterson 2010, 85). 
 
Finally, the oil crisis and the subsequent economic stagnation led to a significant 
downward adjustment of electricity demand scenarios, reduced the urgency to build 
new capacity, and thereby pushed the need for the fast breeder further into the future. 
 
Furthermore, while a similar shift in priorities away from fast breeder research to the 
construction of PWRs took place in France, the French advocates of fast breeders 
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benefited from the energy policy context that was different from that of the UK. The 
French “tout pétrole” policy that had preceded the oil crisis and the scarcity of 
alternative domestic energy sources made it easier to launch a massive nuclear 
programme, thereby helping the “nuclear establishment” to retain and reinforce its 
power. The UK, by contrast, possessed seemingly abundant and cheap domestic 
energy sources, notably coal and North Sea gas and oil. Consequently, the urgency to 
construct thermal reactors and the ability of the nuclear establishment to retain its 
power – let alone acquire a hegemonic position – were considerably weaker than in 
France.  
 
6.3.3 Risks, safety and security: radiation and proliferation 
 
One of the lines of argument employed by many of our interviewees mentioned the 
increasing safety and security concerns as a major reason for the decline of the fast 
breeder programme. From this perspective, risk regulation was perceived as an 
‘external nuisance’ that stemmed from concerns that had little if anything to do with 
the fast breeder technology. The key events can be classified into nuclear accidents on 
the one hand – the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents probably being the 
most influential – and the recurrent technical problems in fast breeder technology 
(fires, interruptions in the operation of the plants, etc.) on the other. While fast breeder 
reactors had not suffered from major accidents, the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl 
accidents increased public concern, eroded public trust in nuclear technology, and led 
to stricter safety regulations and greater outside scrutiny also in the development of 
fast breeders. However, by the time these accidents occurred, the UK nuclear industry 
in general and support for the fast breeder project in particular had already weakened 
to an extent that the accidents mainly accelerated the decline already underway, rather 
than being its main cause. Nevertheless, according to our AEA interviewees, the 
increasing scrutiny and strengthening of the safety regulations fuelled frustration 
among the scientists and engineers, who no longer had the freedom they used to have 
in the past to develop new technologies. 
 
The logical sequence of the argumentation from accidents to the decline of fast 
breeders can be summarised as follows:  
 
accidents, incidents – public and media attention to risks – safety and 
security becomes a politically sensitive topic – tighter safety regulation – 
increasing economic costs – erosion of the economic viability of fast 
breeders 
 
The interviewees obviously portrayed differently the different elements of the 
sequence. Firstly, while all saw the accidents and ‘incidents’ crucial in shaping public 
and political opinions, the ‘true’ nature of such events was seen differently. On the 
one hand, a former AEA scientist seemed to belittle their seriousness, referring for 
example to Three Mile Island accident as a mere ‘incident’. Others saw in the large 
number of incidents a proof of the problems inherent to a technology excessively 
complicated “just to boil water”, as one of our interviewees put it. Consequently, the 
rise of safety and security on the political agenda was interpreted either as welcome 
sign of an increasing ‘awareness of the problems’ or as unjustified ‘public outcry’ 
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stemming from the lack of understanding about the underlying technical matters. An 
AEA interviewee recognised the value of tighter safety regulation, but nevertheless 
lamented the lack of proportionality in the matter. Another AEA interviewee regretted 
the deleterious effects on engineers’ morale from the fact that they should today spend 
so much of their time in ‘preparing the safety case’ instead of doing the ‘real’ work, 
i.e. developing the technology. Finally, as for the economics of fast breeders, the 
rising costs – but especially the increasing attention brought to the economic 
performance of the technology – was portrayed either as an ‘awakening’ to the 
‘realities’ or as an outside intrusion, which distracted the process of long-term R&D 
necessary to bring fast breeders into being. 
 
The comment by a former Friends of the Earth activist, in our interview, characterises 
the criticism against the hypothesis of ‘external events’ behind the fall of the FBR 
programme: “The surprising thing is that people always assume it was outside 
agencies that crippled the FBR program. But it was the fact that it was a flawed 
technology.” Winskel (2002, 457), in turn, abstains from the assumption about the 
possibility of a technology being inherently ‘flawed’ or ‘viable’, and encapsulates the 
ethos of the autonomy of technology, which was prevalent among nuclear engineers 
still in the 1970s. This perspective was based on the premise that the nation’s best 
interests could only be damaged by an unjustified external intrusion into the 
development of technology: 
 
“Marshall, and others, never wavered in their beliefs that, so long as they were 
freed from ‘political interference’ or ‘short-term market concerns’, nuclear 
engineers would ‘get the technology right’ – axiomatically, doing what was best 
for the industry and country.” 
 
6.4 The role of policy actors and policy entrepreneurs: AEA and CEGB 
6.4.1  Role of the AEA: from hegemony to decline and loss of mission 
 
The AEA played a pivotal role in advancing the fast breeder technology in the UK, 
and the development of fast breeders constituted the core mission of the AEA long 
into the 1960s. In a manner similar to that of the CEA in France, the AEA occupied at 
that time a nearly hegemonic position in the UK. While there were attempts of what 
one our interviewees called a “more logical structure” as well as to make the different 
units within the AEA self-standing and subject to the market discipline already in the 
1960s, until 1971 the AEA continued to have comprehensive responsibility for civil 
and military nuclear R&D together with fuel and weapons production. In 1971, the 
AEA was broken up so as to separate the civil and military nuclear activities into 
separate organisations – a key turning point, which arguably initiated a period of 
decline for the AEA.53  
 
Even after the split-up in 1971, the AEA continued to hold a monopoly of civil 
nuclear R&D including early prototype development and was also the major source of 
                                                
53 In the reorganisation, the BNFL became the sole supplier of fuel-cycle services to reactor operators 
(Walker 2000, 842). 
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high-level technical advice to the government (Rush et al. 1977, 96). And yet, AEA 
failed to ever gain the hegemonic status that the CEA – or more broadly, the “Corps 
des Mines” – enjoyed in France. 
 
The gradual decline in the political power of the AEA was on the one hand one of the 
main reasons for the decline of the fast breeder programme, while at the same time 
being itself a consequence of the general loss of support to fast breeders. The mutual 
interaction between the decline of AEA’s power and the declining support for fast 
breeders took many forms, some of which are illustrated in the following. 
 
A further factor weakening the AEA and the fast breeder project was the growing 
feeling of disappointment and disillusionment, even amongst the nuclear scientists 
and engineers, at the slow progress of the project. Since the grandiose plans and 
expectations from the 50s and 60s failed to materialise, this affected the morale within 
the AEA, as noted by our AEA interviewees. This, in turn, contributed to a “brain 
drain” of sorts, from AEA to the CEGB, the latter being perceived by the scientists 
and engineers as the place where the real decisions on nuclear energy were made. The 
AEA staff was drastically reduced from the over 40 000 in the early 1960s and 
keeping the best ‘brains’ in the organisation became an acute challenge for those 
responsible for implementing the policies of personnel reduction. According to our 
AEA interviewee, the introduction of commercial accountability and project-based 
management principles in the early 1980s dented the morale of AEA staff, and took 
away a lot of the excitement that had been in the research until then. Consequently – 
still according to this former AEA scientist – in the course of the 80s, all members of 
the AEA fast breeder community came – at one point or another – to understand that 
their “times were counted”. The late 1980s brought further changes, as the AEA was 
“put into Trading Fund mode”, required to act and account as a commercial 
enterprise. Between 1988 and 1993, staff numbers declined from 13 600 to 8 300 
(HSE 1998, v). In the 1990s the AEA was split again, with the more commercial parts 
transferred into a public company AEA Technology, subsequently floated on the 
London Stock Exchange, while the parts directly related to nuclear liabilities and 
decommissioning were retained at the AEA.54 Only about 2 000 workers stayed in this 
government-owned part, then known as Government Division, which has meant that 
the AEA has had to buy a number of its key services from contractors (HSE 1998, v). 
 
                                                
54 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom_Atomic_Energy_Authority 
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Figure 5. History of AEA 
 
 
Source: HSE 1998, 8 
 
Summing up the argument, the AEA was in the late 1970s and early 1980s well on its 
way towards losing its earlier central position, with some already envisaging the 
disappearance of the organisation. The AEA’s successive failures to defend its 
preferred thermal-reactor technology (the AGRs, then the SGWHR) further 
contributed to the decline of the organisation in political power-play. This process had 
started already in the 1960s, but gained impetus in the somewhat chaotic atmosphere 
in which the UK nuclear policy found itself in the 1970s (GM). Our AEA 
interviewees likewise clearly portrayed the atmosphere of the 1970s in the AEA as 
one of declining self-confidence and the sentiment of rather bleak future prospects for 
the organisation.  
 
Winskel (2002, 456) summarises the position of the AEA and its struggle to maintain 
its political clout and the reputation of nuclear energy in the context of persistent 
technical and economic problems faced by the technology:  
“...behind the façade of success and proclamations of growth and dominance, 
nuclear power was beset by chronic technical and economic problems. The 
failure to deliver cheap nuclear electricity meant that the AEA’s role in ESI 
policymaking is more realistically seen, not as heroically unleashing an 
autonomous force, but as attempting to maintain the commercial credibility of 
British nuclear technology, and black-boxing the programme so as to retain 
its own institutional status and influence.” 
 
In other words, Winskel refutes the argument of the autonomy of the technology, with 
its presumably inherent features and qualities, and underlines instead the central role 
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that the advocates and critiques of a technology play in constructing its viability, and 
thereby defending their own positions in the political process concerning technology 
development. 
 
6.4.2 Institutional arrangements 
 
Collingridge (1984b, 46-47) 55 takes note of the relatively lively discussion concerning 
the role of the institutional arrangements as a central explanation for the poor 
performance of the UK nuclear sector in the 1970s an early 1980s. Williams blamed 
the poor accountability of public bodies in Britain, particularly the CEGB and AEA, a 
view shared by Henderson. Rush et al. (2011) as well as Franks and Patterson were 
concerned about the dominating position of the AEA as supplier of expert opinion and 
monopoly supplier of prototypes, and the secrecy surrounding much of its affairs. 
Sweet (1978; 1982, 26) suggested the establishment of an independent body to 
scrutinize estimates of nuclear costs, in particular to analyse the social costs and 
benefits of public R&D expenditure on fast breeders – not least to avoid the wastage 
of public funds on by continuing such funding simply to ‘buy peace’ once the AEA 
would be abolished. Wonder argued that the attention of bodies that might have been 
able to scrutinise the choices was constantly diverted from the technical issues of 
reactor choice to issues of industrial organisation. Rush et al. (1977, 105) 
acknowledged that unlike in the 1960s, nuclear policy – and fast breeder policy in 
particular – was in the mid-1970s subject to much greater public debate than earlier, 
with the AEA participating in the public debate through its own relatively detailed 
assessments. Yet, the authors argued that there was “still no wholly independent body 
in the UK for expertly and critically reviewing the exceedingly complex technical and 
economic aspects of alternative reactor programmes and for giving a second opinion 
on the UKAEA's extremely authoritative advice.”56 In particular, the RCEP was under 
threat of being dismantled (the RCEP was indeed ultimately abolished, but only 25 
years later, by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2011), and 
the Parliamentary Select Committee on Energy did not have the requisite technical 
expertise, resources and access to detailed technical information (ibid.). 
 
Finally, and perhaps unsurprisingly, Hinton argued that the organisations making 
choices about nuclear development in Britain were not centralised enough. Pearson 
(1979) predicted that since the expected growth in future electricity demand failed to 
materialise, and trade unions were advocating more employment-generating energy 
                                                
55 Referring to the following documents: R. Williams, 'The structure of UK nuclear industry and its 
influence on policy', Nuclear Energy, Vol 19, 1980, pp 417-422. P.D. Henderson, 'Two British errors - 
their probable size, and some possible lessons', Oxford Economic Papers, Vo129, 1977, pp 159-205. C. 
Franks, Parliament and Atomic Energy, D Phil thesis, Oxford, 1983. W. Patterson, The Fissile Society, 
Earth Resources Research, London, 1977. C. Sweet, 'Nuclear power costs in the UK', Energy Policy, 
Vol 6, No 2, 1978, pp 107-118. E. Wonder, 'Decision making and reorganization of the British nuclear 
power industry', Research Policy, Vol 5, 1976, pp 240-88. R. Williams, The Nuclear Power Decisions, 
Croom Helm, London, 1980, p 103 and p 245. 
56 While it is debatable whether a “wholly independent body” could ever exist on matters related to 
technology choice and development, the general point made by Rush et al. remains valid: the absence 
of credible “counter-expertise” on the technical and economic aspects of nuclear energy compromised 
the possibility of a reasoned debate on the benefits and disadvantages of nuclear energy in the UK still 
in the 1970s.
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production methods than nuclear, the AEA would be forced to review its mission and 
reorient its activities away from fast breeder development. 
 
6.4.3  AEA: united or internally divided? 
 
Most accounts of the events in the UK fast breeder history tend to describe the AEA 
as rather unified in its views, interests and argumentation. The picture painted by our 
AEA informants, but also by many other interviewees, was one of high level of 
agreement within the AEA about the fast breeder technology as the ultimate and 
logical objective of the organisation’s R&D activity, and the desirability of work in 
this area even when the initial widespread support for fast breeders began to fade in 
the 1970s. The internal agreement and coherence of views within the AEA concerning 
the fast breeder technology may nevertheless not have been as strong as suggested by 
many. We have only scant evidence to back up this view, not least because many of 
our interviewees simply admitted their ignorance concerning the internal dynamics of 
the AEA – a further proof of the opacity of the AEA at the time.  
 
However, the documentary material suggests that the picture was more complex than 
one of a unified front advocating FBRs. Gowing (1974, cited in Patterson 2010, 73) 
notes that the need for FBRs was the only theme on which there was general 
agreement among the AEA nuclear physicists in Harwell. The main reason for this 
unanimity was the scarcity and high cost of uranium: FBRs would solve the problem 
of access to the resource. However, as demonstrated by our historical survey into the 
UK fast breeder programme, there were influential ‘sceptics’ within the AEA, starting 
from its former chairman, Christopher Hinton. Moreover, a serious disagreement 
prevailed between the proponents of nuclear fusion on the one hand, and the fast 
breeder community on the other. These two communities within the AEA were 
portrayed by one of our interviewee as the worst enemies of each other, each one 
defending its own vision and preferred technology of the future. 
 
6.4.4  The AEA and the CEGB 
 
While the AEA may have presented a relatively unified front in favour of the FBRs, 
conflict was very much established within the broader UK ‘nuclear establishment’. 
Perhaps the most fundamental tension was that between the AEA ‘scientists’ on the 
one hand and the more practice-oriented and economy-conscious engineers within the 
CEGB. A prominent example of the CEGB’s scepticism was a paper by Eric 
Carpenter, head of reactor physics at the CEGB’s Berkeley Nuclear Laboratories, 
presented in an international conference on “Fast Reactor Power Stations” in March 
1974. The paper took a highly sceptical attitude towards fast breeders, underlining in 
particular the reliability problems that the thermal reactors had suffered, the “brochure 
assessments” on which thermal reactor choice had frequently been based, and the high 
cost of fast breeders.  
 
The documentary material provides frequent references to the scepticism of the CEGB 
with regard to fast breeders. For example, as early as 1976, Kenward (1976b, 171) 
explained the support of CEGB to wave power by its capacity to undermine the 
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development of fast breeders, noting that the CEGB seems to “have an aversion to 
breeder reactors; it pounces on any development that could make them unnecessary”. 
However, in the early 1980s, the CEGB still officially considered fast breeders as the 
logical next step from thermal reactors, provided that the technical feasibility of fuel 
fabrication and reprocessing could be established.57 Later, the proposals for energy 
sector liberalisation in the late 1980s provoked profound unintended effects within the 
CEGB, notably by diminishing its interest towards nuclear power in general. Winskel 
(2002, 457) evokes John Baker as a personification of this reversal: as CEGB 
Managing Director, Baker argued that nuclear had ‘by far the cheapest generating 
cost’, while just four years later, as Chief Executive of National Power, he portrayed 
nuclear as ‘a restriction on the CEGB’s ability to compete’. Whilst the nuclear 
physicist Lord Marshall continued to display a reverential commitment to nuclear 
technology, Baker, a former civil servant, quickly abandoned his allegiance.” 
(Winskel 2002, 457) 
 
Illustrative of the widening gap between the AEA’s and CEGB’s operating logic 
during the process of electricity sector privatisation was the change in the personal 
opinion by Walter Marshall. Conway (1989, 64) hence notes that despite having 
advocated fast breeders as the “sensible next step in nuclear power” during his time at 
the AEA, “since becoming a captain of incipiently private industry he has more or less 
told the government to fund the work itself, and the government's response has been 
virtually to drop the project”. 
 
6.5 Policy and Politics  
6.5.1 British industrial policy – or the absence of it?  
 
The absence of a concerted effort and strategy to build national champions and 
develop national industries has been a defining feature of British policy in much of 
the post-War era, and evoked by most interviewees – who often mentioned the 
coherence of the French industrial policy as an illustrative contrast to what they saw 
as the British absence of nuclear and industrial policy. As underlined by Rush et al. 
(1977, 97-98), the government policy in the 1950s and 1960s, which led to the 
multiplication of consortia building nuclear power, and the avoidance of consolidation 
of the industry, did not seem to achieve its objective of greater competition. What is 
more, it tended to spread resources too thinly, as none of the consortia alone had the 
sufficient design engineering capacity required to make successful reactors on a 
commercial scale (ibid.). The economic crisis following the first oil crisis accelerated 
the decline of the British manufacturing industry, and probably did not help the 
nuclear industry either. Furthermore, some interviewees, notably those speaking in 
favour of fast breeder technology, considered this “lack of coherence” as a major 
shortcoming and a reason for the decline of fast breeders, while others questioned 
                                                
57 Britain joins European breeder club. New Scientist, 8 September 1983, p. 669. 
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=aBUDS_G-
SU8C&pg=PA669&lpg=PA669&dq=CEGB+fast+breeder&source=bl&ots=QkzVVo69lL&sig=FqgC6
9uLAAv7zCLNghV3TCFBOHI&hl=en&ei=E3OxTbzQPIau8QOHhrWWDA&sa=X&oi=book_result
&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=CEGB%20fast%20breeder&f=false. 
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whether such a policy was needed. According to this latter line of argument there was 
no reason why the UK could not operate nuclear plants without necessarily having its 
own nuclear technology, let alone fast breeder technology. Some of our interviewees 
put the argument somewhat provocatively claiming that that the UK history of fast 
breeders was perhaps actually a prime example of good industrial policy: one should 
not invest in a technology that recurrently fails to deliver on its economic promise.  
 
The argument put forward by the AEA informants was obviously different: the 
problem with British industrial policy was its lack of orientation, coherence and long-
term character – the “inability to stick to a policy for longer than a couple of years”. 
Since these interviewees had not given up their perception of fast breeders as the 
ultimate objective of a ‘rational’ policy on nuclear energy, and given the long period 
of R&D required to bring fast breeders into being, they argued that the government 
should take the responsibility for continued funding for fast breeder R&D. The 
arguments of climate change and ‘sustainable use of the resource’ were further 
brought forward to support the commitment to the development of fast breeders. 
 
Yet ‘industrial nationalism’ had not completely disappeared from the British nuclear 
politics even by the 1970s. This type of nationalism was presumably strongest within 
the Labour party in the early 1970s. Not only did Labour support the construction of 
AGRs, but when Labour again took power in the early 70s, the party continued to 
support the SGWHR technology. However, even the Energy Secretary Tony Benn, 
described by one of our interviewees as a true ‘industrial nationalist’ conceded that 
the SWGHR would not be an economically viable technology. 
 
6.5.2 Declining political support 
 
While our evidence on the subject is patchy, it seems that the political support for fast 
breeders in the UK followed a trajectory similar to the one observed in France, with 
the 1970s as the crucial decade in which the decline and doubt decisively set in. A 
number of factors contributed to the declining political support. Many of the above-
mentioned external factors were common to both France and the UK, such as the oil 
crisis and the subsequent rise in the priority given to the construction of thermal 
reactors, stagnating electricity demand, declining uranium prices and the gradually 
rising public concern about nuclear safety and proliferation risks. However, in 
contrast with France, the nuclear industry in the UK had a rather dismal record in 
developing its thermal reactor programme. Perhaps even more crucially, the prototype 
reactor in Dounreay had suffered from continuous technical difficulties – again in 
contrast with the relative success of its counterpart, Phénix, in France. Furthermore, 
the intense battles – and political log-rolling – around the choice of the thermal 
reactor type in the 1970s further eroded the legitimacy of the nuclear establishment. 
According to Patterson (2010, 84), the political support for a commercial fast breeder 
reactor was withering away in the mid-1970s, and therefore the apparent “closing of 
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ranks within the UK nuclear establishment” in favour of the construction of 
commercial FBRs.58 was not sufficient to ensure the advancement of the programme. 
 
The significance of the entry in power of the Thatcher government was recognised by 
all interviewees. In particular, the shift in government accelerated the decline in the 
political power of the AEA. Fast breeders were no longer useful as a tool in 
Thatcher’s attempts to bring down the political power of the miners’ unions, even 
though, at the beginning of its mandate, the Thatcher government seems to have given 
a serious thought to the possibility of continuing R&D on fast breeders. Moreover, 
Thatcher earned the respect of at least some of the nuclear scientists and engineers, 
and was described by one of our AEA informants as “extremely intelligent and 
scientifically literate – by far the most scientifically intelligent of our prime 
ministers”. However, while Thatcher had – according to one our interviewees – “huge 
trust in nuclear”, the government took great care to keep the options open and a keen 
eye on the economic performance and value for money. This was also the approach 
that Thatcher adopted towards the AEA – paramount for decisions concerning the 
AEA was whether the organisation was going to deliver on its mission and provide 
good value for money.  
 
The electricity market liberalisation and privatisation introduced by the Thatcher 
government has frequently been described as the origin of the long period of decline 
of the UK nuclear industry since the mid-1980s, and the same explanation was used 
by many of our interviewees to explain the demise of the fast breeder programme. 
While the closer economic scrutiny introduced by Thatcher undoubtedly contributed 
to the end of the fast breeder “dream”, the evidence seems to indicate that the 
privatisation alone could not explain the decline. Rather, the underlying philosophy 
underpinning privatisation – in particular the strong emphasis on economic 
performance – to a large extent existed already prior to the actual act of privatisation, 
and had substantially weakened the fast breeder programme. 
 
6.5.3 Privatisation, liberalisation and the ‘economic dogmatism’ 
 
Arguably, the lack of short and medium-term economic profitability – further 
compromised by the high investments in R&D to develop the technology – were 
among the main factors that brought an end to fast breeder development in most 
countries, including Britain. The fundamental change in the criteria for economic 
assessment of nuclear energy brought about by the energy sector liberalisation plans 
in the 1980s was probably the single most important factor that contributed to the 
decline of FBRs’ attractiveness. Fast breeders were called into question on cost 
grounds also by industry insiders. For instance, the magazine Nuclear Engineering 
International, in 1983, called into question “the vast sums that have been spent and the 
much greater sums that will need to be spent before the fast reactor can become a 
commercial option for electricity utilities” (Patterson 2010, 86) 
 
                                                
58 In 1977, the Select committee on science and technology recommended that a commercial fast 
breeder reactor be built, and John Hill – the chairman of the AEA at the time – concurred (Patterson 
2010, 84). 
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The discussion on the economics of fast breeders brings us back to the question of 
‘external’ versus ‘internal’ factors in affecting the development of a technology. For 
the fast breeder advocates, economics was clearly an ‘external’ factor that could only 
hamper and distort research towards fast breeders. The alleged short-sightedness 
introduced by the emphasis on economic efficiency and project-based management 
could only harm the objective of long-term development of a nuclear technology, 
which would represent ‘sustainable use of the resource’ (uranium). For the critics and 
‘economically-minded agnostics’ (the majority among our interviewees), the 
introduction of economic performance criteria was necessary in order to bring the 
nuclear scientists and engineers ‘down to earth’, and prevent undue costs to society 
from scientific ‘fantasising’. To the extent that they are based on the premise of 
autonomous ‘technological’ or ‘economic’ analysis, both of these perspectives are 
flawed. While the FBR advocates tended to assume that a technology can be judged 
on its technical performance and potential alone, those arguing in the spirit of ‘pure’ 
free market economics make a similar assumption about the existence of independent 
and unquestionable economic fundamentals. By contrast, experience has over and 
again demonstrated the dependence of the outcomes of economic analysis on the 
underlying assumptions (e.g. Hodgson 1989), as well as the inseparability of 
technological performance from the broader economic, institutional and political 
context in which a given technology is being developed (e.g. Latour 1992). 
 
While decision-making on fast breeders – and on nuclear power more generally – 
became more open to perusal by participants outside the ‘inner circle’ of nuclear 
experts, this happened primarily through the introduction of greater economic 
scrutiny. It could be argued that the relative abundance of argumentation in the UK 
around the costs of nuclear energy and fast breeders in the 1980s was partly a 
reflection of Thatcher government’s efforts to introduce economic liberalism. Many 
academic scholars and independent experts then seized the opportunity of contesting 
government’s own policy, precisely in order to check the government’s adherence to 
its principles of economic efficiency. As economics became the central instrument 
used by the various parties in energy policy debate, the supporters of fast breeders 
found it increasingly difficult to defend their arguments, which tended to reason “as if 
economics did not matter”. A typical example of the way in which economic logic 
was employed in order to uncover the allegedly faulty rhetoric of fast breeder 
proponents is provided by Sweet (1982, 19-20), in his refutation of Walter Marshall’s 
“energy value” argument: 
 
“Walter Marshall's… concept that the UK 'needs' the programme because 
it needs the energy from uranium… is an appeal that lies outside the 
efficient use of national resources, as understood by economists. 
Exploitation of uranium in the earth's crust is not in itself a justification 
for nuclear power, no more for example than it is a reason per se that we 
should mine sea bed minerals just because they are there… I therefore 
disagree in principle with Marshall's statement that 'In an energy hungry 
world the idea of burying spent fuel and not making use of it is grotesque'. 
I should certainly regard it… even more grotesque to divert scarce 
resources from those areas of the world that presently suffer severe 
deprivation, in order to build fast reactors.  
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Sweet further denounces what he considers an excessively value-laden approach 
adopted by Marshall, which according to Sweet (1982, 19-20) “may be ideologically 
appealing to some but is not a satisfactory way to argue the case for a particular 
technology.” By contrast, “[t]he acceptance of a principle of economic evaluation is 
central to public decision making, and it is a matter of the greatest importance 
whether the fast reactor debate will take place within the context of an economic 
method, applied with some rigour, or whether the obfuscation that the energy value 
argument has cast over the last public inquiry at Windscale might be present at the 
next.” 
 
6.6 NGOs and public opinion 
 
We have only limited evidence on the role of public and NGO opposition against fast 
breeders and nuclear power. Most of our interviewees considered public opposition as 
having had only minor importance, yet this finding possibly reflects two biases in our 
research setting. Firstly, only two of the interviewees had participated in nuclear 
policy and debate as active representatives of civil society. Secondly, and perhaps 
more importantly, the interviewees probably interpreted the term ‘influence’ more 
narrowly than we had wished – as direct and concrete impact on policy decisions 
concerning the fast breeder programme. Hence, Patterson provides plenty of evidence 
to demonstrate that the mounting public concern over the health effects of Dounreay – 
but also, and above all, of nuclear energy in general – precipitated the decline of the 
fast breeder programme. Indeed, social movements certainly did not contribute much 
to the concrete decisions on fast breeders, and no direct causal link can be established 
between the action by those movements on the one hand, and the decisions on the 
other. If there was an impact from social mobilisation, it certainly was more indirect 
and subtle. For example the discovery of a radioactive particle of spent fuel on 
beaches adjacent to Dounreay in 1983 and the Chernobyl accident were, according to 
this view, decisive in the decision to abandon R&D into fast breeders.  
 
However, the observation about the weak impact of citizen opposition on decisions 
over fast breeders in the UK is in line with findings from earlier research, which have 
concluded that the anti-nuclear NGOs and citizen movements in the UK were weak in 
the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Kitschelt 1986; Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995, 246; 
Twena 2006). Hence, Chafer (1985) notes that the core of the anti-nuclear movement 
in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s was within the peace movement – targeting the 
military use of nuclear – while in France there was a strong opposition against nuclear 
power until the end of the 1970s. Rucht (1995, 287), in turn, places Britain within the 
same group with the Nordic countries and Italy as countries with very weak citizen 
resistance between the mid-70s and late 1980s against nuclear power (with weaker 
anti-nuclear movements only in Canada and Belgium). Finally, Rüdig (1990, 352) 
draws attention to one specificity of the British anti-nuclear movement, that is, its 
seeming inability to take advantage of the considerable difficulties that the UK 
nuclear sector had encountered throughout its history:  
 
“Throughout the history of nuclear power in Britain, many delays were not due to 
anti-nuclear opposition but due to problems located within the industry. The British 
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anti-nuclear movement found itself largely unable to exploit the difficulties in the 
nuclear sector.” 
 
As co-founder of the UK Friends of the Earth and arguably one of the most prominent 
experts of the history of UK nuclear politics, Patterson considers the Flowers report as 
a major milestone, while nevertheless not seeing it as the primary reason for the 
abandonment of fast breeders. Allegedly Flowers was the first since a long time to 
suggest that there were “serious fundamental difficulties” in the fast breeder 
technology (Patterson 2010, 83). A major factor concerning the influence of the 
Flowers report was its timing, at the moment when rumours circulated that a 
commercial fast breeder reactor would finally be constructed (Patterson 2010, 82). 
According to Patterson (2010, 84), “[a]fter the publication of the Flowers report, on 
22 September 1976, the prospect for even a single large fast breeder in Britain became 
distinctly bleaker”. This can be interpreted as a manifestation of the elemental role 
that one of our interviews attributed to NGO action in destabilising and weakening the 
‘nuclear regime’ internationally, as it consistently drew public attention especially to 
problems of nuclear safety and proliferation. This eroded the trust and political capital 
that the fast breeder reactor community would have needed to make fast breeders a 
reality. Such international influence was also evoked in a news article published in 
Europe Energy (1992), after the UK government’s decision to withdraw from the 
European fast breeder cooperation: “This comes five months after the French 
Government, under pressure from ecological groups, had to suspend starting up the 
French Superphénix fast-breeder reactor.” 
 
Most of the interviewees, however, judged the role of public opposition in a way 
similar to that of the Flowers report: neither had much impact on decisions, but they 
possibly helped shape the general atmosphere. The report by Pearson (1979) from an 
energy and fast breeder conference in 1979 provides an example of such changes in 
‘atmosphere’: apparently public participation was recognised as a major need by the 
conference participants, yet a topic that had hitherto attracted too little attention by 
policymakers and researchers. Most interviewees agreed that the Flowers report was 
potentially powerful precisely because its chairman came from the inside of the 
‘nuclear establishment’. Some conceded to the suggestion that the report had 
nevertheless produced an effect by somewhat changing the tone of the debate and for 
the first time seriously calling into question the reasonableness of developing fast 
breeder technology. One interviewee noted that while the Flowers report “led to a lot 
of good things”, for example helped to foster increased citizen engagement in 
planning and decision-making, it did not really influence the FBR project.  
 
A further possible reason why NGO action may have had an impact, but only 
indirectly, was evoked by one of our interviewees. The anti-nuclear NGOs in the UK 
gave a clear priority in their campaigning to the opposition against reprocessing. Their 
judgement was that ‘attacking’ fast breeders would not be the best use of resources, 
since reprocessing was seen as the crucial and vulnerable link in the entire logic 
underpinning the ‘all nuclear’ vision. This prioritisation was presumably further 
reinforced by the belief, expressed by many of our interviewees, that there were 
inherent technological weaknesses that would inevitably lead to the demise of FBRs. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT AND WHO KILLED THE FAST 
BREEDER REACTORS IN BRITAIN? 
 
In this concluding section, we shall examine, one by one, the various explanations 
given by our interviewees and expressed in the documentary material concerning 
notably the reasons for the abandonment of the UK fast breeder programme. The 
presentation does not seek to ‘reveal the truth’, or provide the ’correct’ answer to the 
question of why the fast breeders were abandoned. By contrast, the aim is merely to 
briefly summarise and analyse the logic behind the different arguments. 
 
7.1 Economics and technology: autonomy or dependence? 
 
Probably the most frequently expressed argument was that the fast breeders were 
economically unviable from the very beginning and that their poor economic 
performance was ‘revealed’ once the programme was subjected to greater economic 
and financial scrutiny. Another variant of the economic argument was that the fast 
breeders might have been economically unprofitable in the short run, but that their 
medium- and long-term potential was destroyed by the excessive emphasis on 
economics introduced progressively from the mid-70s onwards. The decline in 
uranium prices was mentioned by almost all of our interviewees as a major 
component undermining the logic behind FBRs. According to the proponents of fast 
breeders, the technology as such is tried and proven in theory and at small scale, yet 
they considered the major mistake of UK nuclear policy to have been the application 
of strictly commercial evaluation criteria to the assessment of a technology that had 
not yet reached a deployment stage. Since the fast breeder advocates deemed the 
technology as indispensable in solving the world’s energy problems in the future, they 
criticised such economics-dominated thinking about leading to short-termism and 
working against the long-term sustainability objectives.  
 
A frequent counterpart and parallel to the economic argument was the claim that the 
technology was either ‘objectively’ proven or ‘inherently’ flawed and unviable. The 
proponents of the former view repeatedly asserted that the technical viability of the 
technology had been demonstrated, that the technical problems encountered in the 
application of the technology were related only to the ‘conventional’, non-nuclear, 
part of the technology, and that R&D into fast breeders should be vigorously pursued 
in order to prepare for the inevitable future scarcity of energy and uranium resources. 
The critics of FBRs, in turn, considered that since the technology was simply too 
complicated to be economically viable within any foreseeable timescale, and given 
that numerous alternative electricity-generation options were available, it would not 
make sense to invest in excessively complicated technology, “merely to boil a kettle 
of water”. From this perspective, there was no mystery: the FBR technology is 
inherently unviable and it simply killed itself, without any need for ‘external 
intervention’. 
 
Common to a lot of the argumentation of both the proponents and critics of FBRs was 
the in our view questionable assumption that the economics and the technical viability 
of a technology could be assessed independently, in isolation of the broader context 
within which the technology is being developed. The fundamental shift in the 
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‘goalposts’ of the evaluation of various energy technologies that was brought about by 
the preparation for the liberalisation of the UK energy supply industry provided a 
particularly vivid example of the contingency of economic assessment on the 
underlying framework and hypotheses. The assumption about the ‘inherent’ 
(un)viability of the technology is likewise highly deficient: the economic 
performance, including notably the predictions concerning energy forecasts, and the 
development of the various alternative technologies, is part and parcel of the process 
whereby the viability of a technology is constructed. 
 
7.2 Hype, disappointments and ‘the reality’ 
 
One strand of argument highlighted the apparent contradiction between the extremely 
optimistic visions from the 50s and 60s concerning the FBRs, and empirical evidence. 
This gap between the expectations and ‘the reality’ meant that there was simply no 
way the technology could actually survive. To illustrate the argument, a comparison 
was made with nuclear fusion: it was far easier for the proponents of fusion energy to 
entertain the idea this technology would actually provide a solution to the energy 
problems, because fusion had not yet been tested on any significant scale. This view 
again highlights the socially constructed nature of the viability of a technology: an 
essential element in the construction of the viability of a technology consists of the 
confrontation of the technology with its external environment. However, contrary to 
the assumption that the FBRs were tested against ‘the reality’ – which turned out to be 
different from the one assumed in the optimistic predictions of the 1950s and 1960s – 
it would be more accurate to argue that the fast breeder project failed to adapt itself to 
its constantly changing environment and institutional context. As many examples 
from the development of technologies in other sectors have demonstrated (e.g. Konrad 
2006; Geels et al. 2007), the explanations for the emergence of over-optimistic 
forecasts are manifold. On the one hand, especially on technological ‘megaprojects’, 
which have no precedents against which one could compare their likely viability, 
forecasting is often in the hands of the ‘insiders’ who have a natural disposition to 
‘believe’ in the potential of the technology (e.g. Flyvbjerg 2007). On the other hand, 
the proponents of a technology also have an interest in exaggerating its future 
potential, for instance in order to attract research funding and gather political support 
needed to render the technology viable. In exaggerating the potential, the advocates 
nevertheless risk compromising the very viability of the technology. By precipitating 
the inevitable disappointment once the inflated expectations fail to materialise, the 
advocates hence undermine the forces that are essential for the construction of the 
viability of the technology. While this type of ‘hype-disappointment’ cycles are a 
frequent phenomenon in technology development, in the case of FBRs, the strong 
independence of the fast breeder community – notably the AEA – accentuated the 
disappointment once the AEA was forced to come out from its isolation. 
 
7.3 External events 
  
In view of the considerations put forward above, the argument frequently evoked 
especially by our AEA informants about the importance of ‘external events’ can be 
called into question. The proponents of FBRs frequently underlined that the decline of 
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uranium and oil prices and the alleged ‘excessive alarmism’ generated by ‘incidents’ 
such as Chernobyl and the Three Mile Island, precipitated the decline of FBRs. 
‘Overreaction’ to such ‘incidents’ would have made nuclear energy in general and fast 
breeders in particular a political hot potato, which the politicians did not dare to touch. 
Therefore, in the final analysis, it would have been the lack of political courage that 
led politicians to avoid difficult decisions that would have been in the long-term 
interest of Britain and the humankind. According to this line of thinking, similar 
‘external’ factors included a wide range of issues such as the domination of economic 
rationality, which the Thatcher government introduced in the sector.  Again, this view 
was underpinned by an assumption about the autonomy of technology: rather than 
becoming viable through the confrontation and ‘negotiation’ with its environment, a 
technology would be independent from its social context, and constantly threatened 
by external forces devoid of sufficient understanding of the nature of the technology. 
Such an approach also entails a particular view of the nature of expertise: the only 
truly valid form of expertise in the area of nuclear technology would be that of nuclear 
scientists and engineers, while economists and politicians would be devoid of a proper 
understanding of the ‘true’ nature of the technology and could therefore only 
‘interfere’ in the process, with unavoidably harmful impact as the main result. 
 
7.4 Social & safety concerns 
 
Another ‘external’ factor that the many FBR advocates perceived as an obstacle to the 
presumably harmonious development of the technology was public opposition against 
nuclear energy in general and fast breeders in particular. However, most of our 
interviewees considered that public opposition and citizen movements had been of 
limited significance; protests never caused any significant changes in the actual 
decisions on fast breeders. One interviewee, with first-hand experience from anti-
nuclear movement, in turn, strongly emphasised the significance of public opposition, 
as elemental in eroding support for nuclear power in general, and destabilising the 
international ‘nuclear regime’. The civil society targeted its opposition against the 
“plutonium complex” – reprocessing, FBRs and MOX (mixed oxide fuel) – and 
refused to make a distinction between the military and civilian applications of nuclear 
technology. 
 
An alternative interpretation would see public opinion as an essential part of the 
context in which a technology is to be applied. Far from being external to the 
technology, the public opinion would be at the same time shaped by the development 
of the technology and one of the factors shaping its viability. An obvious example was 
the way in which the civil society exerted its impact on FBR economics: the 
numerous ‘incidents’ and accidents raised safety concerns among the public, led to 
citizen protests, and thereby increased the pressure on the authorities to tighten safety 
regulation which in turn increased the costs and reduced the economic attractiveness 
of nuclear energy and FBRs. As expressed by one of our interviewees, as “the world” 
became more concerned about safety issues, the FBRs gradually went out of fashion 
even among the pro-nuclear groups. Especially in the US, the price of nuclear energy 
increased progressively throughout the 1970s, and the Three Mile Island accident in 
1979 triggered very significant changes in safety regulation.  
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7.5 Political power play and declining political support 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the arguments put forward to explain the fall of the FBR 
project seldom made reference to strategic and tactical power play and ‘politicking’. 
By contrast, the dominant explanatory narratives emphasised, respectively, the 
inherent economic and financial unviability of the technology or its equally inherent 
viability, and the unrealistic expectations entertained by the nuclear scientists or the 
excessively short-term thinking by the policymakers. The most often evoked 
political/strategic motivations referred to what was described as the overwhelming 
political objective of Margaret Thatcher – crushing the power of the coal miners’ 
unions. According to this argument, Thatcher put aside her otherwise favourable view 
of nuclear technologies in general, once it became clear to her that the fast breeder 
technology would not help her to achieve her political objectives. Another example of 
strategic reasoning was the reference to the battle within the AEA between the 
proponents of nuclear fusion and fast breeder technologies. Hence, the demise of the 
fast breeders would have been partly a result of the victory of the proponents of fusion 
reactors in the battle for resources. 
 
Political power play was, however, clearly present in the process of FBR development 
in particular in the continuous decline of the influence of the AEA and the 
concomitant rise in the power of the CEGB in decisions concerning nuclear energy. 
These shifts provide a further illustration of the inseparability of economics, politics 
and technology. Firstly, the political objectives and ideological conviction of 
Margaret Thatcher were decisive in changing the criteria used for assessing energy 
policy options. Thatcher’s liberalisation agenda introduced a particular perspective to 
economic appraisal and greatly strengthened the weight of economics in political 
argumentation in general. Rather than an interference of economics in the sphere of 
technology, the ‘Thatcherite revolution’ was a manifestation of one specific way of 
constructing the economic argument. Secondly, the change of the ‘goalposts’ of 
appraisal had been in gestation all the way through the 1970s, and contributed to the 
decline of the political clout of the AEA. As underlined by Winskel (2002), it would 
be unhelpful to perceive the loss of power of the AEA as an external intrusion into the 
operation of an autonomous, ‘purely technological’ institution. Instead, this loss of 
power could be perceived as a result of the changing environment, entailing a shift in 
power relations between technology developers and engineers on the one hand, and 
the retailing and commercial side on the other hand. The AEA’s attempts to ‘black-
box’ (Winskel 2002, 456) the nuclear programme in order to retain its institutional 
status and influence can be seen as a key reason for the demise of the FBR 
programme: by isolating the technology from its institutional environment, the AEA 
in fact prevented the necessary process of adapting the technology to its context.  
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